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Abstract
In the search for the foundations of cognition philosophers often encounter 
a familiar problem - the problem of content. The problem of content is essentially 
the problem of how content, whether experiential or intentional, is possible. In 
practice providing a response to this problem involves providing an account of 
how an active self-consciousness is able to conceive/perceive, or in some way be 
consciousness ofx. The unique nature of this problem imposes significant 
constraints on the field of explanatory possibilities. Since the x which is to be 
accounted for is essentially the possibility of absolutely any x there is no y which 
is not also an x. Hence, nothing remains outside of the explanandum which can be 
appealed to in order to account for it without, to some extent, presupposing that 
which needs to be explained. In many of the theories we will examine overcoming 
this problem involves appealing to a transcendental “structure of awareness” 
which more often than not is composed of “universal-like” transcendental 
“entities” of indeterminate nature and ontological status. A major appeal of 
transcendental entities (e.g., forms, species, essences, pure categories, and 
dharmas) is that they can at least appear to provide a way of supplying the power 
of objective “determinateness” necessary to account for the possibility of 
determination without themselves being determinates (i.e., without presupposing 
content). The general strategy of appealing to such transcendental “entities” has, 
however, for some time been suspiciously regarded as it is unclear how such an 
appeal is able to avoid the aforementioned presupposition of content.
But if the appeal to transcendental cognizing intermediates is to be ‘ 
dismissed we may be left to face up to the fact that content simply “happens”- that 
the process of determination, of “judgment”, is a mysterious talent that can neither 
be taught nor understood. Through a critical examination of both Western and 
Eastern philosophical approaches to the problem of content this dissertation 
identifies and describes, insofar as is possible, “that” through which content is 
rendered possible. In so doing it draws attention to previously neglected points of 
contact between major philosophical traditions and clarifies the central issues 
surrounding the problem. The dissertation supports the conclusion that, although 
there is a need to acknowledge a particular role for a transcendental “self- 
consciousness” in providing a coherent response to the problem of content, the 
attempt to articulate a mechanism through which this role is fulfilled most likely 
misguided. Although it appears to be possible both to know something about this 
“self-consciousness”, and even to know it more directly, it cannot be understood 
in the usual sense.
Introduction
The original motivation for the investigations that are to follow was in part 
a desire to clarify and to find a coherent way to defend the anti-relativistic idea 
that “subjective” modes of experience such as music, art, poetry, ways of being, 
etc., were modes of understanding to which knowledge claims could be 
legitimately applied. Initial readings in a variety of disciplines including 
psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy led to a few core ideas that 
demanded clarification and further investigation.1 It seemed, for example, that the 
greatness of a piece of music was fundamentally inseparable from the immediate 
experience and understanding of the music itself. This immediate understanding, 
moreover, seemed to be bound up with a resonance that was, in some sense, 
occurring between the subject and the object. In order to explore these thoughts, 
and the possibility that they might somehow be of assistance in defending my 
anti-relativistic intuitions, it was necessary to undertake an investigation of 
existing theories concerned with the problem of how experience “comes about”. 
Readings in this area recommended to me by my supervisor led quickly away 
from psychology and towards a quintessential philosophical problem - the 
problem of content.
The problem of content is essentially the problem of how content, whether 
experiential or intentional, is possible. Although there are a variety of ways of
1 See appendix A for the relevant list of readings which led to this investigation but which did not 
make the final draft.
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explicating the problem perhaps the most familiar is in terms of the concept of 
judgment. It seems that knowing something to be F (e.g. a lamp) necessarily 
involves correctly judging it to be so. This fact applies obviously to theoretical 
matters but it seems to extend even to perception. So when, for example, one turns 
one’s head and perceives a lamp, the possibility of the veridicality of this 
perception implies that a judgment has somehow taken place within the “process” 
through which the lamp was rendered determinate (i.e., perceived). But since the 
idea of judgment implies an active self-consciousness to discriminate between 
things “seeming” one way and “being” another - simply put, a judge who can get 
matters right or wrong - the problem of how x is rendered determinate in 
perception is bound up with identifying how an active self-consciousness is able 
to perceive, or in some way grasp, x. In other words, it involves providing an 
account of the necessary conditions for the grasping of x, that is, of how a 
consciousness o fx  is possible. In practical terms this amounts to providing an 
account of the “process” through which x is rendered determinate and can be 
perceived as having been rendered determinate
As we will see the unique nature of this problem imposes significant 
constraints on the field of explanatory possibilities. Providing an explanation of 
some x  requires, of course, appealing to some y through which x  is rendered more 
understandable. The behavior of an apple, which has just been detached from a 
tree, for instance, is explained by appealing to the force of gravity. But in the case 
of the problem of content the x  that is to be explained is essentially the possibility 
of absolutely any x. Since there is no y  that is not also an x  nothing remains 
outside of the explanandum that can be appealed to in order to account for it
without, to some extent, presupposing that which needs to be explained. In other 
words, it seems impossible to identify something, which is not “content”, but 
which can function to account for its possibility. In many of the theories we will 
examine overcoming this problem involves appealing to a transcendental 
“structure of awareness” which more often than not is composed of “universal- 
like” transcendental “entities” of indeterminate nature and ontological status - an 
idea that can be traced back at least to Plato. A major appeal of such 
transcendental entities as, for example, forms, species, essences, pure categories, 
and dharmas, is that they can at least appear to provide a way of supplying the 
power of objective “determinateness” necessary to account for the possibility of 
determination without themselves being determinates (i.e., without presupposing 
content).
The general strategy of appealing to such transcendental “entities” has, 
however, for some time been suspiciously regarded as it is unclear how such an 
appeal is able to avoid the aforementioned presupposition of content. It seems that 
if transcendental entities are called upon to supply the “that” through which an 
object is rendered determinate then their function is that of intermediates in the 
determination process set between consciousness and the object. But as both Kant 
and Wittgenstein demonstrate such intermediates (e.g., rules) require 
interpretation, and since no interpretation interprets itself, they are unable to do 
the job for which they are designed. Appealing to intermediates in responding to 
the problem of content leads only to an infinite regress of intermediates and, if 
pressed, to the absurd conclusion that content is not possible. But if the appeal to 2
2 Cf., for example, Wittgenstein’s P.I. §§ 197-202, pp. 80-1, and § 265, pp. 93-4.
transcendental cognizing intermediates is to be dismissed we may be left to face up 
to the fact that content simply “happens”- that the process of determination, of 
“judgment”, is a mysterious talent that can be neither be taught nor understood. And 
now what, if any, coherent characterisation can be given to this “spontaneous 
happening” on which subject and world ultimately seems to depend? How are we to 
account for the possibility of content?
This is a question that seems to have been largely avoided by twentieth- 
century Anglo-American philosophy. We, however, through a critical review of 
both Western and Eastern philosophical approaches will seek to redress it and in 
so doing draw attention both to previously neglected points of contact between 
major philosophical traditions and to directions for future possible research. What 
follows then is in the first place an in depth examination of several theories, from 
a variety of philosophical and cultural backgrounds, which, in their own ways, 
address the problem of content and the issues which surround it. There is no 
attempt made here to “appropriate” concepts from theories in order to construct a 
philosophical system. Rather there is a striving towards the ideal of description 
and a concerted attempt to keep speculative-deductive commitments to a 
minimum - particularly with respect to metaphysics. But we will not merely be 
concerned with exegesis. Our goal is to identify and describe, insofar as is 
possible, that which renders content possible. In order for our investigations to 
progress in this endeavour it will be necessary to make comparisons between 
concepts from radically different philosophical and cultural traditions. This kind 
of comparison, of course, requires sensitivity to context and a thorough 
understanding of each tradition. Consequently, each of the six chapters attempts to
develop the depth of understanding that is necessary to identify comparable 
theoretical elements and to justify those comparisons.
Considered as a whole the dissertation supports the conclusion that, 
although there is a need to acknowledge a particular role for a transcendental 
“self-consciousness” in providing a coherent response to the problem of content, 
the attempt to articulate a mechanism through which this role, is fulfilled most 
likely misguided. Although it appears to be possible both to know something 
about this “self-consciousness”, and even to know it more directly, it cannot be 
understood in the usual sense.
We will begin our investigations in chapter one by concerning ourselves 
with the problem of content as we have described it above in terms of judgment. 
Judgment, we first observe, can generally be divided into two types: practical and 
theoretical - a division which seems to inform the entire philosophical debate about 
judgment. Following a brief historical introduction we settle into a detailed 
examination of Kant who demonstrates that formulating the main problem on a 
model of theoretical judgment leads only to an infinite regress and to the demand 
for an account of practical judgment -  that is, an account of the functioning of that 
intuitive spontaneity which, he suggests, plays an active role in the determination 
of all things? Kant’s failure to cope adequately with this problem in the first 
Critique and his apparent attempt to re-address it in the third Critique are then 
explored in detail. We conclude by observing that, for Kant, reason’s application of 
rules (of judgment) in acts of subsumption depends ultimately on a “that” which, 
being inherently contradictory (e.g., a law unto itself), cannot be grasped by the 
faculty which necessarily employs laws, rules, principles, etc., i.e., the faculty of
understanding. Fortunately, Kant has not left us completely empty handed with 
respect to the ground of the judgment as he connects it intimately with 
supersensible being through his moral theory. The moral and beautiful it seems go 
some way toward revealing the nature of “that” which is purposive for cognition.
Chapter two investigates phenomenological approaches to the problem of 
content with an emphasis on the work of Max Scheler. Scheler believes that he 
knows exactly where Kant goes astray. According to Scheler the source of the 
trouble is the division of experience into sensible intuitions and formal a priori 
processes - an error that he suggests can, at least in part, be accounted for by 
Kant’s ignorance of ‘phenomenological facts’ that exhibit what is already 
contained in receptive experience. Central to every account of how understanding 
grasps its object is a tension between the need for a subject (a someone to 
understand) and the need to rid the process of understanding of this subject in 
order to open up the possibility of objective experience. One strategy to deal with 
this problem is to postulate a realm of non-formal “ideal objects” through which 
content is somehow constituted. Such a material a priori might provide a means 
of accounting for the possibility of experience without needing to refer to a 
process of judgment. In chapter two we examine the possibility that the 
application of transcendental “entities” and “processes” has nothing to do with the 
how content is possible. But rather that content is manifested by means of the 
influence of a non-formal, or material, a priori structure of awareness. 
Unfortunately, some aspects of this particular phenomenological approach will be 
shown to be unsatisfactory and in the third chapter we return again to what is 
perhaps a more conventional approach.
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In chapter three we turn to our attentions to the thirteenth century and the 
writings of Meister Eckhart. Although Eckhart’s primary concern is “to explain 
what the holy Christian faith and the two Testaments maintain” 3 he often does so 
through the appropriation of fundamentally Aristotelian ideas. Eckhart’s 
explanations of how the mind comes to determine the world relies, at least in part, 
on the idea that ideal objects “exist potentially” in the core of the mind (“the 
One”). Eckhart’s analysis of the how the mind functions to render things 
determinate is often put in terms of a “movement” of illumination through which 
the potentially existent Forms are rendered actually so. But Eckhart’s account is 
ultimately not dependent on there “being” a proliferation of such entities either 
potentially or actually. In the final analysis Eckhart suggests that there is no 
“being”, either determinate or indeterminate in the ground of the mind. The mind, 
in its capacity to render intelligible forms, is fundamentally groundless. 
Unfortunately, considered as a response to the problem of content Eckhart’s 
analysis is perhaps unsatisfactory because, as with Kant’s account, it suggests that 
content is ultimately possible by means of a “that” about which nothing can be 
known. It is here that Eckhart, like Kant, draws our attention to a fundamental 
connection between this “that” and a “supersensible” reality with moral 
“attributes”.
Chapter four begins by observing that the apparent permanence and 
substantiality of our everyday experience, which provides the context within 
which Kant’s problem arises, is held by Buddhism to be a partial view which 
needs to be balanced with the insight that all phenomena, including “self’, are
3 E. Colledge and B. McGinn, Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, 
and Defense, London: SPCK, 1981, p. 123.
ultimately impermanent (anitya) and without any substantial or eternal essence 
(ianatman). Since Buddhism adheres to a philosophy of universal flux wherein 
anything existent is momentary it holds that a “subject” emerges with a “world”. 
Hence, Buddhist philosophy is generally inconsistent with the idea that there is 
some “self’ which can be known a priori of “acts of synthesis” and through which 
content is rendered possible. Thus, any “that” on which content is to rest, i.e., any 
“that whereby a synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes possible”, must 
itself be a priori to the appearance of “subject” and “world”. Chapter four 
examines how this is possible in the philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism.
In chapter five we note that the findings of the previous chapters come into 
conflict with some of the conclusions that John McDowell arrives at in “Mind and 
World”. Of particular interest is McDowell’s attempt to mate Kant’s notion of 
“spontaneity” to a pregnant notion of a “second nature” and to draw, from this 
mating, conclusions concerning the interdependent arising of a meaningful world. 
Although sympathetic to McDowell’s basic aim of reconciling “reason and 
nature” in responding to the problem of content, this chapter is critical of some 
aspects of McDowell’s approach. In particular the chapter takes issue with aspects 
of McDowell’s appropriation of certain aspects of Kantian and Aristotelian 
philosophy. McDowell relies on Aristotle’s notion of how practical wisdom is 
acquired to explicate his argument that the acquisition and employment of 
conceptual capacities by the understanding is not “spooky”. But, as we will show, 
Aristotle’s account of the acquisition of “practical wisdom” as a kind of second 
nature relies on an augmented platonism in a way that renders its acquisition 
“spooky” in a manner not anticipated by McDowell. Although there certainly is a
mundane aspect to the acquisition of “practical wisdom”, the necessity of 
experience with particulars to that acquisition, in light of Aristotle’s theory that 
particulars are constituted through the employment of potential “forms”, demands 
that the employment of such potential “forms” is requisite for the acquisition of 
“practical wisdom”. Hence, put simply, the “spooky” part of the story is required 
to account for the acquisition of the “mundane” part. Moreover, we will argue that 
Kant’s notion of “spontaneity” cannot, in any straightforward manner, be plucked 
from his transcendental project and mated to a fundamentally Aristotelian notion 
of a second nature. In this way we will attempt to focus the material of the 
previous chapters and lead to some general conclusions concerning the role of a 
priori structure of awareness in accounts of content.
Finally, in chapter six we examine an influential line of contemporary 
thought on the problem of content as it is elucidated in Susan Hurley’s recent 
book Consciousness in Action. Like McDowell, Hurley is concerned both with 
accounting for the constitutive power of “spontaneity” and providing a role for 
normativity without invoking anything “spooky”. But unlike McDowell she 
employs contemporary cognitive psychological and philosophical theorizing to 
outline a complex alternative to theories that rely on transcendental 
intermediaries. At the heart of Hurley’s alternative theory is the hypothesis that 
complex dynamic systems are central to cognitive performance. Hurley’s work is 
part of a renewed interest among philosophers and cognitive scientists in the use 
of dynamics as a framework for thinking about cognitive functioning. Central to 
Hurley’s approach is the hypothesis that a constitutive interdependence of 
perception and action emerges from dynamic feedback systems of natural causal 
relations. This interdependence, she suggests, has implications for providing a
response to the problem of content. In chapter six we will examine Hurley’s 
approach and attempt to evaluate its explanatory potential with respect to our 
problem. In the course of our examination we will have occasion to observe 
certain consistencies that exist between some of Hurley’s findings and some of the 
philosophies of previous chapters. These consistencies point to a possibility that 
Hurley does not address. Buddhist philosophy contains a line of thought, which 
also does not rely on transcendental intermediaries, does not presuppose content, 
and hence is not subject to infinite regresses. We will complete the dissertation 
with an evaluation of this line of thought in light of our previous discussions.
Chapter 1
Immanuel Kant and the Problem of Judgment
1. A recent book entitled The Concept o f Political Judgment aims to 
“uncover and clarify what we really mean when we say that this or that person 
has, or this or that action was the product of, good judgment”.4 The author devotes 
a large portion of his book to a critical examination of how judgment has 
historically been addressed by philosophy because he considers political judgment 
to be a species of the larger genus of judgment itself. The book is composed of 
four large chapters the first of which is devoted to the intellectual history 
surrounding the problem of political judgment and so does not concern us. The 
second chapter, however, begins in earnest to take up an examination of judgment 
simpliciter by informing us that the process by which judgments are made has for 
a long time been understood on a model of categorical subsumption, a process 
which overtly resembles the activity of placing things in boxes. Thus, for instance, 
the judgment that Churchill was a statesman utilizes the universal concept - 
statesman - to categorize a particular - Churchill.
Any judgment—as the bringing together somehow of a universal and
particular—would seem to require at least three things: (1) the universal qua
4 P. J. Steinberger, The Concept of Political Judgment. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1993, p. viii.
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concept must be identified, and this means being able to specify at least some 
of the conceptual features that make it what it is; (2) the particular must be 
identified, and this means being able to specify at least some of the 
characteristics that individuate it; and (3) there must be a mental faculty that 
allows us to establish some kind of demonstrable and explicable connection 
between the universal’s features and the particular’s characteristics such that 
we can say with some justification that “X is (or is not) Y.” Together these 
three presuppositions may be thought to compose the basis of a tripartite 
model o f judgment.5
To accept this tripartite model of judgment has historically meant that one 
endorses one or another form of rationalism, i.e., views which emphasize the role 
of reason. This may be due in part to the first and second requirements which 
seem to entail conceptual definitions specified in terms of some or other logical or 
linguistic tradition that will allow for the specification of rules of subsumption 
(e.g., Churchill was a statesman just in case ...).
2. Plato’s Gorgias offers an early defense of just such a model of judgment.
The Gorgias, which is an examination of rhetoric and the business of teaching 
rhetoric, defends a fundamental dichotomy between craft-activity (technen) and 
experience-activity (empeirian). Technen, as its ancient Greek origin suggests, is 
closely related to technical activity characterized by the application of rules and 
principles applied toward the achievement of some end. For Plato, it is the 
existence of these rules and principles that permits true judgments to be made. 
Thus, for example, an engineer judges how much concrete is needed in the
5 Ibid., p. 91.
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foundation of a building by applying the rules and principles that define his 
vocation. Empernan, on the other hand, such as cookery, which aims to make 
things delicious, are not able to provide the explicit rules and principles which 
would be necessary for true judgments to be made. According to Plato, taste is 
random and inexplicable. When one claims that something is delicious one is 
simply commenting that one finds eating it a pleasurable experience. But since not 
everyone finds the same things pleasurable there are no reliable defining 
characteristics by which to ascertain whether something is or is not pleasurable. 
Consequently, judgments concerning whether something is or is not delicious are, 
strictly speaking, not judgments at all, but merely indications of preference. Thus, 
whereas technén comports well with the tripartite model of judgment empeirian 
does not.6
But with respect to judgment there are good reasons to believe that the 
distinction between craft-activities and experience-activities cannot be coherently 
maintained. As Steinberger notes, Plato himself concedes that for any given 
experience-activity some individuals seem to be more proficient than others and 
that this proficiency relies on experience with reliable particulars. The knack of a 
good cook is thus dependent on such things as; a familiarity with ingredients, 
knowledge of the effects of heat on those ingredients, and of the apparent likes 
and dislikes of his patrons. The existence of good chefs implies their reliability 
and the reliability of the ingredients to respond in predictable ways. For a chef to 
consistently prepare a good prime rib dinner, for example, he must know a prime 
rib cut when he sees one, and be able to combine it with the proper heat and
6 For a more complete treatment of this issue cf. ibid., pp. 94-102.
braising technique. Thus, good chefs have knowledge of universals, knowledge of 
particulars and a capacity, however unreflective, for bringing together particulars 
and universals. Consequently, experience-activities, such as cookery, appear to 
pass all three tests of the tripartite model of judgment.
Unfortunately, this Platonic dichotomy between craft-activity and 
experience-activity informs the entire debate about the concept of judgment. It 
first recurs in an augmented form in Aristotle’s sixth book of the Nicomachean 
Ethics with the distinction between theoretical wisdom (sophia) and practical 
wisdom (phronésis). At the time that Aristotle was writing, the popular usage of 
sophia described the skill of clever craftsmen, poets and artists7 8and phronésis 
was often used as a synonym. However, Aristotle refines the use of these terms 
such that sophia is reserved for that type of analytical knowledge acquired 
through, and utilized in, the process of discovering what is objectively the case in 
the world (e.g., scientific knowledge) and phronésis is made up of an intuitive 
kind of knowledge utilized in the study of human affairs and other “subjective” 
matters - that is, things which are capable of going this way or that. Phronésis also 
includes a judgmental capacity that enables one to know what to do in any given 
situation. This is an immediate and unreflective ability that Aristotle likens to a 
kind of perception (aisthesis) and associates with the possession of understanding
o
(,synesis) and insight-judgment {gnome). Phronésis, gnomé, and synesis are 
generally found together in persons of arété - excellence of character.9
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. M. Oswald, trans., New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Inc., 1962, n., pp. 155-156.
8 Ibid., NE 1142a 22-32. Sophia also requires a kind of insight - nous, plus objective conceptual or 
analytical knowledge - épistémè, and can exist independently of phronésis in any given person 
(1141b 7-12). Steinberger (1993) points out that Aristotle also uses nous with reference to 
phronésis although it is often believed that he is using the term in a very different way (p. 120).
9 Ibid., NE 1143a25.
In contrast to Plato, Aristotle argues that both sophia and phronesis are 
types of knowledge and that true judgments are possible in both the scientific and 
the human realm. The reliability of scientific judgments is roughly guaranteed by 
the rules of logic and by adherence to the tripartite model. Aristotle does not make 
clear, however, how practical judgments can be reliable and epistemologically 
equal to scientific judgments. What can be gleaned from Aristotle is that reliable 
and correct judgments in the realm of human affairs are determined by excellence 
of deliberation, understanding, and a kind of insight that may or may not be 
different from that which is employed in matters of scientific judgment. But for 
Aristotle practical judgment remains a fairly mysterious process that largely 
defies systematic analysis.
3. Over the next 2000 years or so many attempts were made to address the 
problems surrounding immediate and non-inferential forms of knowledge and 
judgment. Writers such as Addison and Pope, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Burke 
and Hume made contributions to the subject in their discussions of the nature of 
aesthetic judgment. They invariably saw that the production, identification, and 
appreciation of beautiful objects could not be understood plausibly as cases of 
logical or scientific endeavor.10 These inquiries culminate in the Kant’s Critique 
o f Judgment where we find for the first time a systematic attempt to account for 
the kind of practical spontaneous judgment that must be involved in that 
“process” through which things are rendered determinate.
Kant’s theory of judgment offers one of the most comprehensive and 
powerful accounts of human judgment in modem philosophy. In its totality it
10 Steinberger, p. 128.
covers all three of Kant’s Critiques. As is well known the main task of the first 
Critique is to establish a stable basis for mathematics, science, and metaphysics 
by demonstrating the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge claims.11 Kant 
suggests that these claims, although not analytic, are both universal and necessary. 
Hence demonstrating their possibility amounts to demonstrating the possibility of 
non-analytic knowledge. But since “judgment” is necessary to the acquisition of 
all knowledge Kant finds that he must establish the necessity of synthetic a priori 
“judgments” - that is, he must demonstrate that the pre-conditions of experience 
guarantee that the world, in so far as we are able to encounter it, will “harmonize” 
with, or conform to, our mental abilities so as to permit the discovery of universal 
truths.12
Kant’s model of this type of judgment is a variant on the model of 
categorical subsumption. Judgment, he observes in the third Critique, consists in 
the subject’s ability to “think the particular as contained under the universal”.13 
As we observed previously, a central component of subsumption consists in our 
awareness that a sensation we are having matches a certain concept.14 The 
judgment that, “This is a dog”, for example, requires that we be conscious that the 
sensation we are having matches the concept “dog”. On this scenario the 
possibility of knowledge depends critically on two factors: 1) the universal and 
objective nature of the concept being employed, and 2) the fidelity of the 
matching process responsible for determining that, “This is in fact a dog”. The
11 Cf. for example, the Introduction to I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, Werner S. Pluhar, ed., 
Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1790,1987.
121. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Werner S. Pluhar, ed., Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett 
Publishing Co., Inc., 1781,1787, 1996, A 7-10/B 11-14, pp. 51-5.
13 CJ 179, Ibid., p. 18.
14 Cf. also ibid., p.xxxiv.
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faculty that Kant usually suggests enables a match to take place between entities 
as dissimilar as an intuition and a concept is the imagination.15 But exactly how 
the imagination functions to match concepts with intuitions is problematic for 
Kant.
Generally speaking the function of imagination is to “synthesize” the 
manifold of intuition, i.e., that which is given to our senses, into a form useable by 
human discursive intelligence. As Crowther observes this “synthesis” has a 
threefold structure;
(a) in the ‘synthesis of apprehension’ the manifold of sensible intuitions is 
‘run through and held together’, that is, the parts of the manifold must be 
individuated in time. However,
even this apprehension of the manifold would not by itself produce an 
image and a connection of impressions, were it not that there exists a 
subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding 
perception alongside the subsequent perception to which it has passed, 
and so to form a whole series of perceptions.16
This ‘subjective ground’ Kant terms (b) the ‘synthesis of reproduction in 
imagination’. [Finally, this must be augmented by]... (c) ‘the synthesis of 
recognition in a concept’.17
15 Imagination has a central role to play in judgment and, in fact, “mediates between many of the 
dualisms that Kant employs throughout his work - including those between concepts and intuition, 
thought and sensibility, spontaneity and passivity, subject and object, and, somewhat more 
indirectly, nature and freedom”. Cf. S. L. Gibbons, Kant’s Theory of Imagination: Bridging Gaps 
in Judgement and Experience, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 2.
161. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith, trans., London: Macmillan, A 121, p. 
144 in Paul Crowther, The Kantian Sublime, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 52.
17 Ibid., p. 52.
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Steps (a) and (b) function to render the manifold useable by the faculty of 
concepts, i.e., the understanding, which must be applied in step (c) in order to 
render something intelligible, i.e., “to bring this synthesis to concepts”,18 In the 
first Critique this application of understanding to an imaginative synthesis is a 
schematizing activity involving the application of rule-like schemata to 
intuitions.19 20The schematism of the understanding provides judgment with a rule 
under which it subsumes given empirical intuitions. The function of the 
schematism, therefore, is to provide a basis for the act of matching a concept to an 
intuition of an object.
If this all sounds a bit obscure the reader may take solace in the fact that it 
was also a bit obscure to Kant. David Bell has observed that Kant attributes the 
procedure of schematization variously:
to sensibility (B. 186), to understanding (B. 179), to empirical, reproductive 
imagination (B. 180), and to a priori productive imagination (B. 181). 
Schemata are distinguished from concepts (B. 180), and then identified with 
them (ibid.); they are said to be determinate (B. 179), and also indeterminate 
(B. 180); and it is in one place implied that empirical concepts do not require 
schemata (B. 176), but in another that they do (B. 180).21
These apparent inconsistencies suggest that Kant may have been less than 
satisfied with his explanation of the act of judgment in the first Critique. He 
writes, for instance: “This schematism of our understanding, in its application to
18 A 78, Pluhar, 1996, p. 130.
19 Cf. A 141/B 180, ibid., p. 213.
20 Cf. FI 212, Pluhar, 1987, p. 400.
21 D. Bell, The Art of Judgement, Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, XCV1(382):221- 244, 
1987, pp. 228-9.
appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human 
soul ...”.22 We know, at the very least, that he found his account incomplete for in 
the third Critique we find him reconsidering some of the same problems that 
exercised him in the first Critique. In particular problems that the schematism was 
designed to address - most centrally, the problem of judgment.
The postulation of schemata then can be viewed as Kant’s first attempt to 
overcome a philosophical problem, which is articulated quite clearly in the first 
Critique. He writes:
If understanding in general is to be viewed as the faculty of rules, judgment 
will be the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing 
whether something does or does not stand under a given rule. General logic 
contains, and can contain, no rules for judgment. [For] if it sought to give 
general instruction how we are to subsume under these rules, that is, to 
distinguish whether something does or does not come under them, that 
could only be by means of another rule. This in turn, for the very reason that 
it is a rule, again demands guidance from judgment. And thus it appears 
that, though understanding is capable of being instructed, and of being 
equipped with rules, judgment is a peculiar talent which can be practised 
only, and cannot be taught.23
If the understanding is to be taken seriously as the faculty of rules, then the act of 
understanding anything, as the application of this faculty to sensible intuitions, is 
an act of judgment as defined above. The problem of judgment, therefore, is that if 
we are ever to be secure in our understanding of things judgment itself must be
22 A 141-142, B 180-181, in ibid., p. 230.
23 B 171-2, in ibid., p. 227.
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made secure. For Kant, this means that judgment must be rendered rational, 
reliable, defensible, and intelligible - that is, it must be based on universal and 
objective rules, i.e., laws. But a rule is merely a formal principle that, Kant 
implies, cannot provide its own internal measure of correctness. Kant finds 
himself caught in a trap of his own devising. If the world is to be rendered 
intelligible rules must be applied, but the possibility of content demands that these 
rules be guided. This guidance, however, cannot itself be rule governed. Thus, 
Kant is led to conclude the passage above by suggesting of the understanding, the 
very foundation of knowledge, that it depends for its security on “a particular 
talent,” a kind of knowing how, about which he finds he can say very little.
The centrality of this problem to Kant’s critical system demanded that he 
redress judgment simpliciter.24 Hence in the third Critique we find Kant 
reexamining the relations between judgment and sensibility, and in particular “the 
relation between judgment and feeling, that is, between what is potentially 
objective and what is necessarily only subjective in our discursive mental 
abilities.”25 According to Bell, the third Critique presents Kant’s attempt to 
elaborate “an account of our subjective, non-cognitive, spontaneous response to 
experience; and a model for this is to be found in the nature of aesthetic 
experience”.26 Aesthetic judgment provides Kant with a model of those processes 
underlying all knowledge. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a critical 
evaluation of Kant’s attempt to redress the problem of judgment in the third 
Critique.
24 Thus, he writes: “A critique of pure reason, i.e., of our power of judging on a priori principles, 
would be incomplete if  it failed to include, as a special part, a treatment o f judgment, which, since 
it is a cognitive power, also lays claim to a priori principles;...” (CJ 168, in ibid., p. 233).
25 Ibid., pp. 231-2.
26 Ibid., p. 231.
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4. In the third Critique Kant distinguishes between two types of judgment - 
determinant and reflective. Determinant judgment, which falls under the rubric of 
the tripartite model, was the primary concern of the first Critique and involves the 
subsumption of particulars under universals which we already possess.27 
Reflective judgment is less intuitively straightforward. Recall that the first 
criterion of the tripartite model of judgment is that the universal qua concept be 
identified, and this means being able to specify at least some of the conceptual 
features through which it is determined. If the universal cannot be adequately 
specified then there can, of course, be no rule through which the particular may be 
subsumed.28 Reflective judgment does not permit the specification of conceptual 
features. Hence, it cannot be understood as the application of a universal to a 
particular. Instead it begins with particulars and searches for appropriately 
matching universals. The main role of reflective judgment then is in the supplying 
of concepts appropriate to the particular with which one is, whether in perception 
or thought, immediately engaged.29 This fact explains why Kant considers 
reflective judgment to be foundational to all cognition.30 As Gibbons observes, 
Kant believes that: “no empirical determinant judgments are possible without 
reflective judgment supplying the empirical concepts”.31
Here, one might ask, what is the import of an account of how concepts are 
arrived at for the problem of judgment? The problem of judgment, as defined 
above, is a problem of concept application not concept formation. So why does
27 Cf. CJ 179, Pluhar, 1987, p. 18.
28 Reflective judgment is still a matter o f matching a universal and a particular but in this case the 
particular is given and the search for a universal must take place in the free play of imagination as 
it is guided by the indeterminate principle of nature’s purposiveness.
29 As with any Vorstellung.
30 Cf. CJ 218, Pluhar, 1987, pp. 62-3.
31 Gibbons, 1994, pp. 81-2. Cf. also FI 212n, ibid., p. 400.
Kant, if he is concerned with redressing the problem of judgment in the third 
Critique, focus on how concepts are arrived at? Consider for a moment what, on 
Kant’s analysis of judgment, happens when one faces a particular. The act of 
judgment through which it is rendered intelligible is a subsumptive act requiring 
the application of concepts. But, as we have duly noted, not any concept will do. 
Only that concept which “matches” a given particular will unlock its meaning.32 
But how is it that one knows which concept to employ at any given moment? A 
conceptual toolbox analogy will suggest the beginnings of an answer. On Kant’s 
account having the faculty of imagination present an “I know not what” before 
one’s faculty of understanding is, to some extent, comparable to being faced with 
a mechanical watch that isn’t working. Finding an appropriate concept is akin to 
peering into an old watchmaker’s toolbox for a solution. Now if one is to have a 
hope of fixing the watch one must be able to choose those tools necessary for the 
job. But to know which tools to choose depends on knowing how to use them. 
Consequently, to the extent that this analogy holds true of concepts, one can only 
know which concepts to pick from a conceptual toolbox if one also knows how to 
use them. But here we must recall that Kant is not working with a model of mind 
in which concepts lie formed and waiting for employment. Although Kant does, 
on occasion, speak about the “possession” of concepts. He also believes that 
relations of time “lie wholly outside the concepts of understanding”33 Hence, for 
Kant, those “judgments” through which the world is rendered intelligible require 
not the selection and employment of concepts, but their immanent synthesis and
32 Cf. B 130; Imagine trying to apply the concept cat to a horse. Attention to detail will reveal a 
lack of “fit”.
33 B 159, Pluhar, p. 196.
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employment.34 The use of concepts is “based on the spontaneity of thought”- that 
is, on the understanding as the power of judgment.35 Thus, every time I face a 
presentation those concepts most appropriate to it must, in a sense, spontaneously 
arise to meet the challenge of “uniting the manifold”. If this is correct then it 
makes Kant’s preoccupation with concept formation intelligible. For it appears 
that an account of how “appropriate” concepts are arrived at cannot be 
meaningfully separated from an account of how they are employed.
Kant faces a colossal problem. The possibility of knowledge requires that 
judgment be guided so that it can occur in a systematic and non-arbitrary fashion. 
But this guidance cannot determine conditions of application for a concept 
because then it would function like a rule and so be subject to the problem of 
judgment.36 Kant’s response to this problem is to postulate the existence of an 
“indeterminate principle” contained within the process of judgment itself. To 
secure the necessity of this principle for our cognitive abilities he provides it with 
an a priori status.37 Without an a priori principle of judgment, Kant claims, the 
attempt to organize nature systematically would be “mere groping about among 
natural forms,” and that success in this task would be “entirely fortuitous”.38 Only 
an a priori principle, he suggests, can guarantee that nature will “conform to our
34 Cf. A 86/B 118, ibid, p. 143; A 126-8, p. 171-3; B 148-9, pp. 188-9.
35 A 68-9/B 93-4, ibid., p. 122-3; A 79/B 105, p. 131; cf. also A 126, p. 171.
36 In the first Critique Kant suggests that a necessary unity must guide judgment in that creative 
and spontaneous capacity which makes content possible. This unity is, very generally and briefly, 
guaranteed by the pure categories operating through the original synthetic unity o f apperception. 
Cf. A 127, ibid, pp, 172-173; also § 19-20, B 141-4, p. 183-6. By the time that Kant came to write 
his third Critique he may have come to see the limitations o f his account o f this unity as that 
through which the categories guarantee the existence of an ordered universe for our cognitive 
abilities to come to grips with.
37 Guyer, 1979, pp. 42-3.
38 FI IV, Pluhar, p. 210, and in ibid., p. 49.
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power of judgment”. The indeterminate a priori principle of reflective judgment 
then is Kant’s attempt to guarantee that nature will, in the end, conform to the task 
which judgment has been set, i.e., the “rational” and systematic organization of 
nature.
Unfortunately, there are problems with the postulation of an indeterminate 
a priori principle of purposiveness in nature. The idea of an indeterminate 
principle is confusing. Kant, however, offers very little in the way of satisfying 
explication. Hence, one can legitimately question Kant’s attempt to capture the 
forces responsible for rendering content possible, and our cognitive life veridical, 
under the rubric of a “principle”. Moreover, even if one does not wish to quibble 
over language, one may wonder whether Kant is not employing an overly strong 
model of rationality. It is possible that Kant’s demand for an a priori principle is 
motivated by a certain distrust of nature. In the first Critique he claims that:
reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own 
plan; and...must not allow nature by itself to keep it in leading strings, as it 
were, but must - using principles that underlie its judgments - proceed 
according to constant laws and compel nature to answer reason’s own 
questions. For otherwise our observations, made without following any plan 
outlined in advance, are contingent, i.e., they have no coherence at all in 
terms of a necessary law - even though such a law is what reason seeks and
40requires. 3940
39 Kant writes: “if there is to be a concept or rule that arises originally from the power of 
judgment, it would have to be a concept of things of nature insofar as nature conforms to our 
power of judgment.” (FI 202, ibid., p. 392)
40 B xiii, Pluhar, 1996, p. 19.
This is, in fact, Kant’s justification for the requirement of knowing things a priori. 
As it stands, however, it does not comport well with his notion of reflective 
judgment as something more or less beyond conscious control. In his book on the 
third Critique Guyer argues that his indeterminate a priori principle “does nothing 
but transform our own need for systematicity into a self-serving delusion that 
nature is systematic”.41 Guyer also argues persuasively along these lines that the a 
priori principle of purposiveness is actually precluded by Kant’s theory of 
aesthetic judgment.42 Unfortunately, as we shall see, extracting the offending a 
priori principle from Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment reduces it to a 
primarily “psychological” theory that is incapable of providing the security he 
seeks.
5. Kant refers to two forms of the power of reflective judgment. Under the 
first form two “presentations” are “held up” through the operation of the faculty 
of imagination for the purpose of reflective comparison of those objects in light of 
a concept. Kant has very little to say about this first type of reflective judgment 
beyond the fact that it exists and it is of little consequence to our work. Of much 
more interest to him and to us is the second form of reflective judgment in which 
a “presentation” is “held up” before the subject’s “cognitive powers” without the 
aid of concepts. For it is through Kant’s account of this latter form of reflective 
judgment that we discover the process which he suggests lies at the basis of 
human understanding, a spontaneous process utilized by the faculty of judgment
41 Guyer, p. 47. This criticism seems rather weak and it may be that Guyer here belies his own 
mistrust of nature. Only a little reflection on the matter is enough to reveal that nature is 
thoroughly systematic. Do not birds fly south in the winter and for good reason?
42 Guyer, pp. 50-1 & 83.
in the formation and application of concepts.43 It is this latter form of reflective 
judgment that Kant refers to as “aesthetic" and of which the judgment of taste is 
an iconic example.44
The first thing to note in the apprehension of a beautiful object, Kant 
argues, is that the faculties of imagination and understanding do not interact on a 
conceptual level as they would in the case of determinant judgment but instead 
“harmonize” in a “free play”.45 Kant observes that:
a merely reflective judgment about a given object can be aesthetic', [it is 
aesthetic] if (before we attend to a comparison of the object with others) the 
power of judgment, having no concept ready for the given intuition, holds 
[for the sake of comparison] the imagination [itself](as merely apprehends 
the object) up to the understanding [itself]([so that] a concept as such is 
exhibited) and perceives a [certain] relation between the two cognitive 
powers, a relation that constitutes the condition, which we can only sense, 
under which [alone] we can use the power of judgment objectively (namely, 
the mutual harmony of imagination and understanding).46
Thus, aesthetic judgment, as a species of reflective judgment, occurs just in case a 
harmony of the cognitive faculties occurs and is sensed as having occurred.
The reason that this harmonization is experienced as pleasurable is 
explained in Section VII. There Kant re-introduces purposiveness and claims that
43 For further defense of this interpretation of the role o f the third Critique see Bell, 1987; Caygill, 
1989; and Vossenkuhl, 1989.
44 It is important to keep in mind the fact that Kant’s use o f the term “ästhetisch”, as Bell so 
astutely points out, simply means “belonging to sensibility” either through feeling or cognition, 
and did not, in Kant’s time, possess its modem meaning as something akin to: that which pertains 
to beauty (1987, p. 232).
45 CJ 217, Pluhar, 1987, p. 61.
46 FI, 224, ibid., p. 412..
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the feeling of pleasure or displeasure which is experienced within the context of 
the harmonizing function is an indication of the purposiveness of the object for 
our cognitive powers.47 In the General Comment that follows the First Division of 
the Analytic Kant suggests;
that the regularity leading to the concept of an object is the indispensable 
condition (conditio sine qua non) for apprehending \fassen] the object in a 
single presentation and determining the manifold in the object’s form; [and] 
this determination is a purpose [we pursue] with regard to cognition, and so 
related to cognition it is indeed always connected with a liking (since 
achieving any aim [Absicht], even a problematic one, is accompanied by a 
liking).48
Thus, purposiveness can be understood roughly along the lines of a flag to the 
powers of cognition in the search for meaning. Since the activity of 
“purposiveness detection” is foundational to cognition generally it is responsible 
for furthering its inherent aim (i.e., content - the determination of the manifold). 
But as Kant argues in Section VI of the Introduction; “The attainment of an aim 
[Absicht] is always connected with the feeling of pleasure;...” [in cases where 
success is not guaranteed].49 Consequently, that the harmonizing of the faculties 
should result in a feeling of pleasure follows from the fact it enables the 
attainment of an inherent end of cognition just in case one is not completely sure 
what one is going to find.50
47 CJ VII. ibid., 189-190.
48 CJ 242, ibid., p. 93.
49 CJ 187, ibid., p. 27 (brackets mine).
50 Guyer argues that since the a priori principle of purposiveness was apparently designed to 
guarantee that judgment will be successful, and that nature will be perceived as purposive, it is 
inconsistent with the only way in which reflective judgment can be linked to pleasure, i.e., in the
Our characterization of Kant’s account of the harmonization of the
cognitive faculties now has it that the indeterminate a priori principle of 
purposiveness acts as a guide to the harmonizing function and pleasure is its 
product. But matters are not quite as straightforward as this characterization leads 
one to believe. We, for instance, have yet to explain what it is that secures the 
harmonization of the cognitive faculties. In the First Introduction Kant states:
if the form of an object given in empirical intuition is of such a character 
that the apprehension in the imagination, of the object’s manifold agrees 
with the exhibition of a concept of understanding (which concept this is 
being indeterminate), then imagination and understanding are-in mere 
reflection-in mutual harmony...; and the object is perceived as purposive, 
[though] purposive merely for judgment.51
Gibbons suggests that this passage “emphasizes the point that the harmony is a 
felt response to a form exhibited in intuition,...” which “allows us to experience 
empirical objects in the natural world as suited to, or harmonizing with, our 
capacity for judgment;...”.52 This interpretation is consistent with our 
characterization of the harmonization as a response to the “form” of purposivess. 
But the above passage also suggests that the perception of an object as purposive 
is dependent on, or identical with, the harmonizing of understanding and 
imagination. Thus, it seems that although the harmonizing function is set in 
motion by the form of purposivess the perception of the object in question as
satisfaction of contingent aims (cf. Guyer, 1979, pp. 79-83 for a complete analysis). But, it seems 
to me that this is to forget the fact that the a priori principle of purposiveness is indeterminate and 
hence, a merely regulative power which, although it might be claimed to guarantee success in the 
long run, doesn’t always seem to work. The resultant contingency is precisely what permits the 
surprise necessary to produce pleasure as well as the possibility o f getting things wrong.
51 FI 221, in Gibbons, 1994, p. 93.
52 Gibbons, 1994, p. 93.
purposive only becomes possible after the faculties are in free play. But even this 
is not completely accurate because in Section 12 of the “Analytic of The 
Beautiful” Kant writes: “The very consciousness of a merely formal 
purposiveness in the play of the subject’s cognitive powers, accompanying a 
presentation by which an object is given, is that pleasure”. This passage makes it 
clear that the experience of pleasure accompanying the harmonization function 
just is an experience of purposiveness. Thus, purposiveness itself seems to be 
completely psychologically transparent. The cognitive faculties may be able to 
respond to it, but it is not directly perceivable.
Now, as Guyer observes, it would be nice to suppose that what Kant is 
arguing is that there are different pleasures (and/or pains), and hence different 
types of purposiveness, which attend the experience of any aesthetically 
considered object. If Kant were to admit types of pleasure into his theory of 
aesthetic judgment this would go some way toward clearing up two significant 
problems. First, it would become much easier to make sense of how one is to 
recognize when a given pleasure is an instance of aesthetically determined 
pleasure as opposed to pleasure that is connected with an interest. Second, it 
would be much easier to understand how reflective judgment could be an 
explanatory ground to acts of understanding, as the application of concepts to 
intuitions, because the types of pleasure could provide “information” to the 
understanding and so provide a “contentual” basis through which one could 
differentiate relative to concepts. In this case an object would be beautiful just in 
case it “felt” beautiful. Such an interpretation, however, would fly in the face of 53
53 CJ 222, Pluhar, 1987, p. 68.
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the passages in Section VII of the Introduction which suggest that all feelings of 
pleasure are identical and devoid of objective significance.54 Thus, the feeling of 
aesthetic pleasure does not admit of types and cannot provide information about 
the world. The main problem with this position is that it appears to make one 
“feeling”, which is devoid of “cognitive import”, the basis of different judgments 
concerning different objects.
6. Leaving this problem aside for the moment let us examine more closely 
Kant’s model of the process of aesthetic judgment. According to Guyer, although 
Kant is not always consistent in distinguishing between the unintentional 
harmonizing function which is activated by a “purposeful” object and the 
“judging” of that object to be beautiful, Kant’s theory of judgment must, if it is to 
be intelligible, maintain that the;
declaration that an object is beautiful rests on two conceptually distinct acts 
of judgment: one, the “unintentional” reflection which produces the 
pleasure of aesthetic response; the other,... [the] quite possibly intentional 
exercise of reflective judgment which leads to an actual judgment of 
taste....55
Guyer explains the need for this differentiation shortly thereafter by pointing out 
that:
Kant describes the feeling of pleasure as both the product of judgment and 
the ground of the determination for judgment; yet if aesthetic judgment 
resulted from a single act, this would be to say that the same feeling of
54 FI 224, Guyer, 1979, p. 103.
55 Guyer, 1979, p. 110.
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pleasure both succeeded, as its product, and yet preceded, as its evidence or 
ground, a single judgment. This is clearly absurd.56
The intelligibility, it seems, can only be restored by supposing Kant to have 
divided his model of the process of aesthetic judgment into the two phases that are 
outlined above. In this case the feeling of pleasure would be the product of the 
“subjective estimation” of the object and the ground of the “declarative judgment” 
of the object.
This twofold approach to Kant’s account of reflective judgment can be 
understood more fully through considering his, until now, de-emphasized claim 
that judgments of taste have universal validity. Kant writes that;
someone who feels pleasure in the mere reflection on the form of an object, 
without any concern about a concept, rightly lays claim to everyone’s 
assent, even though this judgment is empirical and a singular judgment. For 
the basis of this pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, 
condition of reflective judgments, namely, the purposive harmony of an 
object (whether a product of nature or of art) with the mutual relation of the 
cognitive powers (imagination and understanding) that are required for 
every empirical cognition. Hence the pleasure in a judgment of taste is 
indeed dependent on an empirical presentation and cannot be connected a 
priori with any concept (we cannot determine a priori what object will or 
will not conform to taste; we must try it out); but the pleasure is still the 
basis determining this judgment, solely because we are aware that it rests 
merely on reflection and the universal though only subjective condition of
56 Ibid., p. 112.
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objects generally, the harmony for which the form of the object is 
purposive.57
Thus, since the pleasure that arises in response to a beautiful object is due to an 
underlying purposive unity between the object and the cognitive faculties of all 
human beings one may claim universal validity for any judgments of taste which 
are based on the experience of such pleasure. This account carries within it two 
critical assumptions and an unfortunate conclusion. First, it presupposes a 
fundamental uniformity across human cognitive faculties such that their 
functioning accords with the demands of the indeterminate a priori principle of 
purposiveness. If the universality of aesthetic judgments, and hence of cognition 
generally, is to be guaranteed this “accordance” cannot be merely 
“psychological”. For a psychological theory of mind cannot provide the necessity 
which Kant’s theory demands. This means that the a priori principle of 
purposiveness must, in some way, be immanent to cognitive processes. Second, it 
presupposes the ability of any discerning subject to ascertain whether the pleasure 
in question resulted solely from the harmonizing of the faculties. Unfortunately, 
since no independent, or public, criterion can exist it is unclear how is one to 
know whether one has made a mistake. If one cannot know that a mistake has 
been made then neither can one know that a judgment is correct. Hence, to the 
extent that the judgment of beauty depends on a sensation of pleasure one cannot 
“know” whether an object is, or is not, beautiful. And from this Wittgenstein 
would no doubt conclude that the pleasure in question forms no part of the 
judgment of beauty.58 To the extent that the third Critique is an attempt to ground
57 CJ 191, Pluhar, 1987, p. 31.
58 Cf. L. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, trans., G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986, §258, p. 92, cf. also §270, p. 95.
a universal judgment in private experience the standard Wittgenstenian criticism 
will apply.
Further support of this general line of criticism is to be found if we 
consider making the declarative judgment of beauty dependent on the sensation of 
pleasure in light of the problem of judgment. If Kant’s account of aesthetic 
judgment it to be taken as a reattempt at the problem of judgment it would appear 
that, since acts of determinate judgment are somehow dependent on aesthetic 
reflective judgment to supply empirical concepts, and reflective judgment 
ultimately depends on a “harmonizing function”, which is tuned by an 
indeterminate formal purposiveness, then acts of determinate judgment will also 
depend on this purposiveness.59 The only indication of this purposiveness that can 
reach our awareness, however, is a simple pleasure that, at a conscious level, is to 
be identified with the harmonization function. Now, as we have observed, “Kant 
nowhere argues that there are qualitative or phenomenological differences 
between pleasures,... and in many places he suggests the opposite”.60 
Consequently, the nature of the pleasure in question cannot be a guide to 
judgment because no “information”, i.e., no content, is available serve as a guide 
in the task of “synthesis of recognition in a concept”. In other words, the presence 
or absence of this simple pleasure can in no way provide guidance in the task of 
“how to apply a rule”. A remaining possibility is that “the form of finality”, or
59 Kant writes that reflective judgment “seeks concepts even for empirical presentations, qua 
empirical, must make for this [end] this further assumption: it must assume that nature, with its 
boundless diversity, has hit upon a division of this diversity... that enables our judgment to find 
accordance among natural forms it compares, and [so] enables it to arrive at empirical concepts.” 
(FT 212n, Pluhar, 1987, p. 400)
60 Guyer, 1979, p. 116.
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purposiveness, itself is providing the necessary guidance for judgment. But as we 
will see this seems implausible.
The harmonization function is dependent on an apprehended “agreement” 
between the form of an object given in empirical intuition and the exhibition of an 
“indeterminate” concept of understanding (i.e., the “subjects power of 
cognition”). At CJ 189-190 he writes that aesthetically produced “pleasure cannot 
express anything other than the object’s being commensurate with the cognitive 
powers that are, and insofar as they are, brought into play when we judge 
reflectively, and hence [express] merely a subjective formal purposiveness of the 
object”. Guyer suggests that this purposiveness is “formal”, and is hence referred 
to by Kant as the mere “form of purposiveness”, simply because it furthers the 
general, or “formal”, aim of knowledge itself in its task of unifying the manifold 
of intuition.61 But how would a merely “formal” purposiveness provide the causal 
efficacy that appears to be needed to secure the harmonizing function? Kant does 
not provide a clear answer to this question. However, he implies that it is the 
awareness, or consciousness, of this purposiveness, and hence of that simple 
pleasure referred to above, which plays the necessary causal role. Hence, once 
again, in Section 12 Analytic of The Beautiful Kant maintains:
The very consciousness of a merely formal purposiveness in the play of the 
subject’s cognitive powers, accompanying a presentation by which an 
object is given, is that [merely contemplative] pleasure. For this 
consciousness in aesthetic judgment contains a basis for determining the 
subject’s activity regarding the quickening of his cognitive powers, and
61 Guyer, 1979, pp. 217-18.
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hence an inner causality (which is purposive) concerning cognition in 
general, which however is not restricted to a determinate cognition. Hence it 
contains a mere form of the subjective purposiveness of a presentation.62 63
Unfortunately, as we argued above, the consciousness of a simple pleasure can 
neither serve as a reliable indicator of appearance of beautiful objects nor provide 
the guidance for a determinative judgment.
But this is not Kant’s last word on these matters for in the Third Moment 
of the Analytic of the Beautiful we find a further explanation of the phenomenon 
of a merely “formal purposiveness” through Kant’s attempt to introduce 
restrictions on what can and cannot be considered beautiful. Kant concludes the 
Third Moment by defining beauty as “an object’s form of purposiveness insofar as 
it is perceived in the object without the presentation of a purpose”. A flower, he 
observes, “is considered beautiful, because in our perception of it we encounter a 
certain purposiveness that, given how we are judging the flower, we do not refer 
to any purpose whatever”.64 Kant’s main intention here seems to be to suggest 
that purposiveness without a purpose or, as it is sometimes referred, the form of 
finality, is somehow taken “note of...in objects - even if only by reflection...”, as 
essential to certain objects, states of mind, and actions.65 But since this “form”, 
being merely “formal”, can, by his own definition, possess no conceivable
62 CJ 222, Pluhar, 1987, p. 68. Kant goes on from this quote to suggest that this consciousness of 
simple pleasure, is not only responsible for setting the cognitive faculties in a free play, but also of 
keeping them there. He claims that: “We linger in our contemplation of the beautiful, because this 
contemplation reinforces and reproduces itself.” (p. 68) Thus, it appears, the consciousness of 
simple pleasure is both the ground and the product of the aesthetic judgment.
63 CJ 236, ibid., p. 84.
64 CJ 236n, ibid., p. 84.
65 CJ 220, ibid., p. 65.
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“content” his explanation of it can point to none and so, once again, none can be 
available to guide judgment.66
7. Kant’s discussion of the form of purposiveness is difficult to penetrate. 
According to Guyer, the traditional interpretation which suggests that Kant is 
arguing “that there are certain phenomenal forms which are characteristic of 
designed objects...” neither holds up to scrutiny nor renders his discussion of 
purposiveness intelligible.67 Moreover, he suggests:
that the only purpose which beautiful objects can appear to fulfill without 
actually being judged to be designed is the general purpose of cognition 
itself. But unless we have already placed some constraints on the features by 
which the objects can produce the harmony of the faculties, their appearing 
designed for this purpose can imply no such constraints. [Hence, since 
Kant’s theory implies no such constraints] the appearance of design is a 
vacuous criterion for aesthetic judgment, for any appearance might satisfy 
some design.68
Ultimately, Guyer suggests that the process is left as a mystery because we are 
ultimately left “with no candidates for finality of form at all”.69 Crowther, 
however, objects to Guyer’s analysis of this issue and suggests instead that:
66 Indeed in the First Introduction, in Section VII we find Kant arguing as follows: “Hence we 
then consider the purposiveness itself as merely subjective; by the same token, this 
[purposiveness] neither requires nor produces a determinate concept of the object, and judgment 
itself is not a cognitive one. Such a judgment is called an AESTHETIC judgment o f reflection." 
(FI 221, ibid., p. 409)
67 Guyer, 1979, p. 221.
68 Ibid., p. 222.
69 Ibid., p. 222. Guyer suggests that in the end Kant returns to the first Critique for his inspiration 
and by importing its perceptual theory into his aesthetic theory attempts a transcendental 
explanation of the harmonizing function based on the a priori forms of space and time. But 
“nothing in the concept of the free play of the faculties itself requires its association with the first 
Critique’s separation of form and matter of appearance” (p. 230). Further, the implications of this
in so far as the harmony requisite to the purpose of cognition is between the 
faculties of imagination and understanding, and does not involve reference 
to sensibility or desire, this, of itself, implies some rather severe constraints 
on what will contribute to subjective finality.70
The nature of these constraints, he continues, are implicated in Kant’s notion of 
disinterestedness outlined in the First Moment. In the First Moment Kant claims:
The delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence 
of an object is called interest. Such a delight, therefore, always involves a 
reference to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground, or else as 
necessarily implicated with its determining ground.71
From this and other passages in the First Moment Crowther quite rightly points 
out that Kant connects interest in an object with the imputation of its 
“existence”.72 The pleasure which is experienced as a result of an interest is the 
result of desires and expectations being met - that is, of how an object, whether 
real or imagined, effects or will effect “me.” But the power of the object to affect 
me implies its existence. Hence, interest in an object implies its existence in some 
form. “A judgment of taste, on the other hand, is merely contemplative, i.e., it is a 
judgment indifferent to the existence of the object:..”.73 Only judgments of this 
type are free from the compulsions that must be presupposed in cases where
importation lead to absurd consequences for Kant’s basic aesthetic theory (Cf. Guyer, 1979, pp. 
230-34).
70 Crowther, 1989, p. 57.
711. Kant, The Critique of Judgment, J.C. Meredith, trans., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973, 
§2, p. 42: Note that Pluhar translates this passage as follows: “Interest is what we call the liking 
we connect with the presentation of an object’s existence. Hence such a liking always refers at 
once to our power of desire, either as a basis that determines it, or at any rate as necessarily 
connected with that determining basis.” (CJ 204, 1987, p. 45)
72 Crowther, 1989, pp. 57-58.
73 CJ 209, Pluhar, 1987, p. 51.
interest is the basis that determines approval.74 Hence, interest in an intuition is 
inconsistent with the possibility of harmony in respect of its presentation.
One might expect that when Kant claims universal validity for claims of 
taste he would be claiming that truly beautiful objects will universally impart 
aesthetic pleasure or that we can reasonably expect a truly beautiful object to 
impart such feelings. However, the language that Kant uses in this regard suggests 
that what he is in fact claiming is that a judgment that something is beautiful 
involves the rightful demand, or expectation, that everyone else also experience 
that object as beautiful.75 Kant writes that;
the ought in an aesthetic judgment, even once we have [nach] all the data 
needed for judging, is still uttered only conditionally. We solicit everyone 
else’s assent because we have a basis for it that is common to all.76
The fact of beauty, in part, follows from the use of the word “beautiful”. For when 
I declare something to be beautiful it would be absurd to follow such a declaration 
with the phrase “to me” for otherwise the distinction between something being 
agreeable to me and being beautiful would collapse. Of course, the “basis” which 
Kant refers to in the passage above as justifying the demand for a common assent 
is simply “the effect arising from the free play of our cognitive powers ...” i.e., the 
experience of pleasure.77 Thus, for Kant, judging an object to be beautiful 
amounts to claiming that everyone who perceives this object should find it 
pleasurable - all things being equal. But how, we must now return to ask, can one
74 CJ 210, ibid., p. 52.
75 CJ 213-15, ibid., pp. 55-9.
76 CJ 237, ibid,, p. 86.
77 CJ 238, ibid,, p. 87.
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be certain that the harmonizing of the cognitive faculties is in fact the cause of the 
pleasure being experienced in response to an object?
The short answer to this question is that one must be disinterested in the 
object. Kant holds that; “if a judgment about beauty is mingled with the least 
interest then it is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste”.78 But this 
suggestion only pushes the problem back a step to that of how one is to recognize 
when the judgment of taste is without interest in the object. Guyer notes that 
whatever else is involved in having an interest in an object it clearly involves 
having a concept in mind.79 This concept can then become associated with desires, 
expectations, goals, plans, theories, etc.. But since a true judgment of taste 
involves no concepts it cannot involve any interest in an object.80 Thus, aesthetic 
judgment must be based on the recognition that no “thought” was involved in 
determining the resultant pleasure - put simply, that you didn’t “do” anything. 
Hence, on Guyer’s twofold analysis of the harmonization function, Kant has 
effectively made “disinterest” a necessary precondition of both the “declarative 
judgment” and its’ “subjective ground”.
But how is one to know whether interest in an object has corrupted one’s 
judgment when one has only the simple experience of pleasure as a veridicality 
indicator? Kant has no direct answer to such a question. He merely suggests that 
the knowledge that nothing “subjective” corrupted one’s judgment can only be 
obtained indirectly through introspection (i.e., recent remembering).81 If one
78 a  205, ibid., p. 46.
79 Guyer, 1979, p. 187.
80 As Guyer observes, the claim that beauty produces no interest cannot be accented without 
qualification (cf. ibid., pp. 167-206 for an extended treatment o f this issue)
81 Guyer puts it this way: “A judgment o f disinterestedness cannot be the direct conseauenre nf ,  
judgment that a feeling o f pleasure is due to the harmony o f the faculties, because o f Kam*s thests
cannot uncover any reason for an aesthetic judgment beyond the simple 
experience of a pleasure this is evidence, though not conclusive evidence, for its 
cause being the harmonizing of the faculties. Thus, for example, the fact that one 
realizes that one is thinking about the worth of one’s own art objects while 
observing them is evidence against the hypothesis that the experienced pleasure is 
caused by a simple harmonizing of the faculties. But, of course, this would not be 
conclusive evidence because 1) acts of introspection are subject to all the 
weaknesses of any empirical investigation, and 2) the standard Wittgenstenian 
criticism still applies.
There is an additional problem with this explanation of how one is to 
discern a legitimately aesthetic pleasure. It implies that an experience of beauty is 
incomplete, or at least cannot be known to be such an experience, without an 
accompanying justification. But this demand overlooks the fact that when one 
experiences a beautiful object both its beauty and its existence are evident in an 
immediate and non-inferential way. If experiences of beauty were invariably 
accompanied by doubt they would also be accompanied by a motivation to resolve 
this doubt through some form of rational investigation. But, first, it is not clear 
that it is possible to doubt an aesthetic impression, particularly if it is defined as a 
simple experience of pleasure. And second, even if it were possible, there is no 
reason to believe that aesthetic pleasure is normally accompanied by doubt.
People simply do not seem to engage in the kind of critical reflection in which 
Kant suggests that they ought. If “aesthetic” reflective judgment is to be the 
solution to the problem of judgment Kant’s demand that we be skeptical about our
that in this case there is no consciousness of the cause except for the pleasure itself, or no 
consciousness o f the cause except through its effect.” (ibid., p. 204)
aesthetic intuitions is tantamount to suggesting that we adopt a skeptical attitude 
to all conceivable knowledge. But such a claim would have at least two very 
undesirable consequences. First, if every judgment requires justification, no 
judgment can ever be made with certainty and the possibility of knowledge is lost. 
Second, if we must be skeptical of reflective judgments then, since reflective 
judgment is foundational to all cognition, we ought, by the same reasoning, to be 
skeptical of this claim, i.e., that the only way to be certain of the adequacy of 
one’s reflective judgment is by means of skeptical introspection. And here we can 
observe that Kant is driven to postulate the need for this justificatory step by the 
logic of his enterprise. For he cannot consistently maintain that the experience of 
pleasure be both the product and the ground of aesthetic judgment.
8. An outline of an alternative explanation of the harmonizing function can 
be gleaned from some remarks that Kant makes in the General Comments on the 
First Division of the Analytic. There Kant maintains that in aesthetic judgment the 
imagination must be free for if it were determined by a rule concepts would be 
involved and the judgment would not be a true judgment of taste. Nevertheless, as 
Kant writes; “in apprehending a given object of sense the imagination is tied to a 
determinate form of this object and to that extent does not have free play (as it 
does [e.g.] in poetry),..,”,82 3 Consequently, in a pure judgment of taste the faculty 
of imagination harmonizes with the faculty of understanding in a free lawfulness.
82 As was first pointed out by Peirce such a strategy is ill conceived for one simply cannot force
oneself to doubt that which seems evident. Thus, although such reflective moves may be necessarv 
for justification, they are not required for experience generally (cf C S PPirr* “Thi c
83 CJ 241,Pluhar, 1987, p. 91.
And yet , observes Kant, to say that the im agination  is f r e e  and yet law fu l to  
itself, i.e., that it carries autonomy with it, is a contradiction”.84
Although the model is not Kant’s, one way of understanding “free 
lawfulness , which helps resolve some of the apparent contradictoriness, is on the 
model of improvisation. Improvisation, whether it is in jazz, or dance, or art, 
always presupposes a framework of practice in which, and through which, such 
improvisation is rendered intelligible by both the performers and the audience. 
Radically free performance of any kind is unintelligible performance. On the other 
hand, simply following the rules of the practice is uninspiring and not “beautiful”. 
Consequently, Kant could be interpreted as arguing that aesthetic judgment (and 
hence cognition more generally) takes place within a praxis through which the 
imagination in its cooperation with the understanding plays freely in the process 
of rendering an experience as intelligible. This praxis would have to serve as a 
vehicle for “objectivity”, otherwise “beauty”, once again, could be merely “for” 
someone. Thus conceived “free lawfulness”, as a kind of schematizing without a 
concept, would occur in the leading edge, so to speak, of an embodied praxis. 
Unfortunately, a comprehensive characterization of “free lawfulness” never 
appears in the third Critique. Some intriguing remarks, however, that hint at an 
explanation can be found in Sections 21 and 38.
Sections 21 and 38 form part of Kant’s, unsuccessful, transcendental 
deductions that are designed to prove the intersubjective validity (or universal 
communicability) of aesthetic judgments.85 Briefly, in Section 21 we, once again, 
find Kant claiming that the harmonizing function responsible for aesthetic
84 CJ 241, ibid., p. 91.
85 For a detailed examination o f these arguments see Guyer, 1979, Chapters 7 to 9.
judgment is a special case of the harmonizing function that is responsible for 
cognition generally. Basic human cognitive functions require that an 
“[attunement] does actually take place whenever a given object, by means of the 
senses, induces the imagination to its activity of combining the manifold, the 
imagination in turn inducing the understanding to its activity of providing the 
manifold in concepts”.86 He then goes on to discuss the process in terms of the 
concept of “proportion”. Presumably, although all cognitive activity involves the 
activation of the faculties of imagination and understanding certain “objects”, as 
presented by the imagination, are more conducive for establishing those 
proportions responsible for the “quickening of the two mental powers”. This 
quickening or harmonizing, it is suggested, occurs in the apprehension of objects 
generally, a special case of which is to be found in aesthetic apprehension. From 
these, premises Kant attempts to derive the intersubjective validity of aesthetic 
judgment.
But the introduction of this notion of harmonization function being 
dependent upon “proportions” between the cognitive faculties is problematic for 
Kant. In Section 21 he suggests that some proportions are more conducive to 
harmonizations than others. Once again, Guyer is comprehensive in his treatment 
of this issue. He writes:
If Kant is committed to the view of the first Critique that any manifold of 
which one can be conscious as a manifold can in fact be unified in accord 
with some concept or another, then all manifolds may display the proportion 
appropriate for knowledge in general. Then either aesthetic response
86 CJ 239 , Pluhar, 1987, p. 88.
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requires more than just this proportion, or else every object may be 
beautiful.87
In order to resolve this apparent difficulty one is tempted to make sense of Kant’s - 
discussion of “proportions” in the following way: There is a base rate of 
harmonizing activity that occurs constantly in the everyday cognitive functioning. 
The simple perception, or imagination, of some objects, however, induces an 
increase in the activation of the cognitive faculties sufficient to cause a “pleasure” 
of which one may become conscious. Such an interpretation would avoid the 
above criticism of Guyer’s by maintaining the beautiful objects can be 
differentiated from ordinary objects by the degree of harmonization induced. But, 
of course, there is nothing here to restrict all humans to respond to all and only the 
same objects with increased harmonization of the cognitive faculties. In addition 
this account turns the harmonizing function into a “psychological” phenomenon 
and it is not clearly so since Kant suggests that the indeterminate a priori 
principle of purposiveness is critical to its occurrence. A further problem is raised 
by the fact that a passage in Section 39 contradicts that of Section 21, and the 
above interpretation of it, by claiming that only one proportion is required for 
cognition in general and for aesthetic determination.
A consideration of section 38 in light of its long footnote reveals Kant to 
be arguing in a similar, but not identical, fashion to that of Section 21. He begins 
with the assumption that our ability to communicate our “cognitions” entails that 
the “subjective conditions” required for cognition are the same in all humans.
Since, these “subjective conditions”, which utilize no concept, are responding to
87 G uyer, 1979, p. 295.
48
the merely “formal” characteristics of objects, which include nothing immediately 
amenable to “concepts”, we can assume all humans to “respond”, on these purely 
subjective bases, similarly to all objects, and hence, to all beautiful objects. Since 
purely aesthetic judgments rely exclusively on such subjective bases one is 
justified in rationally imputing aesthetic judgments universally. Thus, the pleasure 
we experience in response to beautiful objects rests “on the same conditions for 
everyone, because they are the subjective conditions for the possibility of 
cognition as such, and because the proportion between these cognitive powers that 
is required for taste is also required for the sound and common understanding that
O Q
we may presuppose in everyone”.
The faculties of imagination and understanding, in the case of aesthetic 
determination, and of cognition generally, are required to be present to each other 
in the right “proportions” in order to excite each other to create a 
“harmonization”. Leaving aside, for the moment, the obvious vagaries of this 
explanation, one might ask why, if one proportion is required for both general 
cognition and aesthetic determination, we don’t find everything beautiful? Guyer 
suggests that in order to solve this problem we must postulate an extra step for the 
harmonization of the faculties in aesthetic determination, but that the taking of 
this step undermines the cogency of Kant’s arguments for universal validity.
Once a capacity which is not an absolutely necessary condition of 
knowledge is introduced into the explanation of aesthetic response, so is an 
element of contingency, and the possibility of an entirely justifiable a priori 
imputation of aesthetic response to others is precluded.... The psychological 8
88 CJ 292-293, Pluhar, 1987, p. 159.
49
capacity to experience the free harmony of imagination and understanding 
goes beyond the minimal capacity for knowledge, and... this harmony 
occasions a pleasure which is not felt in every case of knowledge.89
Since, as we have argued, Kant cannot both claim the possibility universality in 
judgment and consent to a characterization of the harmonizing function as merely 
“psychological” capacity we are led to deny the acceptability of this extra step and 
conclude with Guyer that Kant’s transcendental deductions are unsuccessful and 
that his explanation of the harmonizing function is vague and, in places, 
inconsistent.
9. As was suggested above, one intuitive and accessible analogy that goes 
some way toward rendering the idea of the harmonizing of the cognitive faculties 
intelligible is artistic improvisation. Bell also employs this kind of analogy to 
make sense of the harmonizing process, “but” adds that:
the fully articulated model is couched in terms of our ability to enjoy a 
spontaneous, criterialess, disinterested, presumptively universal, non- 
cognitive, reflective feeling that certain diverse elements of experience as 
such belong together, that they comprise an intrinsically satisfying whole in 
virtue of their seeming to have a point (though without it being the case that 
there is some specific point which they are judged to have).90
Unfortunately, if Guyer is correct then this quote misrepresents Kant’s position 
somewhat. Kant, it was argued, with respect to the harmonizing function, does not 
admit of different pleasures. In the above passage, however, Bell refers to the
89 Guyer, 1979, p. 323.
90 Bell, 1987, p. 239.
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feeling of pleasure that accompanies the harmonizing of the cognitive faculties as 
a “feeling that diverse elements of experience as such belong together”. 
Unfortunately, this is to introduce a phenomenological element into the picture 
that Kant appears not to admit. Bell supports his interpretation with the following 
passage in the third Critique,
In a critique of judgment [in general], the part dealing with aesthetic 
judgment is essentially relevant, as it alone contains a principle ... without 
which the understanding could not feel at home in nature.91
Kant, of course, could simply be inconsistent on the issue. However, it might be 
prudent to note that the same passage is translated by Pluhar as follows:
In a critique of judgment, the part that deals with aesthetic judgment 
belongs to it essentially. For this power alone contains a principle that 
judgment lays completely a priori at the basis of its reflection on nature: the 
principle of a formal purposiveness of nature, in terms of its particular 
(empirical) laws, for our cognitive power, without which principle the 
understanding could not find its way about in nature.92
Notice that this translation does not include the idea that the understanding is 
feeling anything. Instead it suggests that an a priori principle is necessary for 
understanding, as a faculty of concepts, to “Find its way about in nature”. Of 
course, we already know that Kant believes that reason “has insight only into that
91 CJ 193, in Bell, 1987, p. 239.
92 CJ 193, Pluhar, Section VII, On the Logical Presentation of the Purposiveness o f Nature 1987
pp. 33-4 (emphasis mine). The original text reads as follows: “In einer Kritik der Urteilskraft ist ’ 
der Teil, welcher die ästhetische Urteilskraft enthält, ihr wesentlich angehörig, weil diese allein ein 
Prinzip enthält, welches die Urteilskraft völlig a priori ihrer Reflexion über die Natur zum Grunde 
legt, nämhch das emer formalen Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur nach ihren besonderen (empirischen) 
Gesetzen für unser Erkenntn.svermögen, ohne | welche sich der Verstand in sie nicht finTn '  
könnte:...” (Kant, 1790, Kritik Der Urteilskraft, A XLVIII, XLIX). d
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which it produces after a plan of its own”. Consequently, what Kant appears to be 
claiming here that aesthetic judgment is, in some way, guided by the universal but 
indeterminate a priori principle of purposiveness in nature. A principle, once 
again, which Guyer argues is ultimately prohibited.
If, as on Bell’s interpretation, indeterminant, but intrinsically significant, 
wholes underlie the functioning of our entire conceptual apparatus then it is these 
wholes which must come into play in the harmonizing of the cognitive faculties. 
Bell writes:
That one should spontaneously ‘feel at home in nature’ is a necessary, 
though, indeed, subjective condition of the possibility of objective 
knowledge; for it is only if I feel at home in this sense that I come into 
contact with phenomena that are not, so to speak, opaque or problematic for 
me, and which do not, therefore, require conceptualization, thought, 
judgment, or inference in order for me to grasp them. If this condition were 
not met, if, that is, phenomena were in the first instance always problematic, 
then the performance of some prior judgment would always require the 
performance of some prior judgment as to its appropriateness, relevance, or 
warrantability. That the regressive infinity of judgments on judgments, of 
rules for the following of rules, can be stopped, without thereby making a 
mystery of my ability to judge at all, is due to the fact that at a certain point 
I am directly aware of an intrinsic coherence, or unity, or significance in my 
experience, it is because of this felt unity that the concept of an object in 
general can so much as find a foothold in experience. And the vicious
regress is avoided because this feeling owes nothing to concepts, judgments, 
criteria, or rules.93
Although, there is much in this summary to commend it, there is some doubt as to 
whether it can be unequivocally attributed to Kant. First, it assumes that I can 
somehow feel unity. But, as we have seen, by limiting the “harmonic indicator" to 
a singular and simple pleasure Kant denies this possibility. Second, if a felt unity 
is at the basis of aesthetic judgment and therefore cognition generally, reason, it 
seems, would no longer “show the way” but rather would seem to be “kept in 
nature’s leading strings” and judgment would not be based on principles (definite 
or indefinite) or “fixed laws” but rather would be contingent upon the occurrence 
of a “phenomenal” experience. This, fortunately or unfortunately, is a state of 
affairs Kant simply will not, and, I have argued, cannot, permit.
Finally, we should observe that admitting a felt unity into Kant’s theory 
would not solve the problem of judgment, for the experience of a felt unity in one 
set of circumstances and not another is ultimately uninformative as to the nature 
of the relationships that exist between things. Even if we suppose such an 
experience to be able to reliably provide one with an indication of the 
purposiveness of an object for cognition. This does not even get me half way to 
my goal of rendering the manifold intelligible. For “recognition in a concept” 
requires the application of rules, or rule-like, “structures”, to an already varied 
manifold of intuition. But, in the case of harmonization, the intuition that is 
presented to the faculty of understanding has only an invariant content and so, 
once again, is uninformative for the faculty of rules, i.e., the understanding. Bell’s
93 B e ll, 1987, p. 239.
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analysis aside, Kant’s theory of reflective judgment provides us with little with 
which we might solve the problem of judgment. It may in the end help account for 
why we feel at home in our environment, but it leaves the problem of how I know 
a cup of coffee when I see one virtually untouched.
10. An alternative to Bell’s account is offered by Crowther who clarifies 
Kant’s reliance on the notions of “proportion,” “common sense,” and “the 
indeterminate a priori principle of purposiveness” through observing that Kant 
connects them intimately with supersensible being through his moral theory.
Kant, it seems, realized that if reflective judgment is to be able to claim universal 
validity, and so be fundamental for knowledge generally, the psychological 
capacity of the harmonizing function must itself be grounded in “that” through 
which judgments are actively disposed to universal intelligibility. However, since 
this “that”, which grounds judgment, can have no “content,” it cannot itself be 
grasped in an act of synthesis - that is, it falls outside the reach of human 
understanding.94 It can, however, be approached by means of an analogy with 
moral judgment. As Crowther observes: “Pure aesthetic judgements are analogous 
with moral judgements, in respect of their characteristics of immediacy, 
disinterestedness, and universality.”95 Thus, we find Kant writing in §59 that:
the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good; and only because we refer 
[RUcksicht] the beautiful to the morally good (we all do so [Beziehung] 
naturally and require all other to do so, as a duty) does our liking for it 
include a claim to everyone else’s assent, while the mind is also conscious
94 Cf. CJ 483-4, Pluhar, 1987, pp. 378-80. Cf. also for a detailed an exceptionally informative 
account o f how Kant’s notion of the supersensible unites the three Critiques and completes his 
critical system § 15 of Pluhar’s introduction to his translation of the Critique o f Judgment, 1987, 
pp. Ixxxvii-cix.
95 Crowther, p. 70.
of being ennobled, by this [reference], above a mere receptivity for pleasure 
derived from sense impressions, and it assess the value of other people too 
one the basis of [their having] a similar maxim in their power of judgment.96
The beautiful is “symbolic” of the moral in the perhaps somewhat profound sense 
that it goes some way toward revealing the nature of “supersensible ground” 
which sustains and guides the harmonizing of the cognitive faculties.97 As 
Crowther suggests of Kant’s philosophy:
In the Critical philosophy generally, theoretical and moral principles are 
both manifestations of the ‘supersensible’; but in the third Critique he uses 
the term in a more fundamental sense to pick out the unity which links these 
two domains together so as to realize morality’s status as the final end of all 
creation. Hence, in so far as it is the a priori principle of reflective judgment 
which manifests this morally significant unifying aspect of the 
supersensible, and in so far as taste has its causal origin in a common sense 
which is determined by this principle, it follows that taste’s causal origin is 
itself of ultimately moral significance.98
If Crowther’s conclusion is correct then we can also conclude that, since 
the causal origin of taste is also that of cognition generally, the ground of 
cognition is ultimately of moral significance. Even though we have clearly shown
96 C l pp. 223-4, in Crowther, p. 71.
97 Cf. C J175,p. 14.
98 Crowther, p. 69. In the footnote to this passage Crowther writes: “Elliot suggests that the unity 
in question here is God. This is probably correct. It is he whom we presume to have created the 
phenomenal world and our rational moral being so as to allow the ends of the latter to be realized. 
That which bridges these two realms in accordance with the Divinely ordained final end is the a 
priori principle of regulative judgement. This is why, I would suggest, in the Critique of 
Teleological Judgement Kant describes the aesthetic pleasure which arises from such a principle 
as ‘akin to a religious feeling’ (Judgement, Part II, p. 159)”. (R. K. Elliot, ‘The Unity of Kant’s 
“Critique of Aesthetic Judgement”’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 8:3, 1968,244-259)
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that in the case of the harmonizing of the cognitive faculties nothing but simple 
pleasure can be present to consciousness Kant maintains that the ground of 
judgment is not just this pleasure. Kant writes:
The morally good is the intelligible that taste has in view, for it is with this 
intelligible that ever our higher cognitive powers harmonize; for it is with 
this intelligible that even our higher cognitive powers harmonize, and 
without this intelligible contradictions would continually arise from the 
contrast between the nature of these powers and the claims that taste makes. 
In this ability [taste], judgment does not find itself subjected to a 
heteronomy from empirical laws, as it does elsewhere in empirical judging - 
concerning objects of such a pure liking it legislates to itself, just as reason 
does regarding the power of desire. And because the subject has this 
possibility within him, while outside [him] there is also the possibility that 
nature will harmonize with it, judgment finds itself referred to something 
that is both in the subject himself and outside him, something that is neither 
nature nor freedom, the supersensible, in which the theoretical and the 
practical power are in an unknown manner combined and joined in a
. OQunity.
Theoretical and practical powers, it seems, are grounded in the supersensible, 
which resides both within and without the subject, and manifests through our 
“cognitive” capacities as that power of harmonization in reflective judgment. The 
function of reflective judgment is to be attuned to the intelligible so as regulate 
those synthetic activities through which multiplicity is rendered as a unity and 9
99 CJ 353, Pluhar, 1987, pp. 228-9.
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hence, to keep our higher cognitive powers, i.e., understanding and reason, from 
continually finding themselves in contradiction. In other words, the faculty of 
understanding is guided towards the aquisition/application of laws and rules with 
a basis in reality because reflective judgment is attuned that which is intelligible, 
or purposive for cognition. In this capacity judgment legislates to itself, which is 
to say it functions outside of the normal domain of determinate rules and laws 
altogether.
Unfortunately, this account simply leaves the problem of judgment 
unresolved. The problem of judgment points out that the attempt to determine the 
normative conditions of application of universal to particulars, or concepts to 
intuitions, through reference to rules leads to an infinite regress. The third 
Critique shows that reason’s application of rules of judgment in acts of 
subsumption is, at root, dependent on “that” which is a law unto itself, and 
consequently cannot be grasped by the faculty which necessarily employs laws, 
rules, principles, etc., i.e., the faculty of understanding. Thus, it appears, the third 
Critique is not misread as a reattempt to address the problem of judgment. In the 
end, however, it simply reaffirms the assertion of the first Critique that judgment 
is a particular talent that can be practised only and cannot be taught. Kant’s 
alignment of the process of judgment with the non-spatiotemporal supersensible 
means that reflective judgment must be left as a mystery and consequently, so is 
the ground of both theoretical and practical reason.
But it appears that all is not lost for in addition to the insights which might 
be revealed through “analogy” with the moral and the beautiful Kant suggests that 
this supersensible ground can be approached through that form of judgment to
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which the supersensible is immanent, i.e., reflective judgment. In the last 
paragraph of the Critique of Teleological Judgment, in speaking of attempting to 
ground the category of causality as it applies to the concept of a first mover, Kant 
suggests that since the concept of a supersensible being excludes all predicates it 
cannot be grasped by the usual means. “But”, he continues,
what if I [start] from the order in the world: perhaps I shall be more 
successful [in my attempt] not merely to think the causality of that being as 
the causality of a supreme understanding, but also to cognize that being by 
determining the concept in this way, since then the irksome condition of 
space and extension does not come in.100
By attending to the “great purposiveness in the world” one comes, by analogy 
with the way purposiveness functions in my own understanding, unavoidably 
upon the view of the “supersensible being as an intelligence” which both provides 
the final aim of the world, i.e., a “good will,” and perhaps guidance for us along 
the route in our individual attempt to achieve this end.101
In the following chapter we examine the work of a philosophical school 
which found Kant’s general approach to philosophy unsatifying and which looked 
to a kind of order in the world for their foundations. The German 
phenomenologists that followed Kant rejected the idea that the mind was 
responsible for combining things into a unity and instead searched for a more 
materially substantial ground. With Kant’s moral theory in mind, Max Scheler, for 
example, claims:
100 CJ 484, ibid., p. 379.
101 As Kant puts it, “a good will is that whereby man’s existence alone can possess an absolute 
worth, and m relation to which the existence of the world can have a final end " (Judgement Part
TT „  i n a -  in  rV rm /fh p r  n  d'1'1 v  u u ^ e m e m ,  r a n
I am of the opinion that this Kantian colossus of steel and bronze obstructs 
the way of philosophy toward a concrete and evidential theory of moral 
values (which is at the same time independent of positive psychological and 
historical experience),... As long as Kant’s terrifyingly sublime formula, 
with its emptiness, remains valid as the only evidential result of all 
philosophical ethics, we are robbed of the clear vision of the fullness of the 
moral world and its qualities as well as of the conviction which we might 
have that this world is something binding.102
Scheler argues that the ground of cognition and judgment must not be formal but 
material. Certainly this is an intriguing idea. It would seem that a material ground 
stands a much better chance of providing cognition with something on which its 
“rules” could depend for guidance than a purely formal ground. But, as we will, 
see this general approach also faces some steep obstacles.
102 Scheler, 1973a, p. 6.
Chapter 2
The Phenomenology of Max Scheler
1. Why, the knowledgeable reader might inquire, if one wishes to turn to phenomenology 
for an explanation o f the “processes” which make cognition and judgment possible, turn to Max 
Scheler? There are two main reasons. First, central to every account of how understanding grasps 
its object is a tension between the need for an “I think”, a subject to understand, and the need to 
rid the process o f understanding o f this “subject” in order to open up the possibility o f  objective 
experience. Scheler draws our attention to this fundamental tension and in so doing allows us to 
build towards a more comprehensive understanding of the foundations o f  cognition and judgment. 
Second, there is connection between Kant and Scheler on the issue of a priorism, which is both 
interesting and relevant to our discussion. Against Kant, Scheler argues for the existence of “non- 
formal” a priorism which he then relies upon to provide an account o f  foundations for 
understanding and judgment, considered as those “processes" through which the world is rendered 
intelligible (i.e., possible). In order to fully understand Scheler’s work it is useful to first set it in 
its proper theoretical context.
Like Kant, Scheler sees problems with theories of understanding that rely 
on appeals to rules and criteria. But, unlike Kant, Scheler is vehement in his 
assertions that the source of such trouble is the division of experience into 
sensible intuitions and formal a priori processes. “There is”, he exclaims, “no
such thing as an ‘understanding that prescribes laws to nature’ (laws that are not
in nature itself)...'.”103 In one fell swoop Scheler denies the reality and hence the 
significance of formal a priori rules, laws, and principles, for cognition. Kant’s 
entire transcendental project is swept aside. Rules, suggests Scheler, are empirical 
intermediaries that, although of some pedagogical use to beginners, have no 
significant role to play in ascertaining the “truth” in any given domain. Appeals to 
rules and criteria, consequently, are generally evidence of lack of insight into the 
nature of the phenomena under investigation.104 If one wishes to know the “facts 
of the matter” one must “look and see” for oneself without the aid of such 
intermediaries. Only the reality of “phenomenological facts” provided in 
“phenomenological insight” can satisfy non-arbitrary judgments.105 
Understanding how to apply rules and criteria, and so the knowledge of whether 
one is or is not applying a rule correctly, relies on “insight into phenomenological 
facts”.106 Since, for Scheler, rules are derivative on “facts” revealed in 
phenomenological insight the problem of judgment never arises. Objective 
judgment and experience are possible because phenomenological “facts” are given 
and manifest in phenomenological experience.107
But this type of insight-based “explanation” for how things are objectively 
known seems philosophically unsatisfying. Many questions immediately come to 
mind: What does Scheler mean by “phenomenological facts”? What justification 
does he provide for such entities? What processes underlie “insight” so
103 M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics o f Values, trans., M S Frines anrf R 
L. Funk, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973a, p. 73 S ’ K
M' Sc,heí r’ t™*’ D R' L a c h t'« , Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1973b, p. 139-140.
105 Scheler, 1973a, p. 49.
106 Cf. Scheler, 1973a, pp. 74-75.
107 Making objective judgments requires being able to see these facts as they are given in
phenomenological experience (cf. Scheler, 1973a, pp. 51-2). s
conceived? This chapter will provide answers to these questions. We will begin 
by situating Scheler historically and philosophically while emphasizing those 
ways in which Scheler differs from the major phenomenological figures of 
Brentano and Husserl. Then we will detail how in Scheler’s later work he, like 
Kant, attempts to integrate his theory of cognition with metaphysics. 
Unfortunately, as we will see, Scheler’s elucidation of this relationship gives rise 
to certain inconsistencies which impact on his justification for the objectivity of 
phenomenological experience. The ensuing discussion will permit us to develop 
some of our own insights concerning the mental processes underlying 
“judgment”.
2. Scheler’s neglect by contemporary philosophy is undoubtedly due to many 
factors not the least of which is the difficulty of simply getting one’s bearings in 
writings which are exceptional for the radical nature of their break with previous 
Western philosophical thinking. Although his approach to philosophy can safely 
be called “phenomenological”, as readers of phenomenology know this term tends 
to have different meanings for different phenomenologists. Scheler’s independent 
phenomenological thought can be traced back to the time shortly after he read 
Husserl’s 1900/01 Logical Investigations.108 However, as Frings is quick to point 
out: “Anyone familiar with Husserl’s phenomenology will easily see few 
attachments to Husserl as well as Scheler’s many deviations from him as to 
phenomenological procedures”.109 Be this as it may, Scheler’s strategy is often to 
appropriate the language of Husserl and extend it to ethical and “spiritual” 
domains of experience. This extension brings with it both benefits and confusions
108 M. Frings, Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction to the World of a Great Thinker. Marquette 
University Press, 1996, p. xii.
109 Ibid., p. 3.
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which we will need to discern if we are to bring Scheler’s particular contributions 
to light.
The primary concern of Logical Investigations is what we would now call 
the philosophy of logic.110 At the turn of the century logic and its implications for 
other domains of investigation had yet to be clearly determined and it was to this 
task that Husserl put himself. The first step in this task was to set out the purely 
formal conditions for the possibility of making non-arbitrary judgments. These 
included Husserl’s formal categories of meaning and formal categories o f objects, 
which, as Bell says, “together determine what it makes sense to say, or to think; 
they rule out sheer nonsense or gobbledygook (Unsinnj”.111 The second step was 
to suggest that any rational set of beliefs should conform to those a priori laws 
that guard against the possibility of formal absurdity and self-contradiction. These 
conditions together set out a comprehensive system of criterial constraints on 
rational judgment and the possibility of truth.112
Unfortunately, they provide no explanation of how judgments are 
ultimately to be arrived at or grounded. Meeting all of Husserl’s formal 
requirements in making a judgment that “snow is white”, for example, tells me 
nothing about the “basis” on which such knowledge ultimately rests. As Bell 
observes:
In the absence of genuine self-evidence, it is felt, the unpleasant possibility 
opens up that no matter how great the amount of evidence we possess for 
our beliefs there is the need - not universally, but very widely felt - to
Investigation III is an exception to this in being concerned with formal ontoloev
111 D. Bell, Husserl. London: Routledge, 1990, p. 89.
112 Cf. Husserl, EU  §3, p. 17, in ibid., p. 91.
provide an absolute rather than a merely ‘internal’ grounding for one’s 
system of beliefs.... The obtaining of some state of affairs, a, may be 
conclusive evidence for that of another, b; but the judgment 'b obtains 
because a obtains’ itself can provide no stronger grounds for the belief in 
b 's obtaining than the strength of the grounds we have, quite independently, 
for believing that a obtains. As for this latter belief, we as yet have no 
grounds for it; it in turn requires evidence of its own; and so too does 
anything adduced in evidence of it, and so on. Only something that is 
evident but whose evidence is independent, can put a stop to this regression, 
and thereby make intelligible the possibility of a system of beliefs that is
|  ¡ 4
genuinely grounded.
The regress to which Bell refers above is a variant of the problem of judgment. On 
Kant’s account, judging whether some b obtains is a matter of distinguishing 
whether b does or does not stand under a given rule, e.g., “if a then b". But to 
know whether b can be subsumed under a rule such as “if a then b" one needs to 
know how to apply the rule. Knowing how to apply such a rule, however, is 
equivalent to knowing how to satisfy it. Both imply an ability to determine 
whether the antecedent obtains. For example, knowing how to apply the rule “if it 
is a banana then it is nutritious”, requires that I know a banana when I see one. 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations, like Kant’s third Critique, has as its central goal 
the attempt to ground judgment and, thereby, to reconcile “the subjectivity of 
knowing with the objectivity of the known content”.13 14 But, whereas Kant’s
113 Bell, 1990, p. 92.
114 Ibid., p. 135.
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theory is constrained by the inadmissibility of even phenomenological qualities, 
types of pleasure, for example, Husserl’s theory is not.
Husserl recognizes that if logic is to engage the world its universal 
symbols must possess content, which, he suggests, are constitutive of the 
“meanings” of these symbols. Husserl’s “ideal objects”, “ideal unities”, or 
“species”, as the case may be, are an attempt to bridge the gap between the empty 
categorical symbols, which the subject must employ, and the “objective content” 
of the world. “Ideal unities” are purported to possess both phenomenological 
content and “universal” status. In order to better understand Husserl’s concept of a 
“species”;
Suppose, for example, that I have a visual presentation of a circular red 
patch, r. The colour moment of r is an abstract, though real, individual part 
of r. And as such it is unshareable: no object distinct from r may have that 
moment as a part. Clearly, however, there is a sense in which it is possible 
for another patch, p - indeed, for indefinitely many other patches - to be of 
‘exactly the same colour’ as r. Husserl construes the judgment that ‘p has 
exactly the same colour as r’ as an assertion of numerical identity, 
equivalent to ‘the colour of p = the colour of r \  And, ex hypothesi, the 
colour of r = red. The occurrence of the word ‘red’ in the last sentence 
cannot be taken to designate the moment or redness that is a proper part of 
r, and as the notion of numerical identity evidently applies to whatever it is 
that that occurrence of the word ‘red’ does designate, Husserl concludes that
it designates a concrete object, but one that is universal rather than 
individual, and ideal rather than real.115
The case of red in this example can be extended to cover a wide variety of 
species and also serves to illustrate just what Husserl takes “meanings” to be.
The essence of meaning is seen by us, not in the meaning-conferring 
experience, but in its ‘content’, the single, self-identical intentional unity set 
over against the dispersed multiplicity of actual and possible experiences of 
speakers and thinkers. The ‘content’ of a meaning experience in this ideal 
sense is not at all what psychology means by ‘content’, viz: any real part of 
a moment of experience.
What, e.g., the statement ‘n  is a transcendental number’ says, what we 
understand when we read it, and mean when we say it, is no individual 
feature in our thought-experience, which is merely repeated on many 
occasions. Such a feature is always individually different from case to case, 
whereas the sense of the sentence should remain identical... the selfsame 
element expressed in them all, ‘selfsame’ in the very strictest sense.116
In postulating species, therefore, Husserl, like Kant and a host of philosophers 
before him, is addressing the problem of how the world comes to be organized, or 
unified, “objectively”. His concern is to give an account of the apparent 
objectivity of knowledge given the apparent subjectivity of the mental processes 
with which we have access to the world. Species, suggests Husserl, provide the 
“meanings”, which are themselves “unities” through which further unifications
115 Ibid., p. 105.
116 Husserl, LU I, §§31-2, pp. 329-31, in ibid., pp. 105-106.
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may take place. The performance of mental acts, such as judging, remembering, 
and expecting, in so far as they concern instances of species, or “moments”, are 
dependent on the aforementioned “meanings” for their unifying efficacy. In other 
words, “species,” like Platonic “forms,” function to provide the means through 
which objective judgments occur. Speaking generally, and in the language of 
Kant’s first Critique, one might say that it is “species” which permit objects to be 
schematized.
Leaving aside for the moment questions of the reality of such “ideal 
unities” let us inquire into the issue of how we come to possess them. Here we 
encounter two general approaches. Either the “meanings” are somehow 
synthesized from particular experiences or they have an a priori status of some 
kind. If they are synthesized then one may legitimately ask for both an account of 
the process and of how “objectivity” is secured. If “meanings” are known a priori 
then we need an explanation of what such a claim amounts to and of how it is 
possible. With respect to these issues, it is sometimes unclear, in Logical 
Investigations, which way Husserl intends to go. Although “species” are clearly 
non-spatiotemporal entities they are not simply a priori “given ”. Instead they are 
synthetically “realized” from sensorial experiences, which do possess a requisite
giveness.ni
This, of course, leaves open the question of how the reliability of this 
“synthesis” is guaranteed. But Husserl, it seems, is not concerned with such issues 
as his aim “is not to secure objectivity, but to understand it”.17 18 He is simply not 
concerned to justify the objectivity of his “ideal unities”. Instead he intends that
117 Bell, 1990, pp. 112-13.
118 Husserl, Crisis §55/p. 189, in ibid., p. 160.
individuals discover such truths for themselves by means of an “immediate 
experience”. To this end he provides us with his famous method of the “eidetic 
reduction”. Husserl maintains that performing the phenomenological reduction 
reveals a realm of “transcendental being”, the contents of which has an objective 
and seemingly a priori status - that is, “species” are necessary conditions for the 
possibility of any objective knowledge whatsoever.119 120Performing the 
phenomenological reduction, however, is no mean feat. Husserl claims that 
becoming aware of these entities requires reducing all ontological commitments, 
whatsoever, to zero. Only through the “bracketing” of all ontological 
commitments will the proper objects of phenomenological philosophy appear}20
On this point Husserl and Scheler are, to a large extent, in agreement. In 
fact, as we will see, they agree on many points. However, in our summary of 
Logical Investigations there are already at least two fundamental differences. 
First, for Scheler, phenomenology is based on pure intuition and not on a method. 
In the introduction to Phenomenology and the Theory o f Cognition Scheler states 
that phenomenology,
is the name of an attitude of spiritual seeing [geistiges Sehen] in which one 
can see [er-schauen] or experience [er-leben] something which otherwise 
remains hidden, namely, a realm of facts of a particular kind. I say 
“attitude,” and not “method”. A method is a goal-directed procedure of 
thinking about facts, for example, induction or deduction. In
119 Cf. Husserl, Ideas §33/p. 113, or Bell, 1990, pp. 156-161.
120 As we have seen Kant also associates the imputation o f existence to an “object" which being 
intimately associated with desire, constitutes an “interest” in that “object ” with “subjective 8 
experience.” In Kant’s case an interest prohibits reflective judgment from acting as a reliable 
guide to cognition by conflating that simple pleasure proper to the harmonization o f the cognitive 
faculties with the pleasure which results from desires being met (see above, p. 41-1)
phenomenology, however, it is a matter, first of new facts themselves,
before they have been fixed by logic, and second, of a procedure of 
121seeing.
Second, for Scheler, the phenomenological content, or “meanings”, that do appear 
in intuition are in no way synthesized but always and everywhere exhibit an a 
priori status. On this point Scheler’s non-formal a priorism is a radical move 
away from both Husserl and Kant.12 22
3. Scheler’s brand of phenomenology is marshalled against Kant in
Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. The main objectives of 
this work are to 1) establish a rigorous foundation for philosophical ethics and to 
2) use this foundation to criticize Kant’s ethical theory. Since our investigation is 
not directly concerned with ethics, to go deeply into the particulars of Scheler’s 
critique of Kant’s ethics would be imprudent. Fortunately, such an investigation is 
not necessary as Scheler’s general critique of Kant’s formal a priorism, which 
Scheler uses to explicate his ethical theory, will provide us with an understanding 
of Scheler’s phenomenology, as well as its significance for our project.
The first thing to note is that Scheler, like Husserl, gives evidence of a 
deep respect for Kant. Scheler, for instance, agrees with Kant in maintaining that 
ethics and philosophy in general must be grounded in the a priori. Scheler, 
however, disagrees with Kant at the very heart of his philosophy finding serious 
problems with Kant’s theory of the a priori and its application. He claims that in
121 Scheler, 1973b, p. 137.
122 The wary reader may be a bit put off by phrases such as “spiritual seeing”. They, of course, 
lend an air of mysticism to the whole process - a charge, I might add, which one can, with equal 
justification, lay at Husserl’s feet. For it appears, at least to this author, that Husserl’s method of 
eidetic reduction offers no significant advantage in providing an avenue of approach to the realm 
o f “meanings” over Scheler’s more straightforward offer of none (cf. also Bell, 1990, p. 162).
all areas of philosophy Kant’s a priori is connected with two misconceptions (to 
which a fundamental metaphysical world view and a fundamental position of the 
philosopher correspond).123 First, only sensuous raw material in disordered form 
is “given” in intuition, which stands, as it were, in need of organization.124 125This is 
an error which, Scheler believes, Kant took from Hume on blind faith and which 
leads Kant to his second error, - the presupposition that cognition must be 
“formed” using only “sensible content” in conjunction with a priori “synthetic 
functions”. According to Scheler, this is an error, which can, at least in part, be 
accounted for by Kant’s ignorance “of a ‘phenomenological experience’ that 
exhibits as a fact of intuitive content what is already contained in natural and 
scientific experience”.126 If the mind is to be ordered and all that is given is sense 
impressions then the need for “synthetic functions” is evident. But without the 
presupposition that “the world is pulverized into a medley of sensations... there is 
no need for such a hypothesis and hence no need for an interpretation of the a 
priori as a “law of functions” of such organizing activities”.127
123 The companion metaphysical worldview, which supports these misconceptions, is, according to 
Scheler, usually associated with an “attitude” which, he suggests, is endemic to the Western 
world. He also attributes this attitude to Kant. He writes:
This “attitude” I can only describe as a basic “hostility” toward or “distrust” o f the given as 
such, a fear o f  the given as “chaos,” an anxiety - an attitude that can be expressed as “the 
world outside me, nature within me.” “Nature” is what is to be formed, to be organized, to 
be “controlled”; it is the “hostile,” the “chaos,” etc. (1973a, p. 67).
We encountered some support for a claim such as this in the first chapter where, for example,
Kant provides his justification for the need for synthetic a priori knowledge. Scheler maintains 
that his metaphysical worldview and his fundamental philosophical position stand in contrast to 
this isolationist picture o f man’s place in the universe.
124 In Logical Investigations Husserl also disagrees with this point.
125 Scheler, 1973b, p. 203. This, o f course, is only one interpretation o f the basic story o f the first 
Critique. It, however, fails to consider the fact that “sensible content” can only be “sensible 
content” if  it has already (i.e., a priori) been subject to the pure categories (cf., for example, B 
134). A priori concepts make sensible content possible.
126 Scheler, 1973a, p. 47.
127 Ibid., p. 66. Unfortunately, this criticism is a “straw man” since, as was just observed, for Kant, 
there cannot even be a medley of sensations without there having already been an imaginative 
synthesis o f the manifold through the original synthetic unity o f apperception. An unsynthesized 
manifold is nothing at all to a merely human understanding (cf., for example, A 116, A 120).
Since for Scheler, the a priori is simply “given” in experience he also 
objects to any association of the a priori with the “rational”, or what 
understanding, through judgment, adds on to sensory experience. Scheler finds 
Kant’s rational-constructivist theory of the a priori to be wholly unsatisfactory. 
He writes:
Indeed, no doctrine has obstructed the theory of cognition more than the one 
proceeding from the presupposition that a factor in cognition must be either 
a “sensible content” or something “thought”. How can one bring to 
fulfillment, on this presupposition, concepts such as thing, real, force, 
equality, similarity, effect (within the concept of causality), motion, space, 
time, quantity, number, or - and this is our concern here - the value 
concepts? There must be for them a datum of intuition - to be sure, not a 
datum of “sensible” character; otherwise these concepts ... would have to be 
“fabricated” [erdacht], i.e., posited out of nothingness by “thinking.” This 
solution alone always implies an unsatisfactory solution to the problem of 
cognition. Whatever such a solution may be (whether more sensualistic or 
more rationalistic), it will doom cognition to the degree that it has content 
[Inhalt], which here obviously means “sensible” data or the cognition based 
on them, since such content is “subjective” and “relative” to the 
organization of man. Cognition is doomed to become bare content - in the 
final analysis, to become mere relations that are relations of nothing - to the 
degree that it is reduced to purely logical factors.128
128 Ibid., p. 63.
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Scheler never considers the third Critique in the manner which we have above, 
i.e., as Kant’s attempt to found judgment and ultimately cognition on essentially 
“arational” processes. This fact, however, does not affect the force of Scheler’s 
criticisms for, as we concluded above, Kant’s account of the foundations of 
judgment and cognition by leading to the supersensible, leads us to something 
about which nothing, except perhaps by metaphor and analogy, can be known.
In contrast to Kant’s formal a priori then Scheler postulates a non-formal 
[materialer] a priori structure of experience in accordance with, what he refers to 
as, the non-formal structure of the world. He writes that:
this mythology of productive rational activity has nothing to do with 
apriorism;... The a priori is, then, the objective structure [sachliche 
gegenständliche Struktur] of the large areas of experience itself to which 
certain acts and functional relations among them “correspond,” without its 
having been “brought into” or “added to” this structure by such acts.129
Notice here that if one can be said to have a priori knowledge, as it is defined 
above, then the problem of judgment would appear to have an obvious solution. 
The infinite regress of rules would never get started because understanding need 
not rely on rules to the extent that the objective structure of experience is manifest 
in (one’s) experience. In other words, since understanding is not conceived as the 
faculty of rules but operates by means of direct access to the “object structure”, to 
the extent that judgment is conceived as an activity involving rules, principles, 
criteria, etc., cognition is not founded on judgment at all. Having denied the 
significance of Kant’s transcendental project Scheler effectively reduces all
129 Ibid., pp. 66-7.
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judgment to empirical judgment - that is, judgment that takes place after the world 
has, so to speak, already made an appearance. The critical question for Scheler, 
therefore, if he is to provide a defensible account of the appearance of the world, 
is how to give credence to his theory of a “pre-existent” and “objective” structure 
of experience to which the understanding has a kind of immediate access.
Before we deal with this theory head-on, we need to develop a more 
thorough understanding of the concepts that Scheler is employing. We need to 
understand, for instance, what Scheler means by the phrase “objective structure of 
large areas of experience” and what he means by the term acts. We also need to 
know what it means for acts to “correspond” a priori with the “objective 
structure” of large areas of experience. Since Scheler’s choice of descriptive 
terminology in these matters appears to derive directly from his reading of Logical 
Investigations, and Husserl’s terminology can, in turn, be traced to Brentano’s 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. We must first turn our attention to 
some basic facts concerning Brentanian phenomenology.
4. Brentano’s early investigations are largely philosophical and concern 
themselves with the nature of mental phenomena. As Bell observes:
Two ways of modeling the human mind predominated in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. On the one side stood the classical empiricist model 
of the mind as a largely passive, static, transparent medium of awareness on 
which experiences impress themselves. According to this model, perception, 
memory, imagination, judgment, association of ideas and the rest are just so 
many vicissitudes of mental life, so many things which, so to speak, befall 
u s .... The second model, on the other hand, associated particularly with
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Kant, assigns a dynamic, indeed creative role to the human mind: through 
such activities as synthesis, interpretation, inference, judgment, even 
perception itself, the mind imposes its own order and meaning on what Kant 
called ‘the raw material of sensible impressions’. ...
Brentano rejects both these accounts outright, developing in their place a 
theory of mental phenomena which, he hoped, would nevertheless combine 
all that was worth salvaging from either of them. Accordingly, for Brentano, 
mental phenomena are simply acts which have contents.130
Bell goes on from this quote to observe that this latter fact reveals an unusual 
characteristic of Brentanian philosophy. If all mental phenomena are, without 
exception, acts, then the contents of those acts cannot be mental phenomena. And, 
since Brentano divides all phenomena into those that are mental and those that are 
physical, the contents of any act must be a physical phenomenon. Brentano, 
however, employs a curious use of the term “phenomenon” since “it turns out that 
the so-called physical phenomenon does not actually appear to us, and indeed, 
that we have no presentation of it whatsoever....131
Another unusual characteristic of Brentanian philosophy concerns the use 
of the term act. Implicit in Brentano’s conception of mental phenomena is a use of 
the term act that is foreign to its everyday meaning. For, put simply, if all mental 
phenomena are acts then mental acts are not “actions”. This aspect of the term act 
is preserved in both early Husserl and in Scheler. Thus, for example, Husserl 
writes: ‘In talking of “acts”..., we must steer clear of the word’s original meaning:
130 Bell, 1990, p. 7.
131 Brentano, 1973, p. 78, in Bell 1990, p. 8
cill thought o f activity must be rigidly excluded'.™ And Scheler suggests that with 
respect to such acts: “There is no activity which could be increased or intensified 
(as in all attention).”132 33 This fact, combined with the fact that the contents of a 
mental act are not concerned with objects of “the world”, makes it extremely 
difficult to clearly distinguish between an act and its contents. Brentano claims 
that the nature of the relationship that exists between the two is one of intentional 
in-existence - that is, the content is immanent to the act. But what can this mean? I 
know what it means to act on an object, but to suggest that an object, i.e., 
experience, is somehow inherent in, or immanent to, an act requires clarification.
Clearing up this confusion requires that one be aware that central to 
Brentano’s early writings is a distinction between two kinds of complex whole or 
unity; which Bell, following Husserl, calls strong and weak wholes “(Brentano 
calls them ‘real things’ and ‘collectives’ respectively)”.134 Strong wholes conform 
to the so-called principle of mereological essentialism whereby a whole and its 
“parts” are held in a relationship of mutual interdependence such that neither can 
have an independent existence. The parts of a weak whole, however, are simply 
strong wholes, or proper parts, held together in an aggregate. Thus, for example, a 
sheep is a strong whole while a flock of sheep is weak whole. This part-whole 
structure can be employed to make sense out of Brentano’s theory of mental acts 
and their contents in the following way: if content c intentionally in-exists in act a, 
then c is a proper part of a. This structure adequately captures any singular and 
non-reflexive mental act.
132 E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay, London, Routledge & 
[Logische Untersuchungen (2nd édition)], 1,1900/1970, p 563
133 Scheler, 1973b, p. 27.
134 Bell, 1990, p. 18.
Kegan Paul.
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Brentano, however, argues that no mental act ever conforms to this simple 
structure. Instead he suggests that any given mental act always also has itself as a 
secondary object, at the same time as it has its primary object.135 In this latter case 
the relationship between the mental act and its secondary object is one of identity. 
Brentano writes: “The consciousness of the primary object and the consciousness 
of the secondary object are not each a distinct phenomenon but are two aspects of 
one and the same unitary phenomenon”.136 A strong whole is formed between a 
mental act and its secondary content and it is this structure itself which is 
purported to secure the “objectivity” of the inherent primary and secondary 
content since they are, strictly speaking, identical. As Bell observes:
Brentano’s fundamental, and very Cartesian intuition seems to be this: for 
me there is a logical space for error, for illusion, misconception, mistaken 
judgment and the like, only in so far as it is possible for there to be a real 
distinction between how I take things to be, and how they actually are. I can 
only be wrong if it is possible that things are not as I conceive (perceive, 
judge) them to be. If it could somehow be guaranteed that, however things 
might seem to me, that is necessarily the way they in fact are, then my 
beliefs and judgments would necessarily be true. But what could 
conceivably act as guarantor here? What could, even in principle, close the 
gap between how I take things to be and how things really are, so as to seal 
off all logical possibility of error? The only candidate would seem to be the 
strict identity, the complete coincidence of, in Brentano’s terms, the act and 
the object of judgment (belief, conception, presentation, or whatever). My
135 Brentano, 1973, p. 155, in ibid., p. 21.
136 Brentano, 1973, p. 155; in ibid., p. 22.
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taking something to be thus-and-so becomes logically indistinguishable 
from its actually being thus-and-so in the limiting case in which the 
actuality exclusively consists in my taking it to be thus-and-so. And this is 
of course precisely the form which secondary consciousness or inner 
perception takes, with the result that “the phenomena of inner perception ... 
are true themselves. As they appear to be, so they are in reality”.137 1389
The distinguishing mark of the Brentanian lineage in phenomenology then is the 
conflation of appearance and reality in what is given in experience under certain 
specified conditions. Unfortunately, the theory as presented by Brentano is 
internally inconsistent for he ultimately maintains that the relationship of any 
mental phenomenon and its content is simultaneously one of identity and 
difference. Despite this difficulty both Husserl and Scheler with some 
qualification, adopt the basic structure and strategy of Brentano’s theory of 
intentionality. But whereas Brentano and early Husserl rely on part-whole 
ontologies to construct the necessary interdependence between act and content, 
Scheler, for the most part, attempts to provide the requisite intentional-inexistence 
through metaphysics. It is through an examination of Scheler’s metaphysics 
that we are able to provide answers to the questions concerning Scheler’s theory 
of the a priori with which we began our examination of Brentano.
5. Scheler’s metaphysics appears to derive from both Western and Eastern 
influences.140 On the Western side one might claim to discern Neo-Platonic and
137 Brentano, 1973, p. 20, in ibid., p. 25.
138 “Objects” are transcendent for Husserl.
139 This metaphysics is only sketched in Formalism, and doesn’t take clear form until his later 
works, however its basic assumptions appear to be consistent throughout
140 Although the exact lineage would certainly be of interest in itself, it is not important for our
investigation and nothing significant depends on it. v
Christian influences as well the more obvious influences of Kant, Hegel, and 
Husserl. On the Eastern side it is clear that Scheler was aware of Indian 
philosophies, such as Buddhism, and was impressed by what he found.141 This 
fact may help account for certain isomorphisms between his own metaphysics and 
that of certain canonical forms of Buddhist philosophy. Although Scheler’s 
metaphysics is, for the most part, unsuccessful in supporting his phenomenology, 
our analysis of it will provide us with new insights into that form of “insight- 
judgment” which promises to subvert the need for an infinite regress of rules of 
judgment.
The pivot of Scheler’s metaphysics is his doctrine of “the person”. “The 
person” is the name Scheler gives to the human form of “spirit” (Geist). Scheler 
maintains that “...all possible extra-spiritual being is in (mutual) dependency of 
possible spiritual being” (des Geistseienden), “spirit” can only “exist” in 
cooperation with its counterpart “world” and forms one objective structure in all 
its parts.142 Thus, considered outside of this relationship “spirit” is an abstract 
ideal. In his Phenomenology and the Theory o f Cognition Scheler suggests that 
the structure of this ideal and its intrinsic relations is discovered through 
phenomenological experience. He writes:
On the side of content, we find a structure of interconnected essences 
belonging to a world which all the empirical facts of our human world or of 
our empirical milieu merely exemplify. The structure of this world and the
141 Cf. Frings, 1996, pp. 143-56.
142 Scheler, V 181, in Frings, 1996, p. 121.
structure of the spirit form one essentially connected structure in all their 
parts.143 14
For Scheler, there is, therefore, only one a priori abstract, but “objective”, 
structure, which can be divided into two interdependent “moments,” i.e., the 
structure of “spirit”, and the structure of “world”. The reason for the division is 
that if the “objective structure” is to “appear” it must appear to “someone” in 
time. The burden of the emergence of spirit in time necessitates its division into 
the “aspects” which Scheler calls “act” and “essence”. The possibility of objective 
experience, for Scheler, then just consists in the possibility of “discerning” the a 
priori “objective” structure of “spirit” in time. This leaves Scheler, if he is to 
account for the possibility of “objective” experience, to provide an account of the 
role of the individual mental act in the “emergence” of this structure. He attempts 
to do this through his theory of “the person”.
In part II of Formalism Scheler defines the person as ‘‘the concrete and 
essential unity o f the being o f acts o f different essences,...”.144 Scheler’s use of the 
phrase “concrete and essential unity” in this definition appears to derive primarily 
from his reading of Husserl and Brentano. As we discussed, Husserl’s formal 
ontology follows Brentano in being constructed in terms of relations between 
wholes and parts and assigns a central importance to the role of strong wholes in 
the description of ideal objects. In that analysis the term “concrete” is used to 
describe any strong whole, which can, by nature, have an isolated and 
independent existence. This sense of “concrete” is being employed here by
143 Scheler, 1973b, p. 157.
144 Scheler, 1973a, p. 383.
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Scheler.145 146The term “concrete” then as it applies to “the person” refers to the fact 
the being of acts of different essences, in constituting “the person”, are 
interdependently bound together to form a strong whole, or “unity”, that is 
capable of possessing an independent existence. Moreover, the constitution of 
“the person” is that of concrete unity “essentially”. In other words, this unitary 
“transcendent” structure forms a strong whole with its interdependent parts, 
which, as we shall see, are act-essences.
The above characterization is adequate in so far as it deals with “the 
person” as an abstract notion. However, if Scheler is to give an account of the 
possibility of real non-formal a priori contents and provide us with a theory of the 
non-formal relationship of mind and world then he needs to account for the role of 
individual mental “acts” in the emergence of the a priori objective structure of 
experience in time. Thus, later in Formalism he augments his discussion of what 
constitutes a concretization of “the person” in the following way:
Abstract act-essences concretize into concrete act-essences only by 
belonging to the essence of this or that individual person.... Any 
“interconnective complex” will remain a mere complex of abstract act- 
essences if the person “himself’ in whom such an interconnective complex
. . * 146exists is not given.
In line with Scheler’s dictum that all spiritual being can only exist in dependence 
of extra-spiritual being the addition of this qualification to Scheler’s theory of the 
person clearly suggests that “the concrete and essential unity of the being of acts 
of different essences”, i.e., “the person”, is not truly “concrete” unless
145 Cf., for example, ibid., p. 383n.
146 Ibid., p. 384.
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immediately manifest, or exemplified, in some particular person. Thus, “the 
person,” considered in absence of the condition of exemplification in a real 
person, cannot be a concrete and essential unity as defined above. The 
“concretization” of this “abstract structure” requires its movement in an “act” - 
that is, in the act of a real particular person. The person is concrete only in the 
execution of acts.
Scheler’s theory is intriguing but there is problem as it now stands. Since 
the person is the “the concrete and essential unity of acts of different essences” 
any single concrete “act” of a real person cannot be sufficient to concretize “the 
person” as Scheler has defined it. Scheler, however, has not yet finished and we 
soon find him augmenting his theory of the “the person” as follows:
If we consider only one concrete act of a person, this act contains in itself 
all possible act-essences, and its objective correlate contains all essential 
factors of world ... on the basis of an a priori and lawful structure, valid 
without exception for all possible persons and all possible acts of all 
persons. This structure is valid not only for the real world but also for all 
possible worlds.147
In this passage Scheler first claims that every concrete “act” of a real person, 
given its correlate “essence”, “contains” the entire atemporal abstract a priori 
“act-essence” structure of “the person”.148 This assertion effectively guarantees 
that any concrete act of a real person will also be a concretization of the entire 
“person”. Scheler then postulates an a priori and lawful structure as a formal 
guarantor that the non-formal a priori will behave as he has suggested. This
147 Ibid., p. 393.
148 Cf. Scheler, 1961, pp. 36-37, and Frings, 1996, pp. 95-96.
lawful structure, it seems, is simply “the person” considered in abstraction and so 
is an a priori and formal condition of all possible non-formal person-world 
manifestations.
Since Scheler’s argument is complex let us now recap the details of the 
theory as we have considered it thus far. First, it postulates an ideal a priori 
objective structure of experience that contains all possible “act-essences”, i.e., the 
person.149 Second, to the extent that any concrete “act” is o/the a priori objective 
structure of “the person” it always occurs, by virtue of an a priori law, conjoined 
in interdependence with its corresponding “essence”. These first two facts 
together guarantee the objectivity of the contents of any mental act to the extent 
that that act exemplifies, or is a manifestation of, a “part” of the entire a priori 
“person-world” structure. Third, any particular concrete “act” contains, in some 
sense of that term, the entire a priori structure of “the person”. Of course, the idea 
that a single part can contain all the parts that make up the whole is both 
counterintuitive and, since there is no clear sense in which a part can “contain” a 
whole, logically inconsistent.150 This fact, puts a heavy burden on Scheler’s 
notion of “containing”. Unfortunately, it is not adequately explicated and since 
there is no clear sense in which a part can “contain” a whole Scheler, like
149 The quasi-Platonic idea that a transcendent world o f “ideal objects”, in some sense, “pre­
exists” their instantiation is an idea to which Scheler appears to have been attached throughout his 
career. In Idealism and Realism, one of his last works, we find the following statement: “It is clear 
that the being of ideal objects and their conformity to law are independent o f  and logically prior to 
the being o f real objects” (1973b, p. 303). Unfortunately, it is neither clear what such a statement 
means nor that it is true. It is only clear that Scheler needs to posit the a priori structure of ideal 
objects to logically secure the possibility of objective experience.
i5oJOf course, this idea is not completely impossible to come to terms with, at least intuitively. 
There are examples o f  systems that more or less fit this description. One such example would be a 
hologram, wherein any portion of the hologram in some sense contains the information necessary 
to create the whole structure. Another example might be that of a living cell, since the DNA of a 
cell contains all the information necessary to construct the whole creature. Finally, there is the 
example o f seeds. Unfortunately, in these examples the whole does not “contain” in part in the 
strict sense that is necessary for a concrete act to guarantee the objectivity of its content.
Brentano, is subject to the charge of inconsistency. Finally, Scheler maintains that 
the realm of the ideal and the realm of the real exist in interdependence. “The 
person” can only be to the extent that some real person exists.151
6. There is one nuance of Scheler’s theory that is left to be addressed. If the 
person is identical with the objective act-essence structure then it would appear 
that to the extent that the abstract structure of “the person” is concretely 
exemplified in more than one person the phenomenal lives of those persons must 
coincide with the ideal “person”, i.e., the objective structure of experience.152 153
Scheler, however, does not arrive at this conclusion. In contrast to every major 
philosophical theory I can think of, Scheler finds such a conclusion completely 
unsatisfactory. Nothing is more obvious to Scheler than that every person contains 
a particular personality and that this fact cannot be an impediment to the 
realization of absolute truth. He suggests that one need only “glance at the person 
himself and his essence immediately yields a peculiarity for every act that we 
know him to execute, and the knowledge of his ‘world’ yields a peculiarity for the 
contents of his acts”. This fact, moreover, he claims, neither results from any 
contingent characteristics of a person such as embodiment, ego, or environmental 
impact, nor can it “be grasped in terms of essential concepts pertaining to general 
essences”.154 The latter claim entails that, since “the person” is itself an essential 
concept pertaining to general essences, this peculiarity cannot be grasped through 
the concept of “the person”.
151 Scheler also defines the person as “the immediately co experienced unity o f experiencing-'' 
(1973a, p. 371).
152 Cf. Scheler, 1973a, ch. 6/A. Such is that case with any theory which holds the person as 
essentially a rational being, e.g., Descartes, Hegel, and Fichte (cf. ibid,, p. 372). Thus, the 
structure of spirit-world is not essentially rational though rationality may be an essential aspect.
153 Ibid., p. 386.
154 Ibid., p. 394.
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What we have failed to consider up to now is that, according to Scheler, an 
ultimate particularity, or personality, “is a general essential trait of all possible 
worlds”, i.e., of “persons”, as they emerge into time and space.155 “Hence 
metaphysical truth, or ‘the’ truth, must have a different content, within the limits 
of the a priori structure of world, for each person because the content of world- 
being is, in every case, different for each person”.156 Notice that Scheler’s theory 
will only sustain this demand for “individualized objectivity” because of the 
assumption that each concrete act “contains” the entire act-essence structure.
Since any truly concrete act is held to “contain” “the person” and an ultimate 
peculiarity is essential to each concrete person there is no single template of “the 
person”. The concrete person varies with the particular “act consciousness” which 
is responsible for its manifestation. In line with his intuitions Scheler gives “the 
person” an infinite number of faces.
But in an environment where “the objective structure of experience” varies 
across persons the notion of “objectivity” loses its moorings to intersubjective and 
universal validity. Scheler elucidates this fact as follows:
Needless to say, “universal validity” has nothing to do with the a priori, for 
“universality” in no sense belongs to essence [Wesenheit]. There are 
individual essences and essential interconnections between individual 
elements. We have stressed elsewhere that universality in the sense of 
validity “for” all subjects having a certain “understanding”, or for the 
human species, has nothing to do with the “a priori”. There can very well be 
an a priori for only one individual’s insight, or one that only one individual
155 Ibid., p. 394.
156 Ibid., pp. 394-5.
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can have! A proposition based on the a priori is “universal” only for those 
subjects who can have the same insight (all universality is essentially “for” 
someone, whereas the a priori does not at all imply such a “for” relation).157
In this passage Scheler is at pains to differentiate his theory from any theory that 
seeks to explain objective experience by suggesting that an existent relates to a 
universal validity of some kind - whether exemplified in the form of a proposition, 
or in the form of a transcendent structure. For Scheler there is no subsistent soul 
to guarantee the identity of the subject through time. The person just “consists” in 
his acts.158 Hence, “act-essences” come into being through the concrete acts of 
real persons. And, since each act “contains” the entire act-essence structure, the 
real person, to the extent that it is dissociated from anything contingent, is 
essentially the manifestation of the a priori structure of “the person”.
Nevertheless, the fact that subjects “can have the same insight” implies that 
“experiences” are relating to a reality in which both parties participate.159 Thus, it
157 Scheler, 1973a, p.76. One of the first points that Scheler makes about essences is that they are 
neither universal nor particular. The essence red, for example, can be found in the universal 
concept as well as in each perceivable shade of this colour. Any universality or particularity must, 
therefore, be determined experientially through discovering whether or not any particular essence 
is found in a plurality o f objects o f different kinds. Second, essences are cognized completely 
independently o f  the ontological status of the objects that serve as the vehicle for such cognitions. 
Consequently, a priori essences and their interconnections can be given in objects of fiction and 
fantasy, or in deception. Third, essences are not learned, in any sense of the term. One exposure is 
all that is required for an essence to be grasped and it then may be validly applied to all objects 
and situations in which it plays a part. An essence is not conceptual but informs concepts, and is 
not a thing but can constitute the nature o f an individual thing. In a priori essences and essential 
interconnections, therefore, we have a foundation for judgment and cognition itself, which 
threatens to transcend the strict separation of universal and particular, o f concept and object, and 
o f  mind and world.
158 He claims:
Surely the person is and experiences himself only as a being that executes acts, he is in no 
sense “behind” or “above” acts, or something standing “above” the execution and 
processes of acts, like a point at rest. For all o f this is a picture taken from a spatiotemporal 
sphere; and it stands to reason that this does not hold for the relation between person and 
acts (p. 385).
Nevertheless, acts are executed, and since acts correspond to essences a priori, it is the nature of a 
given act that is responsible for the degree o f objectivity of the essence that appears.
159 Scheler writes:
is difficult to see how Scheler can simultaneously maintain that a priori essences 
are phenomenological “facts” which are not “for” any subject and that such 
“facts” are not necessarily valid universally.
Here we see Scheler concerned with a central and recurrent onto- 
epistemological problem, i.e., the apparent need to rid the subject of “subjectivity” 
to secure the possibility of “objective” experience. Scheler’s general approach to 
this problem is to attempt to isolate his theory of the non-formal a priori from it 
by in essence suggesting that the experiencer and the experience arise together. 
Scheler asserts that, the fact that absolute being can only arise in a person in 
accordance with a priori structural laws entails that absolute truth be personal. 
“And,” writes Scheler, “insofar as truth is impersonal, and insofar as it is 
‘universal’ and not personally valid, there must be either falsehood or merely truth 
relative to life”.160 Such statements make it appear that Scheler is concerned to 
secure, theoretically at least, a priori intuitive knowledge “for” particular 
persons.161 But this is not Scheler’s goal.
The person, as the concrete objective structure of experience and its 
experiencer, it seems, come into being in interdependence. The emergence of 
objective “contents” therefore is dependent on the concrete acts of particular 
persons with particular personalities.162 But, as we have seen, for anything at all to
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the discussion of phenomenological issues cannot 
enter into the question o f universally valid truth or into the problem of how we can still 
understand an individually valid truth in spite of its individual validity - contrary to what 
the opponents of phenomenologists like to claim, not in order to refute phenomenologists 
but to silence them. For this much is clear: If what is seen by A is genuine essence, then 
everyone must be able to see it, since its inclusion in the content o f  all possible experience 
is essentially necessary (1973b, pp. 154-155; cf. also footnote).
160 Scheler, 1973a, p .395.
161 He suggests that a priori “essences” are not for  persons but at the same time makes the 
emergence o f such facts depend on the “being of the person”.
162 He suggests that in principle such “act-contents” are immune from outside corruption, see for 
example Scheler, 1954, pp. 163-164. He also writes in his last work that; “our own participation in
appear “the person” must become a real person. Any real person, however, 
necessarily functions through its lived body and historically, culturally, and 
biologically effected mind. This immediately raises the question of how 
phenomenological “facts” are to be isolated from among everyday percepts and 
concepts. Scheler (1973a) maintains:
We designate as (a priori’ all those ideal units of meaning and those 
propositions that are self-given by way of an immediate intuitive content in 
the absence of any kind of positing [Setzung] of subjects that think them 
and of the real nature of these subjects, and in the absence of any kind of 
positing of objects to which such units of meaning are applicable.163
This gives the impression at least that the a priori will appear just in case the real 
nature of the subject is completely transcended such that the subject (with its 
inherent desires) does not contribute anything to that which appears (i.e., does not 
“combine” representations, or in anyway add something which is not “given”). 
But, as we know, this cannot be the case. If, as Scheler suggests, the 
interdependence of spiritual and extra-spiritual being comprehensively extends to 
all possible being, “ideal units of meaning” can only be just in case they exist in 
“real” being of some kind.
Now, if Scheler were to maintain that this real “being” is contingent in any 
fashion he would introduce contingency into “the objective structure of 
experience”. In one place Scheler claims that: The being of the person is ... the
these acts [of eternal spirit] is not simply a matter of discovering or o f  disclosing some being or 
essence that exists independently o f us. It is, rather, a genuine co-creation o f the essences, ideas, 
values and goals coordinated with the eternal logos, the eternal love, and the eternal will" Scheler, 
1961, p. 48.
163 Scheler, 1973a, p. 48.
foundation” o f all essentially different acts.164 But what can the word “being” 
mean in this context? Scheler appears to be maintaining some kind of foundation 
for “acts” over and above the acts themselves. This would fit with our observation 
that Scheler’s conception of “the person” is an ideal abstraction and hence, 
requires the power, if you will, of a real being for its concretization. But if Scheler 
must admit the necessity of the “real” contingently formed being as the foundation 
of the manifestation of the a priori structure of experience he will, it seems, be 
caught in a trap of his own devising. For it is difficult to see how he can 
consistently maintain both the possibility of a type of experience which is 
independent of the contingent nature of the real person, and that this same real 
person is foundational to said experience.165
If we accept that all “phenomena” emerge interdependently with “the real 
nature of the subject” then it appears we must concern ourselves with how to 
“purify” our mental acts. We must consider the question of how to remove from 
the subject contingencies related to its embodied being so that its “ideal” nature 
can serve as the foundation of its mental acts. In other words, we must consider 
how to isolate the a priori nature of any particular subject from its a posteriori 
nature. This problem is a familiar one and, for Scheler, a central aspect of his 
philosophy.166 With respect to this problem two intertwined threads that run
164 Ibid., p. 383.
165 Scheler claims that “each experience is fully and adequately given only if the experiencing 
individual is co given in it” (1973a, p. 377). Scheler suggests that person and act are neither 
mental nor physical, but are psychophysically indifferent. He writes: “We are not troubled by the 
old Cartesian alternative, which requires that everything be either psychic or physical. For such a 
long time this alternative has concealed ideal objects....”(1973a, p. 389). But Scheler’s theory 
cannot wholly avoid such Cartesian concerns. Notice also that if  the real person becomes the 
foundation of the emergence of “contents” then the spectre of an infinite regress raises its head 
resulting from the fact that the intentional acts o f a real person presupposes content.
166 Cf., for example, Scheler 1973a, p. 380-381. Husserl also requires a similar overcoming of 
“embeddedness in the world” to bring about a transcendent awareness through which species are 
made apparent (CM §15/p. 35, in Bell, 1990, p. 169).
through Scheler’s thought. The first is that a priori “facts” emerge in acts of 
“ideation” as a cancellation of the reality of the world. The second, stresses the 
“purification” of human being, in its essential nature as spiritual being, and 
detachment from all that is relative to this nature. Cognition of “essences”, it 
seems, like Kant’s harmonization of the cognitive faculties, requires the absence 
of drive impulses, such as desire, and of representations in the mind. According to 
Scheler, the human beings’ ability to detach from its environment and its own 
psycho-emotional states is what differentiates it from “animals” and what permits 
the emergence of a priori essences. Doing phenomenology, in Scheler’s sense, 
involves a kind of meditative practice wherein contingencies relative to situated- 
embodiment are peeled off the lenses of awareness thereby permitting the 
employment of intuitive insight. Developing phenomenological insight involves 
overcoming all that is contingent to manifesting spirit. Scheler mentions the ego, 
bodiliness, and prejudices, each of which block “absolute truth” from view. Thus, 
one has access to such truths to the extent that one is able to dissociate ones 
awareness from the “natural view” of the world.
7. As I mentioned above, Scheler was influenced by Buddhist philosophy 
and appears to share some basic metaphysical assumptions with certain canonical 
forms of Buddhism. I will now expand briefly on this relationship in order to 
further clarify Scheler’s position and indicate where he seems to go astray.
Scheler argues for the a priority of a certain class of “non-formal” phenomena 
which are permitted to vary across individuals. As we have seen his main line of 
argument for such a conclusion is not entirely cogent. The key assumption in this 
argument, once again, is the existence of a priori structural “laws” which are valid
for the real world and all possible worlds and which govern the regular emergence 
of particular “essences” given corresponding “acts”. A central assumption of 
Buddhist philosophy generally is also that of “pre-existent laws” which are, in 
some sense, contained in a unity and which govern the regular emergence of all 
phenomena given corresponding intentional acts.167 Buddhism, however, does not 
go on from this assumption to postulate the possibility of a multiplicity of mental 
phenomena that are in no way relative to the historically embodied “subject”. 
Why, we might ask, given a philosophically analogous fundamental assumption 
does Buddhism contradict Scheler and deny the possibility of phenomena that are 
completely removed from the contingencies of embodied existence? The short 
answer to this question is that since, for Buddhism, any self must arise with an 
object, and absolute self is no self, any experience necessarily participates in the 
contingent.168
A key concept of Buddhism is that of pratitya-samutpada, which literally 
means “conditioned co-arising” or “interdependent co-arising” but is often also 
translated as “conditional nexus” or “causal nexus”.169 It is the name given to a 
twelve member series that is held to account for the appearance, and apparent 
substantiality, of subject and world - that is, it accounts for content.170 We will
167 These are the laws of dharma, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.
168 As we will see in chapters 4 & 5 this statement also appears to be true of Kant.
169 M. H. Kohn, trans., The Shambhala Dictionary of Buddhism and Zen. Boston: Shambhala, 
1991. Cf. also, L. M. Pruden, trans., Abhidarmakosabhagyam, Berkley: Asian Humanities Press, 
1988, pp. 413-17. “The meaning o f the expression pratitya-samutpada is as indicated in the Sutra, 
“If that exists, then this exists; through the arising of that, there is the arising of this.” (p. 414).
170 Scheler, appears to agree with this position and writes: “Whenever self-consciousness and 
consciousness o f an object arise, they do so simultaneously and through the same process.” 
(1973b, p. 298). He goes on from this point to explicate what he has in mind by contrasting it with 
the kind o f judgment employed in abstraction.
The categorical form of an object is not first impressed in a judgment upon a non-objective 
given, not even in a one-term, simple judgment, as some people have thought (e.g.,
Heinrich Maier in his book Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit). This is a pure construction. 
Consciousness of an object precedes all judgment and is not originally constituted by 
judgment. The same holds true of consciousness o f states o f affairs. The consciousness of
have an opportunity to examine this concept in detail in the fourth chapter but for 
the moment it is sufficient to observe that the series can be divided into two parts, 
which are closely associated with two uses of the term vijnana. The first part of 
the series can be meaningfully captured under a metaphysical use of vijnana as 
“consciousness”. Vijnana in this sense can be understood as roughly parallel in 
function to Scheler’s use of “the person” considered as an atemporal structure of 
experience the postulation of which is necessary to account for the appearance of 
any phenomena whatsoever.171 The second part of the series comes under a use of 
vijnana as “cognition” considered as that process through which the atemporal 
structure of experience is able to “concretize”.172
Now, in spite of these apparent parallels between Scheler’s philosophy and 
Buddhism, in contrast to Scheler, Buddhism does not make claims for “pure” a 
priori mental phenomena. For Buddhism, the “a priori laws” which govern the 
interdependent emergence of mental phenomena do not guarantee the
an object and the intentional object are not the result o f  an active [tatige] “forming” or 
“imprinting” which we perform on the given through judgments or any other operations of 
thought. On the contrary, they are the result of a pulling back, the result, that is, of the 
reflexive act, in which an originally ecstatic [ekstatic gebender] act turns back knowingly 
onto itself and comes upon a central self as its starting point. This central self can be given 
at every level and degree of “concentration” and “collectedness” o f “self-consciousness” 
(1973b, p. 298).
Scheler seems to think that this self-consciousness, which arises with consciousness of an object, 
is the central self and can somehow be “given”. Buddhism, on the other hand, holds any 
consciousness that arises with an object to be impermanent, insubstantial, and without genuine 
essence.
171 In the Yogacara school, as we shall see, a species of vijhana is held to “contain”, all possible 
“phenomena” in potential form. W.S. Waldron, How innovative is the alayavijnanal: The 
alayavijhdna in the context of the canonical and Abhidhrama vijnana theory. Part 1, Journal of 
Indian Philosophy, 22: 199-258,1994, in particular pp. 201-2. Cf. also this text chapter 4, n. 15.
172 Here one might observe the tension which exists within any theory which suggests that 
“subject” and “object” are merely “co-arising interdependent phenomena” and the idea of a 
subject which “acts” or “cognizes” its “phenomena”. These two senses o f vijhana can only appear 
to co-exist happily because of the underlying metaphysical doctrine, widespread in Indian 
philosophies, o f “an ultimate homology between what we would call the psychological and 
metaphysical realms, what Maryla Falk (1943:49) considers a ‘conception o f  a fundamental 
identity o f  the facts and events on both the scales, which are considered as only twin projections 
o f  one common complex of facts and events’” (Ibid., p.226).
“objectivity” of those phenomena. There is nothing to prohibit a conditioned and
contingent “mental act” x  from interdependently arising with phenomenon y  in 
accordance with an a priori “law” z. In fact, for Buddhism all “phenomena” 
manifest in just this way and are consequently all viewed equally in being 
conditioned. For the Buddhists, although interdependent arising in accordance 
with “a priori laws” guarantees a kind of invariant relationship between act and 
content, it does not guarantee the “absolute” nature, or objectivity, of that “act- 
content”. Rather any product of interdependent arising is held to be impermanent 
and inessential - that is, it has only momentary existence and its “content” exists 
in interdependence with, and relative to, the nature of its co-emerging “mental 
act”.173 The doctrine, therefore, applies both to any self, or soul, and to its 
interdependently emerging manifestations.174 Both Scheler and the Buddhists 
deny the existence of an enduring self, or soul, that subsists throughout a 
succession of experiences “in order to safeguard the ‘identity of the individual 
person’”.175 The crucial difference between these philosophies concerns the 
ontological status of the “mental act”. In demanding the possibility of a kind of 
individualized objectivity Scheler makes personality a general essential trait of all 
possible worlds and the “being” of the real person as the foundation of all acts. He 
also insists that “acts” are executed. These assertions together would seem to 
imply the essentiality of an executor of acts. The metaphysics of interdependent
173 Cf., chapter 4, n. 23 for further clarification of these terms.
174 Here we should note that:
Buddha himself, in answer to the question whether a self exists or not, never put forward a 
definite position so as not to cause new concepts to arise that would be irrelevant and 
obstructive for spiritual practice. Thus the teaching of no self is to be understood more as a 
fruitful pedagogical device than as a philosophical doctrine. Nevertheless in the course of 
the development of the Buddhist system of thought, this came more and more to be an 
unequivocal denial o f the existence of a self. M.H. Kohn, The Shambhala Dictionary of 
Buddhism and Zen. Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1991, p.8.
175 Scheler, 1973a, p. 385.
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arising and actionless acts , however, demands an inessential actor - that is, no 
essential self. It is unclear from Scheler’s writings as to how he intended to 
reconcile these apparently contradictory demands.176
Buddhism argues that if it is the case that there is no enduring self, i.e., 
that the “self’ subsists entirely within the dynamic of interdependent arising then 
the subject loses its ontological independence from this arising. So also if, as 
Scheler argues, all sense of “action” and “actor” must be removed from “act” and 
the subject just consists in its “acts” which arise with corresponding “essences”, 
then the “subject”, as a permanent and essential entity, has vanished! But if this 
“subject” is denied an independent and permanent reality it is not clear how 
content is possible, as “experiences” would seem to be completely relative to each 
momentary interdependently arising subject. If, for instance, the appearance of 
beautiful “object” x  at time t can be adequately explained by its “law governed 
interdependent arising” with the appearance of “subject” y at time t then questions 
of the objectivity or subjectivity of the experience of x would appear to lose their 
force because the account seems to provide no role for the autonomous “mental 
acts” of an independent and, in some sense, permanent subject. To speak 
colloquially, there seems to be no “self’ that continues through experiences to get 
the facts of the matter wrong or right and, therefore, no possibility of experience,
176 That view that such contradictory demands are in fact irreconcilable is a view o f one branch of 
Buddhist philosophy. The contemporary Indian philosopher J. N. Mohanty argues as follows: "A 
phenomenological philosophy has to accept a radical phenomenological discontinuity, and any 
attempt to overcome it is to be suspected as originating from a too hasty desire to achieve 
metaphysical simplicity. One of the beauties of the Advaita Vedanta is that it accepts such a 
discontinuity between vyâvahârika (the empirical) and the pâramârthika (the transcendental), and 
considers any relationship between them as being logically indescribable. Our distinction between 
the practical and the theoretical may be regarded as a pale reflection of that spiritual philosophy on 
the level o f secular philosophizing.” (J. N. Mohanty, Phenomenology and Ontology, Martinus 
Nijhoff: The Haag, 1970, p. 103) This passage concisely captures a central thrust o f this 
dissertation.
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or more generally, of content. To accept such an account at face value would not, 
therefore, help us to understand our original problem of what it is that enables the 
possibility of content - that is, what it is that, if we take Kant seriously, abrogates 
the need for an infinite regress of rules of judgment.
Scheler, it seems, does not argue cogently that a non-formal a priori 
structure of awareness is constitutively influential in experience. How then might 
we attempt to rescue the subject and with it the possibility of experience from the 
oblivion to which our investigation of Scheler has led it? If we acknowledge the 
apparently greater consistency of the Buddhist position and admit to the 
inessential nature of all phenomena we would appear to be forced into a position 
where we are not able to provide a satisfactory response to the problem of content. 
In order to make further progress towards understanding how content is possible 
we will, at least temporarily, abandon Scheler and Buddhism. In the next chapter 
we will examine a philosophy not ostensibly based on interdependent arising. The 
philosophy of Meister Eckhart, as we will see, appears to be better situated to 
provide for a “self’, which is sufficiently permanent to permit a satisfactory 
response to the problem of content, and to permit us to move forward in our 
attempt to understand the foundations of cognition.
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Chapter 3
Meister Eckhart
1. Our focus in this chapter is once again with the problem of content and
with understanding those “mental processes” which are foundational to cognition. 
Our interest in Eckhart is primarily motivated by the realization that in the course 
of his attempts “to explain what the holy Christian faith and the two Testaments 
maintain through the help of the natural philosophers” he perhaps provides us 
with a way forward.177 As we will see, Eckhart’s explanations of how the mind 
comes to know things often employs the notion of “ideal objects” which exist 
potentially in the mind - an idea which can be traced at least to Aristotle. This 
postulation provides Eckhart with a fundamentally Aristotelian way to account for 
the emergence of intelligible forms (i.e., content). However, although Eckhart 
draws on Aristotle to help render these matters more satisfactory his own account 
is unique as it is ultimately not dependent on there being a proliferation of such 
entities either potentially or actually. In the final analysis Eckhart suggests that 
there is no “being”, either determinate or indeterminate in the ground of the mind. 
The mind, in its capacity to render intelligible forms, is fundamentally groundless. 
But, for Eckhart, this fact does not imply that experience is not possible or that it
177 E. Colledge and B. McGinn, Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons Commentaries 
Treatises, and Defense, London: SPCK, 1981, p. 123. commentaries,
is impossible to have knowledge of the ground of the mind. Rather Eckhart argues 
that for a detached mind both of these are simultaneously possible.
Much of Eckhart’s work is, as Schttrmann informs us, an attempt to 
reconcile his original insights into the nature of being with the philosophical 
thought that dominated Medieval Europe. One school of thought that flourished in 
Germany during the fourteenth century went by the name of Platonist 
Albertinism. The central doctrine of this philosophy held that all things eternally 
preexist in God by means of their ideal being. Plato, in the Meno, prefigures the 
thrust of this doctrine. In the Meno, as part of his inquiry into the teachability of 
virtue, Socrates concerns himself with how knowledge is possible and with the 
nature of its source. Central to this inquiry is his explication of the theory of 
recollection (anamnesis) whereby one is able to discover the truth of things buried 
within oneself like seeds. Socrates puts the theory to the test by eliciting from a 
boy who has not received instruction the answer to a geometrical problem. Since 
the problem is a geometrical one, it is one that cannot be answered by an appeal to 
the senses. Thus, when the correct answer is elicited Socrates claims that he has 
enabled the boy to recollect something that he had known by means of the pre­
existence of his soul. To further support his argument Socrates mentions that the 
doctrine that the soul has long ago experienced all things in its various existences 
is well known to the priests and poets. Hence, in a sense, the soul knows all things 
but because it has forgotten them it has to be reminded of them.
In the hands of Thomas Aquinas and other medieval theologians this 
doctrine receives a reading which is mediated by Aristotle’s theory of the intellect 
and his modification of Plato’s theory of Forms. Of particular significance to
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Eckhart are the following points from Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De 
Anima. First, Aristotle claims that for any organ of sense to function properly it 
must be “without” any property and entirely receptive. Aquinas interprets this 
principle as applying also to the intellect. Thus, he maintains that if one is to know 
the truth of all things the intellect must be entirely receptive and empty of any 
“images” of its own production.178 Second, Aristotle suggests that although the 
mind, as the intellectual part of the soul, is a place of “forms” they only reside 
there potentially and not actually.179 Aristotle does not object to talk of the ideas 
of all things residing in man’s intellect so far as these ideas are understood only 
potentially to inhere there. Eckhart subscribes to a similar position in his 
Commentary on the Gospel of John.180 Eckhart’s way of explicating what this 
means is, however, not the same as Aristotle’s.181
In addition to being influenced by the views of Plato and Aristotle the 
tradition of Medieval Scholasticism was also heavily influenced by Neoplatonic 
thought.182 Of particular interest to Eckhart was a text of Proclus’, entitled Book of 
Causes.
According to Proclus, the fiod, the first deployment or radiation 
springing from the One, contains in itself intellectually the multiplicity of 
sensible forms; like a reservoir of archetypes, it collects potentialities of all
178 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, ch. Ill, lecture 7, K. Foster et al., 
trans., New Haven, 1951, pp. 402-410.
179 Aristotle writes: “It has been said well that the soul is a place o f forms or ideas: except that this 
is not true for the whole soul, but only of the soul which can think, and again that the forms are 
there not in actuality but potentially.” (Aristotle, De Anima, book III, ch. 4; 429 a 27; R. D. Hicks, 
trans., Amsterdam, 1907,1965, p. 131, in R. Schtirmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and 
Philosopher, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978, p. 34)
180 Cf. College and McGinn, pp. 123-4.
181 Cf. R. SchUrmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher, Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1978, pp. 172-180.
182 Ibid., p. 73.
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things. With relation to the One, the summit of the universe and source of 
all existing things, in whose divinity it shares, the intellect is a henad• the 
first “hypostasis” or the first degree of perfection, and the family of the 
gods; with relation to existing beings, to which it gives intelligence, it is a 
“monad,” the principle in the quality of which they share.... It is, one might 
say, the threshold where the One overflows into the multiple: “One and yet 
not one”.183
In Proclus’ schematic of the universe the fio6 involves a  twofold process 
in  which the  m ultiplicity of objects is derived from the One and then  
led back to the  One. The in tensity  of being increases on such 
Neoplatonic systems as the  mind approaches the  fullness of being in 
universal One. Eckhart shares with Proclus the general idea that the intellect and 
the One are intimately related and that, in some sense, the intellect contains, 
potentially, all possible “intelligible forms”. Their general philosophical 
perspectives, however, are utterly distinct.184 According to SchUrmann, Eckhart 
adopts Neoplatonic vocabulary primarily because he cannot articulate his 
experience of the ground of being adequately and stay within the limits of 
Aristotelian philosophy.185
Having familiarized ourselves with some of Eckhart’s philosophical 
influences let us now take a closer look at how he suggests intelligible forms 
emerge (i.e., how content manifests). Central to Eckhart’s account is a division of 
the intellect into active and passive aspects. According Eckhart, intelligible forms
183 Ibid., p. 37.
There is, for example, nothing in Proclus that compares to Eckhart’s conception of the power 
o f the intellect to “manifest” the Son of the One.
185 SchUrmann, 1978, p. 140.
manifest by means of a movement of “Forms” or “principles” from the active to 
the passive intellect. In this way those Forms which inhere only potentially in the 
mind are rendered actual.186 Eckhart illustrates this model as follows:
Now observe. We spoke just now of an active and a passive intellect. The 
active intellect abstracts images from outward things, stripping them of 
matter and of accidents, and introduces them to the passive intellect, 
begetting their mental image therein. And the passive intellect, made 
pregnant by the active in this way, cherishes and knows these things with 
the aid of the active intellect. Even then, the passive intellect cannot keep on 
knowing these things unless the active intellect illumines them afresh.187
Here Eckhart suggests that things are known, or illuminated, in the movement of 
“images” from the active to the passive intellect. This description of how we come 
to know things is, it seems, not far removed from Aristotle’s characterization of 
the role of intelligence (nous) in the Nictomachean Ethics in so far as both 
accounts are concerned with attaining truth by means of abstracting universals and 
first principles from experience of particulars.188 On this general line of thought
186 Both Aquinas and Eckhart show particular interest in the following passage o f De Anima: “The 
mind as we have described it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another 
which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort o f a positive state like light; for in a 
sense light makes potential color into actual color. Mind in this sense of it is... in its essential 
nature activity....” (Aristotle, De Anima, book III, ch. 5, in R. McKeon, Trans. The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, New York: Random House, 1941, p. 592) Aquinas picks up the essentials o f these ideas 
and repeats them in his own words. He writes: “The intellect is an active immaterial force able to 
assimilate other things to itself, i.e., to immaterialize them; in this way it makes the potentially 
intelligible actually so.” (Ibid., Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, book III, ch. 5, lecture 10,
n. 739; p. 430)
187 M. O ’C. Walshe, German Sermons & Treatises Vol. I, II, & III, London: Watkins Publishing, 
1979, Vol. I, pp. 29-30.
188 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. M. Oswald. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Inc., 1962, N.E., 1141al-20, pp. 154-156. Hence, for Aristotle, it would seem that in the sphere of 
matters about which deliberation is possible practical wisdom is that faculty which employs those 
ultimate forms, or universals, which intelligence is able to make available in receptivity. The 
resulting ultimate particulars may be used by active thought in theoretical matters. In this way 
“practical wisdom does not use theoretical wisdom but makes the provisions to secure it” [1145a- 
8].
once universals, or principles, are abstracted they are then “illumined” by means 
of passing them from the active intellect to passive intellect as described above. 
But there is a significant problem with this kind of abstractionist approach to 
accounting for how things are rendered intelligible. It can provide no way to 
account for how “principles” are abstracted without presupposing that which 
needs to be explained.
On the line of thought advanced here by Eckhart abstracting a principle 
requires that one first identify likeness in the world. But identifying a “likeness” 
requires applying within the abstracting “process” a matching principle. Since, in 
practice, this latter principle turns out to be the very same “likeness” one is 
attempting to identify, there is ultimately no way for the active intellect to abstract 
principles. It can only pass on to the passive intellect those principles that it, in 
some sense, already possesses. Hence, as Eckhart observes, the problem with 
relying on abstraction is simply that “the active intellect cannot give what it has 
not [already] got”.189 And since the active intellect has no power of its own to 
create ex nihilo that which intelligence grasps (in receptivity),190 an account of 
how content emerges which relies on abstracting images from outward things, if it 
is to have a chance of being satisfactory, must assume that the movement through 
which likenesses are identified is powered by ultimate Forms, Principles, or 
Universals all of which, in some sense, must already exist within the abstraction
189 Walshe, Vol. I, p. 30.
190 Cf. Colledge and McGinn, p. 73; and R. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc., 1941, p. 98. Aristotle seems also to have noticed this fact. He writes:
“Intelligence is, therefore, both starting point and end; for demonstrations start with ultimate terms 
and have ultimate facts as their objects.” (Aristotle, M. Oswald, trans., p. 167n., NE, 1143bl0)
process. Thus Eckhart relies on the Aristotelian idea that the Forms exist 
potentially in the mind (sè ie ) .191 1923
But, as we have suggested, even this idea is not completely adequate to 
Eckhart’s understanding of the process through which things are rendered 
determinate. This is shown, for example, when in speaking of God’s perfections 
(e.g., goodness, truth, justice, love, wisdom, etc.) he writes that,
among perfections in themselves intelligence comes first, and then 
determinate or indeterminate being.... On the basis of this I show that in 
God there is no being, determinate or indeterminate.... Nevertheless I say 
that if there is anything in God that you want to call being, it belongs to him
♦ 192through his intelligence.
God’s intelligence, it seems, is immanent to that movement of the intellect 
through which things are rendered intelligible. This same intelligence is 
required both in tasks of perceiving, reason, imagining, judging, etc., and in 
drawing aside the veil to perceive “God naked, stripped, of goodness, or of being, 
or of any name.”194 This fact makes it clear that Eckhart’s commitment to 
potentially pre-existent Forms is not without equivocation and implies that such 
talk is employed primarily as a useful expository device.195
191 Eckhart’s use of the term sêle has two meanings one corresponding to anima, the animating 
principle o f the body, and the other to animus which can be more accurately translated as "mind” 
(Schiirmann, 1978, p. xiv).
192 Master Eckhart, Parisian Questions and Prologues, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 
Toronto, 1974, pp. 46-48; in Schiirmann, p. 189.
193 God is the active form of Godhead (Blakney, p. 226).
194 Blakney, p. 221.
195 Schiirmann claims that, for Eckhart; "God is the universal par excellence: everything universal, 
inasmuch as it is universal, he says, is G od.... Eckhart pushes to extremes the Aristotelian 
teaching according to which universal forms exist only in particular beings. In the ground of the 
mind the universal is particularized (I possess intelligible forms), and the particular universalized 
(I am detached from sensible forms). In fact this thrust leads Meister Eckhart to abolish both 
universal and particular in the ground of the mind. The identity of a shared quality is a false
In the end Eckhart relies on a notion of the One, which he refers to by 
various names.196 The acts of what we have called determinate judgment, 
discernment, comparison, understanding, thought, perception, etc., owe their 
possibility ultimately to this One.197 It is the One, therefore, which possess the 
capacity to “illuminate”. As Eckhart suggests: “I cannot see anything unless it 
bears some likeness to myself, nor can I know anything unless it is analogous to 
me. God has hidden [the essence of] all things in himself. They are not this and 
that, individually distinct, but rather, they are one with unity.”198 Or, as he writes 
elsewhere: “Likeness in all things,... is the birth of the One and the likeness of the 
One,...”.199 Hence, for Eckhart the illumination of things involves a kind of 
reflexivity in which intelligence (or “the One”) contacts itself.200
But there are familiar difficulties with attempting to elucidate the 
“process” of emergence by reference to a reflexively illuminating Unity. First, it 
seems that we are only ever able to encounter that which has already been 
illuminated and, since that which illuminates can be none of those things, it will 
admit of no predicates. Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, an account of 
experience that relies on a reflexively illuminating Unity ultimately identifies the
identity. The effect of participation is that a perfection is no longer the same, but other. 
Participation depends on that formal hierarchy which Eckhart intends to destroy. Participation 
sanctions the gradual loss of intensity through degrees of being.” (p. 143)
196 That which illuminates Eckhart refers to variously as the Father, One, Idea, God, Word, 
Principle, or Unbegotten while that which is illuminated is idea, object, principle, created thing, 
image, or begotten.
197 Cf. Ibid., p. 221; and Blakney, p. 225.
198 Ibid., p. 148.
199 College and McGinn, p. 221. Or elsewhere: “God becomes as phenomena express him." 
(Blakney, p. 225)
200 Cf. where Eckhart writes: “It is asked where an image is, in the mirror [i.e., mind] or in the 
object? The image is in me, of me, and to m e .... Thus, the being of angels depends on the 
presence of the divine mind in which they behold themselves,....” (Blakney, pp. 221-222) Angels, 
for Eckhart, are essentially ideas of God - Principles. For a recent defense of a closely related 
position cf. T. Nagel, The Last Word, Oxford University Press, 1997. Eckhart’s final position also 
seems close to that of Santarak§ita (cf. below chapter 6, §6).
knower and the known, and hence is inconsistent. Consequently, applied to the 
problem of how intelligible forms (i.e., contents) emerge, a theory that relies on 
the notion of a reflexively illuminating Unity can only leave the matter 
mysterious.
2. As a Meister of the Catholic Church Eckhart’s primary concern is not to 
provide a philosophically coherent account of the possibility of content. Eckhart’s 
employment of philosophy is strategic and modified where necessary in service of 
articulating his fundamental experience of the ground of Being and its relationship 
to the Christian faith. Eckhart’s main concern throughout his sermons is to 
educate people about what he takes to be the true nature of the relationship 
between God and the human sele. Eckhart is after expressing the Truth that 
reveals itself to a truly detached mind, - a mind that has been co-opted by, or more 
accurately is, God.201 Eckhart’s account of the life of the intellect in its capacity to 
render intelligible forms results in large part from his desire to place them 
appropriately as distractions from man’s proper aim and destiny. The Truth that 
Eckhart ultimately desires for us occurs “beyond” all such contingencies. For 
Eckhart, thinking, imagining, judging, and perceiving lead only to an inferior sort 
of knowledge.202 Hence, when Eckhart continues his discussion of the active and 
passive intellects he writes:
201 The word, which is being translated as “disinterest” here and by “detachment” elsewhere, is 
Abgescheidenheit. The basic idea is not far removed from what Kant has in mind when he 
suggests that one must not have an “interest” in the object in question for harmonization to occur - 
at least in so far as no determinate thought can be in mind at the time of inception. For an analysis 
see Schiirmann, pp. 84-5.
202 Eckhart writes: “Thus, the authorities teach when one knows creatures as they are in 
themselves, that is ‘twilight knowledge,’ in which creation is perceived by clearly distinguished 
ideas; but when creatures are known in God, that is ‘daybreak knowledge,’ in which creatures are 
perceived without distinctions, all ideas being rejected, all comparisons done away in that One that 
God himself is.” (Blakney, p. 79)
Now observe: what the active intellect does for the natural man, that and far 
more God does for one with detachment: He takes away the active intellect 
from him, and installing Himself in its stead, He himself undertakes all that 
the active intellect ought to be doing.203
What the active intellect ought to be doing is permitting Unity to reveal itself and 
not attending to multiplicity.204 Instead of bending God’s power through 
attachment to do one’s own will by thinking and perceiving, - that is, by 
continually passing images abstracted from outward things from the active 
intellect to the passive intellect in attachment (and thereby rendering content) - the 
active intellect should remain still, and disinterested, in order to permit “God to 
reveal himself’. If the power through which things are illuminated is to reveal its 
nature the intellect, it seems, must remain fundamentally receptive and “let God 
do the work”. Where the mind has ceased its incessant activity of “expecting and 
rejecting,” Eckhart suggests, all things are present in their essence.205 But how 
should such a claim be interpreted? Such a lack of intellectual movement would 
seem imply a lack of consciousness. But, of course, this cannot be quite right.
As Eckhart describes it the movement of the intellect is a necessary 
condition of experience. But it seems that it is not in itself sufficient. It requires 
the One to supply the power of illumination. Now, according to Eckhart, if the 
One can become detached from the function of sustaining this movement it will 
service itself and reveal “God to be where he is One and simple”. In other words, 
when a person is completely unattached to self and world, and hence purely
203 Walshe, Vol. I,pp. 29-30.
204 Blakney, 1941, p. 225. It is interesting to note that cognition (i.e„ attending to things) is an 
activity which, like Kant, Eckhart suggests occurs with pleasure
205 He writes; Intellect s object and lodgement is essence, not accident (zuoval), but pure 
unmixed being itself.” (Walshe, Vol. I, p. 31)
receptive, the One, Godhead, or Void, by necessity of its nature as the power of 
illumination fills this void.206 In this case simple Being manifests and Truth is 
revealed.207 This is made clear by Eckhart in his explication of the following 
passage from Luke 10:38. He writes:
“Our Lord Jesus Christ went into a little castle and was received by a virgin 
who was his wife”.
Now then, pay close attention to this word: it was necessary that it be a 
virgin by whom Jesus was received. “Virgin” designates a human being 
who is devoid of all foreign images and who is as void as he was when he 
was not yet.208
Schiirmann points out that this is a loose translation, so loose in fact that Eckhart 
has undoubtedly accommodated it to his own ends.209 The reception of Jesus by a 
“virgin” signifies the fact that, for God’s knowledge to manifest, the intellect must 
be completely “void”.210 To speak metaphorically with Eckhart, God’s knowledge 
can only be received by a “virgin” and conceived by a “wife,” both of which are 
the same “woman”. As long as the active intellect is dominant and occupied with 
activities like abstraction, thought, and imagination the mind, it seems, is largely 
condemned to a kind of circularity in which it can only employ the products of
206 Eckhart often employs the phrase “and the light shines in the darkness” to illustrate this point. 
Here as in Eckhart, the terms Godhead, Not, Void, Father, Unity, and One are strict synonyms. 
Without this proliferation of terms, as Schilrmann observes, we would be reduced to silence (p. 
73).
207 Cf. Walshe, Vol. I, pp. 29-32.
208 Luke 10:38, Eckhart in SchUrmann, p. 3.
209 Ibid., p. 10.
210 The word “enpfangen”, which Eckhart uses for “receive” in this text, can equally mean 
“conceive” (SchUrmann, p. 11). Since, as SchUrmann suggests, Eckhart’s sermons are carefully 
planned, I take the use of this bivalent term to imply the two emergent aspects o f the unity he calls 
the little castle, i.e., the forming (active) and being formed (passive) “aspects” of the intellect. 
Since the little castle is a Unity this makes it clear that the differentiation of active and passive 
intellects are, in fact, two ways of conceptualizing one “movement”.
previous renderings.211 If, however, the active intellect can be made void then that 
ultimate Truth manifests which can be known by no “self* and hence is not an 
experience in the usual sense. Eckhart suggests that to know this one must:
Look and see: this little castle in the mind (sele) of which I am speaking and 
which is my intention, is so simple,... that if God is ever to catch a glimpse 
of it, it will cost him all his divine names.... You see, insofar as he is one 
and simple, he penetrates into this unity that I call the little castle in the 
mind, but otherwise he will not enter into it in any way;... .With this part of 
itself the mind is equal to God and not otherwise. What I have told you is 
the truth; I give you truth itself as witness and my soul as pledge.212
What Eckhart is here calling “this little castle in the mind,” is the seat of the 
intellect’s power. This power can be directed both toward the world through 
attachment and the movement of the intellect or it can be returned to itself as 
“void”. Directed toward the world it is the means by which the active intellect, 
with its abstracted principles, is provided with the power to render things 
intelligible. Returned to itself in detachment it is a revelation of the nature of 
“that” which is ultimately responsible for the possibility of content.213
211 Eckhart writes: “No idea represents or signifies itself. It always points to something else, of  
which it is a symbol. And since man has no ideas, except those abstracted from external things 
through the sense, he cannot be blessed by an idea” (p. 98). This argument is analogous to: No 
interpretation interprets itself. All interpretations (i.e., rules) point to something else. And since all 
abstracted forms are interpretations. Abstracted forms cannot render content.
212 Schtirmann, p. 45.
213 Eckhart writes: “The masters say: The mind has two faces. The upper face beholds God 
incessantly, the lower face looks a little towards the below and directs the senses. The upper face, 
however, which is the peak o f the mind, stands in eternity. It has nothing to do with time; it is 
ignorant of time as well as of the body.... The masters say that from the higher part of the mind 
emanate two powers. The first is called will, the other intellect. But the highest perfection of these 
powers resides in the higher power, namely the intellect. This can never find rest. It aspires to God 
neither as he is the Holy Spirit nor as he is the Son: it flees from the Son. Nor does it want God 
inasmuch as he is God. Why? Because, as such, he still carries a name. It wants something more 
noble, something better than God as having a name. What then does the intellect want? It does not 
know; it wants him as he is the Father.... Only there is he the Father.” (Eckhart, in SchUrmann,
But there is a problem with Eckhart’s account of how the Absolute is able 
to reveal itself. As Schurmann observes, Eckhart’s thoughts on these matters seem 
to lead to an aporia. On the one hand Eckhart suggests that the Absolute 
manifests just in case we become void, or “break through beyond everything that 
has a name”, on the other hand it manifests in letting the “Son of God be born in 
you”. In the first instance Truth, or Being, is to manifest in, or as, the 
unrepresentable One, and in the second instance it is to manifest through letting 
God act in place of the active intellect. Unfortunately, since something cannot 
consist both in a Unity and a multiplicity these lines of thought are inconsistent.214
This inconsistency, Schtirmann argues, is ultimately overcome in Eckhart’s 
doctrine of detachment wherein the bifurcation of that which illuminates and that 
which is illuminated is resolved. As Eckhart writes:
Listen closely to the instruction that I am going to give you. I could have so 
vast an intelligence that all the images that all human beings have ever 
received and those that are in God himself were comprehended in my 
intellect; however, if I were in no way attached to them, to the point that in 
everything I do or neglect to do, I did not cling to any of them with 
attachment - with its before and its after - but if in this present now I kept 
myself unceasingly free and void for the beloved will of God and its
1978, p. 71) From this passage it is clear that the intellect is, for Eckhart, ultimately not anything 
like a faculty o f concepts or the seat of merely formal, or noetic, activity. Rather, it is the dwelling 
place of the Father, the power of illumination, and identical with the ground of the upper face of 
mind, the seat of intentionality. The intellect when active and directed outward engenders “se lf’ 
and “world," when passive and directed inwards “se lf’ and “world” are both diminished. The 
more they are diminished the more likely it becomes that the power of Self-illumination (i.e., the 
Truth) will appear.
214 Cf. SchUrmann, p. 159.
fulfillment, then I should indeed be a virgin, without the views of all the 
images, as truly as I was when I was not yet.
The logic of the reconciliation then appears to run as follows: Eckhart’s 
detachment is a self and world forgetting so complete that it would be a mistake to 
say of one who lives in detachment that they “are” so-and-so (who continues 
through time). And yet, for such a person, content neither vanishes nor merges 
into a unitary mass. Rather it seems that in detachment, where the “active 
intellect” is replaced by God, one’s normal everyday “awareness of...” things is 
somehow transcended such that anything which “appears” is seen “in its True 
light”. Here, in detachment, the One and the process through which it enacts itself 
are apparently identical.
Unfortunately, this is a rather imprecise way of speaking which does not 
clearly show how a “self-consciousness” (through which experience becomes 
possible) can be sustained. It also does little to show how an appeal to a 
reflexively illuminating “One”, which transcends the bifurcation between that 
which illuminates and that which is illuminated, might provide a satisfactory 
alternative to an account which relies on this division. Hence, it is unclear from 
SchUrmann’s remarks how Eckhart’s doctrine of detachment is able to resolve 
these apparently inconsistent lines of thought.
3. As Eckhart has explained the matter so far the voidness which is requisite 
for a knowledge of “That” which is responsible for content seems to require a 
detachment so complete that the “self’ for all intents and purposes has vanished. 
In other words, in detachment the active intellect is “taken away”, or at least
2,5 Ibid., p. 3.
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remains still, and God functions in its place. But Eckhart’s account of how 
intelligible forms emerge, at least in the first instance, relies on the abstraction of 
forms and their subsequent movement from the active to passive intellect. Hence, 
it implies the identity through time of an active intellect in order to abstract, store, 
and then apply forms.216 If the active intellect remains still then it would seem that 
the “self’, through which these activities are made possible, cannot function, and 
hence cannot be sustained. In this case content would not seem to be possible 
because there is, so to speak, no continuing “self’ to cement the individual 
experiences into one whole.
Here one may be tempted to suggest that Eckhart may be able to avoid the 
aforementioned inconsistency, as well as the conclusion that detachment offers no 
coherent possibility of experience, by means of his concept of God. According to 
Eckhart, in detachement God takes over the functions of the active intellect and 
does even more. Since God is conceived of a permanent the concept may provide 
Eckhart with a way, a kind of subject, by means of which “things” are able to 
manifest.217 But there remains a significant problem which Eckhart can ultimately
216 Consider the following passage from Aristotle in Physica, book 4 , 14.223°21f where he writes: 
“Whether if soul did not exist time would exist or not, is a question that may fairly be asked; for if 
there cannot be someone to count there cannot be anything that can be counted, so that evidently 
there cannot be number; for number is either what has been, or what can be, counted. But if 
nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, there would not be time unless there were 
soul, but only that of which time is an attribute, i.e., if movement can exist without soul, and the 
before and after are attributes o f movement, and time is these qua numerable.” (Hardie and Gaye, 
trans., in M. Heiddegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Albert Hofstadter, trans.
Revised Edition. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 254f) The main point for our 
purposes is that multiplicity strictly implies time. But we can rephrase the argument along the 
following lines: Multiplicity involves the counting of things. But the counting o f things implies 
both time and someone to count. Thus, we might conclude, multiplicity implies time and time 
implies the soul. Furthermore, time is an attribute of movement. And movement implies things to 
move. Things to move, however, imply space. Thus, the soul exists on one side o f the equation 
and in interdependence, time, space, and number together on the other. Hence, a multiplicity of 
non-spatiotemporal entities (in the One) is an incoherent idea.
217 Put another way, it would seem that one becomes immediately aware of, and transformed by, 
what always was the case, - the Truth - that the One is the source of that movement, of the self and 
other.
do little to clear up. Unlike the movement of the active intellect, God’s 
“movements” do not take time.218 As a result, when God takes over the 
functioning of the active intellect, Eckhart is left with an atemporal “Permanent” 
which, although capable of serving both as source of all potential forms and as the 
“perceiver” of actualized forms, cannot provide Eckhart with a way to account for 
the necessary movement by means of which the potential becomes actual -  a 
process which, it would seem, must occur in time. But these are not Eckhart’s last 
words on the matter.
Further clarification of the theory of experience implicit in Eckhart’s 
doctrine of being can be obtained through a consideration of some comments that 
he makes at the beginning of his Defense to charges of heresy. There he sets out 
three main points from which, he suggests, “I can clearly demonstrate the truth of 
everything brought up against me from my books and remarks. I can also show 
the ignorance and irreverence of my opponents,...”.219 The first of his points, is 
that,
... the absolute acts of the Godhead proceed from God according to the 
property of his attributes, as a theological maxim says. Hence, in the fifth 
book of On Consideration Bernard says the ‘God loves as charity, knows as
218 Eckhart writes: “I am cause of myself according to my being which is eternal, but not 
according to my becoming which is temporal” (in Schtirmann, 1978, p. 219). Or: “As long as one 
clings to time, space, number, and quantity, he is on the wrong track and God is strange and far 
away” (Blakney, p. 213). And elsewhere: “The spirit, in knowing, has no use for multiplicity, for 
multiplicity is o f use only within time, in this defective world. No one can strike his roots into 
eternity without being rid of multiplicity." (p. 192) And again: “God does not see through time, 
nor does anything new happen in his sight.” (Blakney, p. 86) Such being it would seem “is bereft 
of all wonder” and “gets nothing new from things to come nor from any chance” not because it 
can “tell the future” but because it is always already complete (in SchUrmann, 1978, p. 6).
219 Colledge and McGinn, 1981, p. 71.
truth, sits in judgment as justice, rules as majesty,... operates as strength, 
reveals as light, etc..’
The second is that the good man and goodness are one. The good man
insofar as he is good signifies goodness alone, just as something white
signifies whiteness. These two things, being good and goodness, are
univocally one in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. They are analogically one
220in God and in us considered as good.
Here Eckhart suggests first that, insofar as the absolute acts of Godhead, or the 
One, proceed from God they do so in the form of his attributes. Second, these 
attributes of God are, insofar as a person is detached, identified with that person. 
Hence, it follows that, insofar as a person is detached, the absolute acts of 
Godhead both proceed from that person (God replaces the active intellect) and are 
that person.20 21 As Eckhart suggests, the good man and goodness are one. This 
identification is true univocally as regards the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
because this holy trinity, considered as a function (i.e., “movement”) of the 
intellect, is the actualization of the being of the Father.222 On the other hand they 
are analogically identified with God and with us insofar as we are good because 
in those instances both God and us are considered as merely potential, or ideal.
220 Ibid., p. 73.
221 Exert yourself so that the child [i.e., the Son] be not only in the process of being bom, but that 
it be already bom, just as in God the Son is always bom and in the process o f being bom. May 
God help us that this be our destiny. Amen.” (Schtirmann, p. 170) And elsewhere: “God desires 
urgently that you, the creature, get out of his way - as if  his own blessedness depends on it.” 
(Blakney, p. 127)
222 Here we can note that creatures seem to be nothing without God and God is Nothing without 
creatures. Eckhart eliminates the notion of “ideal being” having any existence at all prior to its 
instantiation in concreto. This is a break with Aristotle, Plato, Augustine, and with the 
Neoplatonists (cf. SchUrmann, 1978, p. 177, for a detailed account). This is also a position towards 
which Scheler leans but does not want to fully accept because it appears to reduce the individual 
to nothing.
In order to explicate this rather cryptic way of speaking more thoroughly 
we must return to Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas borrowed from Aristotle several 
interesting expressions of identity. One of which is the principle that “the thinking 
and that which is thought are identical”.223 24In his commentary on this passage 
Aquinas writes: “The actually (in actu) understood object and the actually 
understanding subject are one being, just as the actually sensed object and the 
actually sensing subject are one being.” This doctrine of the onto- 
epistemological identity of mind and object is picked up by Eckhart and extended 
to the realm of the spirit where he concludes that since God’s being is his 
knowledge, the mind that knows God is God. In other words, since the mind 
which functions in complete detachment engenders God’s knowledge (i.e., his 
Principles) and, since there is no separate experiencer here, this mind is God’s 
knowledge. But since God’s knowledge is his being this mind is identical with 
God.225
How God happens to engender his being is essentially the subject of 
Eckhart’s third point. There he begins by suggesting:
The third is that everything that begets, indeed everything that acts, at that 
moment possesses two characteristics. The first characteristic is that by 
nature it does not rest or stop until it introduces its form in what it acts upon
223 Aristotle, De Atiima, book III, ch. 4; 430 a 3; op. cit., p. 135. Cf. also the following in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, book XII, ch. 9; 1075 a 3-5: “Wherever things are immaterial the mind 
and its object are not different, so that they are the same; and knowing is one with what is known, 
(R. Hope, trans., New York, 1952, p. 266, and ibid., p. 230)
224 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, book III, Ch. 4, lecture 9, n. 724; p. 
423.
225 In The Book of Divine Comfort Eckhart writes: “St. Augustine says that to apprehend apart 
from thought, apart from spatial forms and imagination, without abstracting from what is seen, is 
to know the truth of things. Those who do not know this will laugh and mock me and I shall pity 
them. They like to look at eternal things and consider divine works and to stand in the light of 
eternity, while their hearts still flutter about in yesterday and today, in space and time.” (R. 
Blakney, Meister Eckhart, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1941, pp. 72-3)
and begets. When the form as such has been introduced, bestowed and 
communicated, it confers existence, as well as everything that belongs to it, 
namely operation and any type of property. That is why according to 
Aristotle [Physics III, 2 and VII, 1] what has not been moved is not moved, 
and what does not touch does not act. The second characteristic is that every 
agent insofar as it is an agent, or everything that begets insofar as it begets, 
is unbegotten, neither made nor created, because it is not derived from 
another. For example, the form of a work of art (think of a house in the 
architect’s mind) is a kind of begotten or made offspring. If I may speak in 
this way, it is created from something outside, namely from a real house or 
the architect’s teacher. It does not beget as such; it is not a father or a 
principle that produces.226 27
Here Eckhart is referring to what he considers to be the essential characteristic of 
the “movement” of the intellect -  that is, at any given moment, it’s “acting” 
possesses two characteristics. First, it does not stop until its potential being is 
rendered actual. Second, “potential” being is Unconditioned being. As we have 
seen Eckhart maintains that the “form” of all things can be impressed on the 
intellect because it is a purely receptive faculty open to become all things. 
However, since the intellect is primarily an active power, and subject to desire and 
attachment, it tends to take up what it already knows and thereby impose those 
things on itself.228 Nevertheless, as we have made clear this “taking-up” of
226 Colledge and McGinn, p. 73.
227 Schiirmann, p. 147.
228 Eckhart writes: “When the agents of the soul contact creatures, they take and make ideas 
[bilde] and likenesses of them and bear them back again into the s e lf . ... Thus the soul gets at 
things by means of ideas and the idea is an entity created by the soul’s agents. Be it a stone, or a 
rose, or a person, or whatever it is that is to be known, first an idea is taken and then absorbed, and 
in this way the soul connects with the phenomenal world.” (Blakney, p. 97)
images, or forms, must be powered by those Ultimate Forms which Eckhart 
resolves into Unity and which achieve “being” in “becoming”. Hence, Eckhart 
continues:
“The Son can do nothing of himself’ (Jn. 5:19). From this it clearly follows 
that the begetter [potential being] and the begotten [actual being] are one in 
reality, but of opposed and distinct relation, either by a real relation in the 
Godhead where the relation and the real being are the same thing, or by 
relation and reason in created things. This is because acting and being acted 
upon are two equally primary principles but one motion. To move and to be 
moved according to the nature of their relations begin and end at the same 
time.229
From this passage we are able to conclude that, for Eckhart, whether in the 
ground of the mind or in “becoming” intelligible things, the Universal and the 
particular are, the Illuminator and the illuminated are, in fact, One/one. This is 
true both for the Godhead where, accepting for the moment the idea that all 
intelligible forms exist potentially, relation (e.g. goodness) and real being (e.g., 
the good) are the same and, in created things (i.e., content) by means of relation 
(e.g., whiteness) and reason (e.g., the movement of the mind through which 
something is determined to be white). They are, however, as he recognizes, quite 
naturally broken up by the “active intellect” into a subjective/active aspect and an 
objective/passive aspect - a division that, once created, cannot be rendered 
consistent with the Unity that was responsible for its birth.
229 Colledge and McGinn, p. 73, (brackets mine).
Reasoning such as this then led Eckhart to rely on analogy to explicate his 
understanding of experience. In the end Eckhart suggests that in “becoming” God 
manifests in fluxu et fieri.230 In “becoming”, analogically speaking, Universal 
Being gels in particular being. The “movement”, however, by which this 
“happens”, since it begins and ends at the same time, is in fact is no movement at 
all. Instead, as he tells us elsewhere, time, space, and all things, come from this 
“movement”.231 Consistent with his Christian mission these facts effectively 
render self, world, and the philosophical problems that creaturely experience 
gives birth to, as illusions to be overcome in detachment. Since some closely 
related claims are foundational to Buddhism. We will now return to look at 
Buddhist philosophy in more depth to see if it can contribute further to our 
understanding of the foundations of cognition.
230 Fieri is the passive form of the Medieval Latin facere a polyvalent term which primarily 
designates the formation of something.
231 He writes: “The course of heaven is outside time - and yet time comes from its movements. 
Nothing hinders the soul’s knowledge of God as much as time and space, for time and space are 
fragments, whereas God is one! And, therefore, if  the soul is to know God, it must know him 
above time and outside of space; for God is neither this nor that, as are these manifold things. God 
is One!” (Blakney, p. 131) Hence, in this being/becoming, which is One, the categories of being 
and non-being, movement and rest, illuminator and illuminated, are do not appear to be 
meaningfully applicable.
Chapter 4
Buddhism
1. From the introductory remarks of the previous two chapters it should 
already be clear that Buddhism will not provide us with a solution to the problem 
of judgment. Instead it will suggest that the apparent permanence and 
substantiality of our everyday experience, which provides the context within 
which Kant’s problem arises, is a partial view which needs to be balanced with 
the insight that all phenomena are ultimately impermanent (anitya) and without 
any substantial or eternal essence (anatman). Furthermore, that on which
everyday experience rests, i.e., “that whereby a synthetic apprehension of the 
whole becomes possible”, although in some indeterminate way permanent and 
real, cannot be known. In other words, it cannot be understood or grasped, at least 
not in the conventional manner. Unfortunately, the indeterminability of this 
foundation renders it largely unsuitable for explanatory purposes. This fact, 
however, has not stopped Buddhist philosophers from devising theories that 
attempt to account for the appearance of all things.23 33
232 Something with an eternal essence would be unconditioned, or uncaused, - i.e., not the product 
of pratitya-samutpada (e.g., a “soul”). Buddhism denies the existence of any such “thing”. As 
Schumann observes: “These characteristics cannot be found in the empirical world, for it is devoid 
of essentiality, that is empty.” (H. W. Schumann, Buddhism: An outline of its teaching and 
schools, Georg Fenerstein, trans., London: Rider and Company, 1973, p. 143)
233 In the current study we will primarily be concerned with those philosophical schools of 
Mahàyàna Buddhism that concentrate on the relationship between Unity and multiplicity, i.e., the 
Màdhyamika and the Yogàcàra. A combination of restrictions on space and considerations of flow 
necessitate that certain generalizations be made in referring to “Buddhist philosophy” and
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In our discussion of Scheler in the second chapter we introduced the 
Buddhist concept of pratitya-samutpada, or “conditioned co-arising”. We are now 
in a position to investigate this concept more thoroughly. The pratitya-samutpada 
series, it will be recalled, can generally be divided into two parts, which 
correspond to two senses of the term vijnana. The first part of the series deals in a 
general way with vijnana considered as an atemporal “consciousness” which, in 
some sense, “contains” all dharmas,234 235The second part provides an explanatory 
sketch of how vijnana, considered roughly as “cognition”, functions to render 
things intelligible and to impart to those “things” the appearance of permanence 
and essentiality. It also provides some explanation of how vijnana, considered as 
“consciousness”, comes to be conditioned by its own “products”, thereby 
facilitating the “birth” of further “experiences”. The two parts of the series 
together, therefore, attempt to provide a general elucidation of the “process” 
through which the stable impression of an individual “subject” and “world” arise
235and are sustained.
Although it will take some time to explicate the details, the series proceeds 
as follows: Avidya (ignorance)236 is considered as the root of the appearance of all
“Buddhist philosophers”. These will be kept to a minimum and qualified in cases where the 
differences between schools bear significantly on the particular issue under discussion.
234 The term dharma is central to Buddhist philosophy. It has several meanings all o f which are 
related (cf., for example, Schumann, pp. 86-90; pp. 101-2). In this text it is largely considered as 
that indefinitely large set of transcendent “laws” through which all phenomena appear and in 
which they are constitutively manifested. It must, however, be recognized that there are, strictly 
speaking, no dharmas (cf. the discussion of prajha below for an elaboration of this point. Cf. also 
W. S. Waldron, “How Innovative is the Klayavijnanal: The klayavijnana in the Context of the 
Canonical and Abhidharma Vijnana Theory. Part 1 "Journal of Indian Philosophy, 22: 199-258, 
1994, pp. 216).
235 The word “process” is placed within quotation marks to indicate the fact, elucidated below, that 
pratitya-samutpada is temporally and causally problematic.
236 Nagarjuna suggests that, more specifically, it is “what is hidden by ignorance” (avidyanivrta) 
which is the cause o f all conditioned phenomenon and which sustains the activity o f samskara
(Mulamadhyamakakarikas:Fundamentals of the Middle Way, 26-1, translated in F. Streng, 
Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 217).
“conditioned” phenomena. It can be defined as a lack of insight into pratTtya- 
samutpada and the “suffering-ridden” character of existence.237 2389The stage 
immediately following avidya is samskdra (intention/consequence). The term 
samskdra refers generally to factors through which conditioning takes place. 
Stage three is consciousness (vijnana), which is held to function interdependently 
with stage four, name and form (nama-rupa). This “functioning”, it seems, 
occurs through samskdra in accordance with the dharmasP9 Thus ends the first 
part of the series. At this point an indeterminate “subject” has already been 
condemned to render some particular “content” which has been conditioned by 
previous cognitive activity.240 That content, however, can also only be considered 
indeterminate, or “potential”, until in stage five the six cognitive groups 
(shadayatana) (i.e., sight, sound, touch, taste, smell, and momentary states of 
thought/feeling) are “informed” by the products of the first part of the series. The 
informing of the six cognitive groups begins the cognizing aspect of vijnana 
without which the sense faculties are essentially impotent.241 On the Buddhist 
view no object can appear, and hence no analysis of the objects of perception can
237 As Streng observes: ‘The Buddhist insight into the “actual” character of existence requires an 
awareness of the mental processes themselves, for there could be no true knowledge if the mind is 
caught by its own mechanism.” (pp. 150-1)
238 In anticipation of the discussion of the alayavijndna to follow below we can note that, as 
Schmithausen writes: “In the Mahayanasamgraha, this mutual dependence is in fact used as a 
proof for the existence of the alayavijnana.” (7.3.4.1, p. 170) Note also: For those readers with 
little or no background in Buddhist philosophy an initial and tentative grasp of the dependence in 
question here can be obtained without great risk if one considers the statement as roughly 
equivalent to Kant’s suggestion of the mutual dependence of concepts and intuitions.
239 The dharmas, in this context, are functionally equivalent to nama-rupa (cf., for example, 
Streng, p. 79). In the Abhidharmakosabhagyam we find the following: “It is also said that 
pratTtya-samutpada is both momentary and serial at the same time. The Prakarana says, “What is 
pratltya-samutpadal All the conditioned (samskrta) dharmas. What are the dharmas produced 
through dependence (pratltya-samutpanna)? All the conditioned dharmas." (p. 405) For a further 
elucidation of the concept of dharma cf. n. 234 above.
240 “Condemned”, in other words, to the everyday life of being a subject who has experiences of 
the world.
241 In fact, each o f the six cognitive groups is often said to have its own corresponding vijhana 
through which it is rendered potent.
take place, unless the object of perception is a meaningful whole. This 
presupposition requires that any “object” must, in some way, be constitutively 
cognized in and through “name and form”, i.e., in and through that body of 
accumulated knowledge and experience which, in some way, lies dormant in the 
mind. It is this body of knowledge, therefore, together with the constitutive power 
of the first part of the series that permits: (6) contact (sparsha) with the “object” 
and (7) sensation (vedana), out of which develops (8) craving (trishna) and (9) 
attachment/appropriation (upadana). With the appropriation of “things” vijnana 
(consciousness) appears and is momentarily sustained. Finally, consciousness 
being sustained (10) a new becoming of existent things (bhava) is fostered and 
through thought the (11) birth (jati) of cognizing “universals”242 243which continues 
to (12) old age and death (jara-maranam).
In the early Pali canons the details of the reciprocal relationship that exists 
between the two senses of vijnana  implied in the two parts of the p ra tity a -  
sam u tpada  series goes largely undeveloped.244 Of central importance to this 
relationship, however, is the generation and perpetuation of “latent knowledge 
and dispositions” (an usaya ). In early Buddhism this latent content refers to those
242 S. Mookerjee sees an unbridgeable inconsistency between a “universals-based” approach to 
explaining perceptual cognition and the Buddhist doctrine of universal flux (i.e., momentary 
interdependent emergence). He also translates jatis as “universals” and argues that, being 
abstracted from experience, they are “pure fictions o f the imagination”. (S. Mookerjee, The 
Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1935, p. 295, cf. also pp. 87 & 
110)
243 The Abhidharmakosabhaqyam suggests: “The “part” that receives the name of consciousness in 
a present existence [i.e., mind-moment] is called jati in a future existence.... From jati until 
sensation,... there are four parts of the present existent, nama-rupa, the six ayatana, contact and 
sensation which are, in a future existence designated by the expression old age and death, the 
twelfth part of this twelvefold series”, (p. 404, square brackets mine) This should help clear up the 
meaning and significance of the last two stages of the series. The last two stages o f the series 
allude to its reflective nature and imply its indefinite continuity. Notice that since there is no 
substantial existent to move from one mind-moment to the next it is quite proper, the theory of 
reincarnation to one side, for the Buddhists to refer to their succession as “existences”.
244 W. S. Waldron, 1994, p. 203.
aspects of subliminal “mind” which, through the operation of the pratitya- 
samutpada series, condition immediate appearances and, through appropriation, 
are themselves “conditioned” so as to impact on future intentions. In this way the 
latent content provides support for the continued appearance of a substantial self 
and world and so maintains the ignorance (avidya) of the subject. Overcoming 
ignorance requires reducing or eliminating the impact of these latent dispositions 
on experience.245A central problem for Buddhism then emerges in the attempt to 
elucidate the general nature of the relationships that exist between this latent 
content and the appearance of an essential self and world.246 And since this 
appearance is held to occur through the operation of the pratitya-samutpada series 
the Buddhist’s were faced with the problem of elucidating the relationship of the 
first part of the series to the second.
One of the most detailed and philosophically sophisticated accounts of this 
relationship is developed within the Yogacara school between the third and fifth 
century.247 248The Yogacara theory of the alayavijnana is an attempt to elucidate the 
nature of the relationships between subsisting and subliminal “consciousness”, on 
one hand, and momentary supraliminal “cognition”, on the other, as the process is
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outlined in the pratitya-samutpada series. More particularly it addresses itself
245 Waldron quotes the following from The Book of Kindred Sayings: “If one does not will, O 
monks, does not intend, yet [a disposition] lies dormant (anuseti), this becomes an object for the 
persistence of consciousness. There being an object, there comes to be a support o f consciousness. 
Consciousness being supported and growing, renewed existence takes place in the future.
Renewed existence in the future taking place, old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, 
sorrow and despair come to pass. Such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering”. (Samyutta 
Nikaya (1894-1904) Rhys-Davids, C.A.F. and Woodward, F.L., trans., London: Pali Text Society, 
(191-30) in Waldron, 1994, p. 205)
246 Cf., for example, the discussion of pratitya-samutpada in L. M. Pruden, 
Abhidharmakosabhasyam, Berkley, Asian Humanities Press, 1988, Vol. II, pp. 401-439.
247 For a concise account see Schumann, ch. 4, or M. H. Kohn, ed., The Shambhala Dictionary of 
Buddhism and Zen. Boston: Shambala Publications, Inc., 1991, pp. 131-2 & 253-4.
248 These remarks are merely introductory and do not begin to address the historical developments 
which took place from the traditional Pali canons to the Yogacara texts. These matters are taken 
up in detail in L. Schmithausen, Alayavijhana: On the Origin and Early Development of a Central
to the question, which arises in Buddhism, as it does for Scheler, of how a “self’ 
can impact on the nature of experience when it is purported to be inherently 
inessential and to subsist only in act-moments, which arise interdependently with 
corresponding “objects”. Thus, the theory of the alayavijnana is a theory of mind 
that attempts to account for the continuous appearance of a substantial self and 
world given the constraints imposed by the pratltya-samutpada series and the 
doctrine of andtman.249
2. A preliminary understanding of the alayavijnana can be obtained by 
means of a conceptual analysis of its constituent parts of alaya and vijnana.
Taking the root word vijnana first, we can observe that, as Schmithausen notes, 
the Abhidharma definition of vijnana, “which in substance can be traced back to 
canonical texts, takes vijnana as that which performs the act of vi- jna-, or, more 
explicitly, as that which makes known (vijfiapti), i.e., perceives or cognizes 
(upalabdhi), an object (visaya, dlambana)".250 The alayavijnana, hence, being a 
species of vijnana, is a form of consciousness through which objects are cognized. 
Turning to the prefix alaya, we can observe that it has two interrelated meanings, 
one of which is “that which is clung to”, and the other which is “dwelling place”, 
or “storehouse”.251 The dlayavijnana can thus be understood as the storehouse 
consciousness, which, in being clung to, makes experience possible.
Concept ofYogacara Philosophy, Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987, 
and in Waldron, 1994,1995. Generally speaking, our concern is to give a defensible account of 
the final form which theory of the dlayavijnana took.
249 It is interesting to observe that Scheler and Buddhism part company on the ontological status of 
“personality”. While Scheler maintains that personality is a general essential trait o f all possible 
worlds and so is manifested in the unity of every “act-essence” Buddhism maintains that 
personality is an inessential aggregate.
250 Schmithausen, 5.2, p. 85, and 8.4, p. 191.
251 Waldron, 1995, p. 34n.
But what, we might ask, is the alayavijhdna storing? And how is it able, 
through the pratTtya-samutpada series, to make experience possible? An answer 
to the former question will provide us with a clue to the latter. The entities that the 
alayavijnana is purported to store are likened to the “seeds” of all possible 
experience. Although the precise nature of these “seeds” is left somewhat 
underdeveloped in Yogacara Buddhist philosophy it is clear that the idea that the 
alayavijnana contains all the “seeds” is roughly equivalent to the suggestion that 
the mind contains all possible experiences in potential form. As Schmithausen 
observes, “in the Abhidharmasutra and in the Mahayanasamgraha, the 
dlayavijhana is the Seed-basis or cause and the support not only of personal 
existence but of all dharmas, of the whole world as it appears to a given living 
being”.252 253Hence, since everything is constituted in and through dharmas, and the 
alayavijhdna is that consciousness through which everything is constituted, the 
seeds can, generally speaking, be considered to be equivalent to dharmas.
Dharmas, we can now observe, fall into two general classes:
“conditioned” (samskrta) and “unconditioned”(aM/tts&mi). The unconditioned 
dharmas are eternal, are not subject to the forces of karma,254 and are constitutive 
of Nirvana. The conditioned dharmas, by contrast, are impermanent, subject to
252 Schmithausen, 3.13.7, p. 65.
253 Schmithausen observes that although the Mahayanasamgraha and Abhidarma-samuccaya 
clearly emphasize the role of the alayavijnana as a container of all the dharmas its role as a 
cognizer o f objects is less clearly implied there (5.12.1, p. 100). Cf., also in Waldron 1995:
“Mahayanasamgraha (Msg) 1.2. ‘the cognition containing all the seeds is the receptacle (alaya) of 
all dharmas,’ (chos kun sa bon thams cadpa’i/mampar shes pajun gzhi ste /) etc. This is 
probably the most common synonym o f the alayavijnana." (n. 226, p. 48); and in the Abhidarma- 
samuccaya (ASBh) 11,9-14 we find, “Since dharmas dwell (alTyante) there as seeds, or since 
beings grasp [to it] as a self, [it is called] the alayavijhdna.” (ibid., n. 229, p. 49) The cognizing 
role o f the alayavijhana receives full acknowledgment in the Pavrtti Portion (cf., for a thorough 
commentary, Schmithausen, 5.13.2 - 5.14.2, pp. 102-4).
254 Generally speaking the idea of karmic forces refers to a universal and transcendental relation of 
a cause-effect nature dependent on “intention”.
karmic forces, and exhaustively constitutive of Samsara, i.e., of “subject” and 
“world”. In being “that vijhana which is clung to” the alayavijhana, although able 
to cultivate and reinforce unconditioned dharmas, is particularly associated 
with the cultivation of conditioned dharmas. Once “cultivated” and 
“impregnated” with karmic forces these dharmas take on their empirical label as 
“latent knowledge and dispositions”. In the appropriation (upadana) cum 
constitution of experience, therefore, the dlayavijhana employs dharmas which, 
through previous experiential manifestations, have been karmically cultivated to 
grow into what we normally refer to as that body of knowledge, dispositions, 
attitudes, conceptual capacities, etc., which together form the core of a person as 
he or she exists through time and which lie dormant until such time as they are 
called upon, intentionally or unintentionally, and brought to bear, moment to
256moment, in rendering things intelligible, i.e., in experience.
The necessity of dharmas to a plausible account of experience results, at 
least in part, from the constitutively legislative role that experience plays in 
thought. There is, of course, nothing particularly novel about the idea that an 
individual and her “mind states” are conditioned by her own interpretations of her 
“environment” and by earlier “mind states”. But, as we have observed, this fact is 
not in itself sufficient to account for the intelligibility of things. Since the mind 
which thinks, imagines, and abstracts cannot create ex nihilo it must rely on the 256
255 Schmithausen, 4.8.3-4, pp. 78-9.
256 As Waldron observes: “The mind which has all the seeds represents then the totality of karma, 
of causal conditioning, subsisting within, indeed virtually constituting, the mental stream, and 
thereby supporting all of its intermittent and momentary cognitive and affective processes.” (1995, 
p. 30) Since, however, dharmas have a merely momentary existence how they can be “cultivated” 
and “conditioned” so as to acquire experiential efficacy is problematic.
more or less passive presentation of an intelligible world for its material.257 It is 
this fact of intelligibility in receptivity which points to the need for “pre-existent” 
universal structures of experience in an account of how content is possible. In 
Buddhism these universal structures often take the form of dharmas, or dharma- 
like entities such as the “seeds”. The suggestion that the seeds of the dlayavijndna 
are dharma ’s under the influence of karmic forces then implies that these seeds 
are placeholders for “universal and transcendental relationships.”258 In other 
words, that they are indications of a reality which, in some way, is a priori and 
constitutive of experience.259 260In this way the hypothesis of a seed-like realm of
ryfjT\
dharmas serves as a critical component in the explanation of experience.
Now the notion that the seeds, as transcendental placeholders, are 
experientially “cultivated” into knowledge and dispositions implies an interaction 
between a transcendental realm of universal-like entities and an empirical world 
and existent. Ultimately, however, Buddhism admits of no such bifurcation. 
Consequently, we must investigate matters more thoroughly. Although Buddhist 
philosophy often employs the idea of non-momentary entities for explanatory 
purposes, the Buddhist account of how self and world appear and are sustained is, 
at root, a theory of universal flux. This theory demands that, “whatever is existent
257 A Buddhist acknowledgement of this fact can be found in Mookerjee, who notes the 
“inefficiency” of thinking consciousness “in regard to the acquisition of fresh knowledge”. (1935, 
P. 314)
258 Cf. Waldron, 1995, p. 32. Interestingly Eckhart uses the metaphor of “seeds” in a similar 
manner in College and McGinn, 1981, pp. 123-124.
259 Here one might tempted to conclude that the claim that the álayavijñána contains all the 
“seeds” is isomorphic with Scheler’s claim that “the person” contains all “act-essences”. However, 
whereas Scheler’s “person” is “in principle incorruptible” and his “containing” restricted to, so 
called, a priori phenomena which have nothing to do with embodied existence, the seeds o f the 
álayavijñána, are conditioned and conditionable. Hence, experiences, which the álayavijñána 
makes possible, do not reveal or express universal or absolute truth.
260 The necessity of dharmas to an intelligible account of the álayavijñána points to the 
interdependence o f vijñána and náma-rüpa in prat tty a-samutpáda (cf. Schmithausen, 7.3.6.3 1 p. 
178).
is momentary”. Strictly speaking, therefore, neither dharmas nor “seeds” can be 
consistently held to refer to any form of permanent existent. Dharmas, it seems, 
must arise and pass away with the subject and world of which they are 
constitutive.261 62 263
The main implication of this fact for the dlayavijhana is straightforward. As 
Waldron observes:
It is important to note that even though the dlayavijhana always has an 
object and functions homogeneously (ekarasatva) from birth to death, it is 
not considered a singular entity since it cognizes its objects from instant to 
instant and so flows in a continuous stream of moments (ksanika-srotah-
263satana-vartiri).
But while the fluxional nature of the dlayavijhana puts to rest any notion that it 
may form part of a theory in which some permanent “self’ interacts with a realm 
of universal-like intermediaries it creates other problems. It makes it difficult to 
see how the alayavijhana can be any kind of storehouse at all.264 It is difficult to 
understand, for example, how notions of cultivated and maturing “seeds” can 
contribute to our understanding of mental processes if the “seeds” do not
1
261 Mookerjee, p. 24.
262 Cf., for example, ibid., 7.1B.2.1.4, pp. 160-2; also Streng, pp. 53-4. Obviously one cannot 
consistently maintain that there is no permanent subject and that experience comes about by 
means of the interaction of a priori universal “intermediaries” with a subject.
263 Waldron, 1995, p. 21. Cf. also Schmithausen, S.6.3.4, p. 91. Note also that in the 
Mahayanasamgraha 1.4 we find the following:
“The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,
Like a violent current, flows with all the seeds;
I have not taught it to the ignorant,
Lest they should imagine [it] as a self.” (In W. S. Waldron, “How Innovative is the 
Alayavijhanal: The Klayavijnana in the Context of the Canonical and Abhidharma Vijhana 
Theory. Part 2,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 23: 9-51, 1995, p. 15)
264 It also becomes unclear how it can serve as that consciousness which continues during nirodha- 
samapatti - the main function for which it appears to have been originally designed (cf. 
Schmithausen, 5.7, p. 92).
represent some permanent entity that undergoes change. In fact, if the seeds, or 
dharmas, can only exist in some “now” it is not clear how they can be 
differentiated from the momentary things of which they are constitutive.
It is perhaps with some of these problems in mind that the later dogmatics 
of Yogacara Buddhism introduce a new class of consciousness through which the 
seeds are purported to be conveyed. The modified theory of mind distinguishes a 
total of eight classes of “consciousness”.265 The first six of these are the 
“cognitive groups” mentioned above, i.e., the five senses and a momentary 
intellect, the seventh is called manas, and the eighth is the dlayavijndna. The 
momentary nature of the six cognitive groups means that they cannot receive, 
retain or transmit the seeds.266 267This fact creates a functional divide between the 
six cognitive groups and the constitutively unifying power of the alayavijnana.
265 Cf. for example, ibid., 7.1A.1, pp. 144-5.
266 Waldron, 1995, p. 26. The functioning of the six cognitions is thereby rendered consistent with 
the doctrine of the momentariness o f all “existents” (which includes the six cognitions). Although 
the idea that the sense organs do not receive or retain “content” is common scientific knowledge 
the idea that they do not transmit “content” may be less universally received. At what point in the 
chain of events that begins with the illumination of the retina, for example, does the red “stop” 
sign become “red”, or a “stop sign”? Barry Falk and Stephen Mulhall suggest that science cannot 
give an adequate account of these matters because it conflates two entirely separate matters a 
perceptual capacity, and the causal preconditions for the exercise of that capacity. Science has 
traced a causal chain beginning with light reflected from an object and ending with a set o f events 
in the perceiving subject’s brain within which irradiation of the retina by that reflected light plays 
a vital part, in that it brings about stimulation of the optic nerve; and as a result of this discovery, 
we can now confidently claim that certain things must hold of the retina, the optic nerve and the 
brain of a human being if  she is to exercise her capacity for visual perception. But this means only 
that her retina must be appropriately irradiated if she is to see a given object: it does not mean that 
this irradiation is (any part of) the content of what she sees. If the phrase means anything, ‘the 
content of what she sees’ is either the object of her perception, or her visual impression of that 
object; and it is given by her best description of what she sees or of how it strikes her. It follows 
that, whilst information about the shape or location of the pattern of retinal irradiation may be 
relevant to a scientific account of why someone was able to perceive a given object or event, it can 
have no part to play in an account of what she saw”. (B. Falk and S. Mulhall, “Consciousness, 
Cognition and the Phenomenal,” Aristotelian Society, Supplement (67), 1993, p. 86) A 
sympathetic view is also maintained by Gibsonian theories of perception. In The Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception Gibson writes: “The information for perception is not transmitted, 
does not consist o f signals, and does not entail a sender and receiver.” (1986, pp. 61 ,63)
267 The essential identity of the alayavijnana with the Absolute implies its nature as a permanent. 
But as Mookerjee points out “the permanent is not amenable to any activity” and, since this would 
presumably include cognizing, that activity must be assigned to another “consciousness”. 
(Mookerjee, 1935, p. 81)
Removing the six cognitive groups from direct interaction with the alayavijnana 
has the beneficial effect of rendering the alayavijnana free from having to be the 
locus of the impression of a substantial “self’ and hence, free to be some kind 
of transcendental “storehouse”, i.e., one that is not tied to fluxional existence. But 
this move also immediately raises the question of how its “cognizing” functions 
are to be sustained. Nothing it would seem can “appear” without the interaction of 
the alayavijnana with the six cognitive groups. Yet, as we can now see, it is 
unclear how either a momentarily existent or transcendental alayavijnana is able 
to interact with the six momentary cognitive groups.
The introduction of a schematizing intermediate (manas) between the 
alayavijnana and the six cognitive groups seems to go some way toward 
addressing the problem of how the alayavijnana is to “inform” them. Through 
clinging to the alayavijnana, manas is held to appropriate its constitutive power 
with respect to objects and, thereby, serve as the schematizing vehicle of the 
seeds.268 970 In this capacity manas becomes the locus of the impression of a 
permanent self and the source of desire. It is identified as “the one which has the 
form (-akara)271 of conceiving (manyana) by way of the notion of “I” (ahahkara)
268 Schmithausen, 7.1A.2.2, pp. 150-1. It is also free to serve the purpose of the basis o f corporeal 
existence - the reason, Schmithausen argues, for which the concept was originally introduced 
(5.12.3, p. 101 & 7.1A.2.2b), p. 147).
269 Cf. ibid., p. 4 5 .1 do not mean to suggest here that the “resultant divide” is the historical reason 
for the introduction of the concept of manas, but only that the assignment to manas o f cognizing 
functions originally held by alayavijnana addresses problems raised by the afforementioned 
“divide”.
270 In the broadest sense manas refers to those mental activities associated with intellectual 
functioning, and is usually translated simply as “thought.” Hence, it is conceptually akin to the 
notion of the active intellect.
271 Dreyfus suggests two perhaps not wholly incompatible ways of viewing the role of an akara. 
First, one may view an akara as an intermediate, - a form or aspect through which an object is 
rendered. This idea often seems to presuppose that an intentional, “process” is occurring through 
which an individual “consciousness” is able to render objects apprehendable. In this case 
consciousness functions by means o f the akara which, in some sense, stands between the subject 
and the world. Relying on such a model, however, leads to an infinite regress of intermediaries in 
need of guidance or interpretation. Second, one may see reference to an akara as a way of
and the feeling of identity (asmimana)”. 272 But being the locus of the self renders 
manas a “something” - a product of the “seeds”. Unfortunately, it is not clear how 
manas ’ status as a cognizer (vijnana) and conveyer of seeds can be made 
consistent with its also being a cognized product of the “seeds”.273 2745If it is a 
cognized product of the seeds it is only entitled to an empirical and momentary 
status. In this case its interactions with the alayavijnana take on the same 
problems that exist between the alayavijnana and the six cognitive groups. 
Consequently, as later Buddhists were to point out, relying on manas (as a new 
kind of manovijnanaf1* does not appear to provide any new insight into the
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processes through which experience is made possible.
referring to the reflexive nature of Consciousness itself - that is, to a kind of self-consciousness 
(svasamvedana or svasamvitti, rang rig) which is comparable to Kant’s notion of apperception 
insofar as one does not conceive of apperception as implying or involving a “act” of a separate 
consciousness (cf. G. B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and Its 
Tibetan Interpretations, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997, pp. 335-41). From 
this perspective the akara can be identified with both the subject and the object, since the subject 
and object can be argued to be two “aspects”, or ways o f conceiving, the same “process” of self- 
revealing Consciousness (p. 339, brackets mine). This line of investigation will be pursued more 
fully in chapter 6.
272 Schmithausen translates this early “statement of identity” from the VinSg dlay. Treatise 
(7.1A.2.2c),pp. 150-1).
273 The dependence of manas on alayavijhana for its apparent existence is made clear in the 
following passage of the Lahkavatarasutra: “The Thought-consciousness (manovijhana) by being 
active through its urge to make observations in the sense-world, interpenetrates the Base­
consciousness (alayavijnana) with karmic impressions (vasana) ... .  (From these karmic 
impressions) there develops thought (manas) which brings with it the proneness for grasping a 
(supposed) Self and something of the nature of S e lf .... It is (however) without the characteristic of 
a body (and) dependent on the Base-consciousness as its cause” (Lahkavatara-Sutra, ed. By B. 
Nanjino, Bibliotheca Otaneinsis, Kyoto, 1956,2, p. 126f.; in Schumann, p. 152) The picture 
which emerges here is that it is the urge, or desire, to make observations which, through 
appropriating the constitutive power of the base-consciousness (manovijhana) sustains the 
impression of an essential self and world. Once sustained, the urge to “make observations” arises 
again. In this cycle the Yogacarins see the wheel of “rebirths”. Note also that although the 
dlayavijhdna is the mind that contains all the karmically charged seeds, it is, in itself, karmically 
neutral, unconditioned, and in essence identical with the Absolute. As Schumann observes: “In 
fact ‘mind’ in the Yogacara system is a designation of the Absolute. Thusness, Emptiness, 
Nirvana, Essence of Reality, and Mind are identical.” (Cf. Lahkavatara-Sutra, 3 ,31 , p. 154; in 
Schumann, p.151) Thus, the judgment that the Yogacara school is “idealistic” should not be 
interpreted to suggest, in “veil of ideas” fashion, that the real objects are never encountered but 
rather that the real objects are Mind.
274 Schmithausen, 7.1A.2.2 c), pp. 150-1.
275 In fact, Mookerjee goes so far as to argue that manovijhana, considered in its capacity “as an 
intermediate between the indeterminate sense-perception and the determinate interpretive 
knowledge which makes selective activity possible”, “... is an idle hypothesis,...” (p. 314) In fact,
The question of the necessity or absurdity of a manovijnana to one side we 
can conclude this section with some general observations concerning the structure 
of Buddhist accounts of experience. As with Eckhart’s philosophy, the Buddhists 
divide the mind into active and passive aspects. The active aspect is closely 
associated with rationality and conceptualization and the passive aspect is 
associated with the Absolute as it is manifested through an individual mind. While 
the Absolute serves as the occasion for the appearance of all things, which are 
somehow immanent to it, it cannot, without the cooperation of an appropriating 
consciousness, yield any “experience”. In terms of the pratitya-samutpada series 
we can recall that appropriation is immediately preceded by craving, or desire, 
and followed by a new becoming. Consequently, for the Buddhists, it is desire that 
precipitates the appropriating consciousness to make new “existences” possible 
through clinging to the results of the maturation of the seeds, - i.e., to the Base-
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consciousness as it manifests relative to some object.
3. We are now in a position to apply some insights from the above discussion 
to the problem of judgment. We have seen that for both Kant and Buddhism 
understanding is an appropriating, or “grasping”, activity in which an existing 
“cognitive structure” is employed in the process of rendering things intelligible. 
For Kant such “rendering” involves a process of synthesis - by which, he says, “in 276
it leads ultimately to an infinite regress of interpreting intermediarites. Mookerjee, also suggests: 
“If you suppose a tertium quid between the two cognitions, you will only make the indeterminate 
sense perception an inefficient, abortive fact, which is absurd.” (p. 315)
276 The Parvrtti Portion compares the functioning of the alayavijnana to a burning flame as 
follows: “Thus, one should know that the way the alayavijnana [occurs] in regard to the object of 
inner appropriation and the external object is similar to a burning flame which occurs inwardly 
while it emits light outwardly on the basis of the wick and oil.” (l.b) A.3, in Waldron, 1995, n. 
182, p. 39) It seems, therefore, that in turning back to appropriate the base consciousness relative 
to some “object” a product of consciousness appropriates a kind of self-reflexive consciousness 
which is not dependent on them for its existence. For more on such a notion of consciousness see 
chapter 6 below.
its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations 
together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one cognition”.277 278This 
notion of how understanding functions, however, implies a need for a self which 
can combine [verbinden\ representations. Indeed, it is a central function of the 
first Critique to argue for the necessity of such a self in order to counter Hume’s 
skeptical claims. Thus, Kant suggests that the fact of synthesis requires that: “[I 
call my representations ‘mine’.] This amounts to saying that I am conscious to 
myself a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations - to be entitled the 
original synthetic unity of apperception”.279 However, as one commentator 
argues:
it is important to note a serious deficiency in Kant’s account. Kant equates 
standing in a relation of synthesis with being states of the same thinking 
self: the former relation is both a necessary (A118) and a sufficient (B134) 
condition of the latter. However, if synthesis is only a general relation of 
contentual dependence, the contents of the later states being produced as a
277 1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1950, A77/B103). 
Pluhar translates this passage as follows: “By synthesis, in the most general sense of the term, I 
mean the act o f putting various presentations together with one another and of comprising 
[begreifen] their manifoldness in one cognition.” (I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. W. S. 
Pluhar, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996, p. 130)
278 Ibid., B137, p. 180. Cf. also Kant writes: “Hence all combination is an act of understanding - 
whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or the manifold of various concepts;... I 
would assign to this act of understanding the name synthesis, in order to point out at the same 
time: that we cannot present anything as combined in the object without ourselves’ having 
combined it before hand;... combination... being an act of the subject’s self-activity - can be 
performed only by the subject himself.” (B 131, p. 176)
279 Ibid., B135, p. 179; cf. also B133, p. 178, and B134, p. 178. The ontological status of Kant’s 
thinking I is the subject of some debate. The “thinking subject” is “transcendental”, i.e., beyond 
experience (A296/B351). However, it functions to impute existence (B15a and B4222a). Note that 
whether one translates Vorstellung in this passage as “representation”, as N.K. Smith does, or as 
“presentation”, as Pluhar does, will effect how one understands the nature o f the “I think”. For 
reasons which Pluhar presents I believe “presentations” may be more appropriate (cf. ibid., p. 22, 
n. 73).
result of the information contained in earlier states, then it is plainly not a 
sufficient condition for comentality as pretheoretically understood.280
In other words, the deficiency of Kant’s account is argued to be revealed in the 
fact that synthesis, as the general relation in which understanding is, at any given 
moment, constitutively dependent on former understandings, is not in itself a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a “thinking I” which 
accompanies the “combination” of [representations.281 28
Indeed Buddhism, as we have seen, maintains that current understanding is 
constitutively dependent on previous understandings. But it also accounts for the 
appearance of a subject by suggesting that it is “constituted” with its 
corresponding object through that fundamentally appropriate “process” in
^so'y
which all things appear. In other words, the Buddhists maintain that the 
phenomenon of something appearing to an existent can be more accurately 
described as an appearance with a subject. Even when the Yogacara Buddhists 
posit manas as a kind of apperceptive appropriating consciousness, it is not
280 Cf. P. Kitcher, “Kant’s Real S e lf’, in A. W. Wood, Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, 
(London: Cornell Univesity Press, 1984, p. 117).
281 Kitcher writes: “When Kant equates the relation of synthesis with the relation of comentality, 
he intends ‘synthesis’ to refer to the precise relation of informational interconnection which holds 
among the states o f one mind, or thinking self (cf. B135)” as opposed to the general process of 
putting representations together. This, she continues, “renders ‘synthesis’ dangerously 
ambiguous”... and “enables him to move from his understanding o f the [interdependent] nature of 
mental states to the doctrine that the specific concept of a thinking self is a necessary concept for 
experience, rather than to a vaguer doctrine about the generic concept of a mental system.” (p.
118)
282 Throughout the dissertation I am maintaining the basic position that an absolutely unintelligible 
appearance, or object, is a logical impossibility. In other words, as McDowell writes speaking of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on the possibility of a private language: “a bare presence cannot supply 
justificatory input into a conceptual repertoire from outside it, the sort of thing the connection 
between concepts and spontaneity made us hanker for.” (p. 20) Or elsewhere: “When Kant 
describes the understanding as the faculty o f spontaneity, that reflects his view of the relation 
between reason and freedom: rational necessitation is not just compatible with freedom but 
constitutive of it.” (J. McDowell, Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1996, p. 5) This amounts to saying that intelligibility (i.e., the supersensible) is itself an a priori 
condition of anything what so ever.
permitted any permanent, or a priori, status. Rather it is confined to being a 
product of the appropriative process itself, which in supporting a reflective 
clinging to the Storehouse-consciousness, “schematizes” by means of dharmas283 
In this way Buddhism argues that the “appropriating” activity itself, driven by 
desire and perpetuated by ignorance, simultaneously supports the experience of an 
essential “self’ and “world”. Although there may be said to be an “I” in Buddhism 
a priori to the interdependent presentations of some “now”, to the extent that it 
refers to any “thing” it can only be to the Base-consciousness considered as 
Absolute which, like the formal “I think”, is an idealization, - although perhaps no 
mere idealization.
This fundamentally Buddhist line of thought reveals the source of the 
paradox which constitutes the problem of judgment. Kant’s model of 
understanding as the faculty of rules, and of judgment as the faculty of subsuming 
under rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand 
under a given rule, implies the need for a “judge” who exists prior to the moment 
of judgment and who possesses the “talents” necessary to abrogate the need for an 
infinite regress of rules of judgment.284 On this model of mind both the act of 
“understanding” and the appearance of anything what so ever, are held to function 
through acts of conceptual appropriation, i.e., by subsuming intuitions under 
concepts, or particulars under universals. As an explanation of “how one
283 The dharmas in question are of both the conditioned and unconditioned variety. The 
conditioned dharmas are, by and large, constitutive of the alayavijhana. Here, however, one must 
realize that any given dharma that could be said to constitute the dlayavijhana must have been 
“employable” prior to said constitution. Hence, providing an account of the emergence of content 
in terms o f the power of dharmas is problematic.
284 Cf. Kant writes: “The unity of apperception [considered] in reference to the synthesis of the 
imagination is understanding; and the same unity as referred [beziehungsweise] to the 
transcendental synthesis of imagination is pure understanding....” (Pluhar, 1996, A119, p. 167)
understands” Kant’s model accurately captures something of the nature of the 
mind in thought. The limitations of this explanation are, however, revealed when 
one demands that the resultant understanding be “knowledge” - that is, one 
attempts to epistemically ground judgment. Or, alternatively, one attempts to 
apply the notion of understanding as “rule-governed” to an account of how things 
appear in receptivity, i.e., in a “ready to hand” fashion.285 For Kant, or so it often 
appears, an inquiry into these matters concerns the activity of spontaneous 
synthesis through which “objects” appear to a subject.286 Consequently, it remains 
as a question of “judgment” in which a “subjective basis” is required.287 But for 
Buddhist philosophy this is always an inquiry into that appropriative “process” 
through which an object appears with a subject - that is, it is an inquiry into the 
relationships between the Absolute and the relative, between Unity and
285 Cf. Kant writes: “We may now characterize the understanding as our power of rules. ...”
(A 126, Ibid., p. 172)
286 To a large extent Kant’s analysis o f how a “se lf’ is constituted agrees with that of Buddhism. 
The above argument, however, emphasizes a line of thought in the first Critique which latches on 
to the fact that the “unconditioned” original synthetic unity o f apperception in its necessary 
application to experience must rely on sensibility which, as we have repeatedly argued, is 
necessarily “conditioned” (B140). By itself unity can have no “object” and hence, is merely an 
analytic presupposition o f  all experience (B135; B138). When Kant suggests that an I think 
necessarily exists prior to any cognition, it is the original “unconditioned” synthetic unity of 
apperception considered as transcendental and unconditioned which he has in mind 
(B142).“Judgment”, he tells us, “is nothing but a way of bringing given cognitions to the objective 
unity o f apperception.” (B142, ibid., p. 184) [emphasis mine]. Unfortunately, it seems, this 
process is necessarily “derivative (intuitus derivativus) rather than original (intuitus originarius)’’ 
(cf. ibid., B72, p. 103). Although, the possibility of “judgment” then is contingent upon something 
which combines presentations a priori, and this thing, once again, is pure, original, and 
unconditioned, and so, it seems, are its “rules”, or “laws” (A 127) (which we can only discover by 
abstraction, B145), the application of these rules in an empirical synthesis, which is our only 
avenue o f approach to things, requires an act [Handlung] which depends on a “subjective basis” 
(A 119-121; A 124; §22). Kant does discuss the idea of “a thought with a subject” in connection 
with the synthetic unity of apperception but this synthesis, it seems, is the synthesis of  the pure 
categories through which contact with the world proceeds. Hence “thought with a subject” is only 
a necessary condition of all possible experience and can have no object (cf. A397, ibid., p. 419; 
and B 138, p. 181). In this way Kant’s synthesis of the pure categories, or conditions of thought, is 
consistent with the first half of the pratitya-samutpada series considered as “consciousness” (cf. 
ABO).
287 For a related argument demonstrating how the notion of spontaneous synthesis, as something 
we do, must presuppose the possibility o f “content” and hence cannot provide an account o f it, see 
below Chapter 6, section III.
multiplicity, as revealed through the activity of a mind.288 This relationship they 
point out, can never be adequately grasped because, as we have seen, one cannot 
grasp “that” which permits grasping.289 Demanding an explanation of how one is 
able to understand (i.e., how one’s understanding can be epistemologically 
secured) leads directly to an encounter with the limitations of understanding and 
rational explanation - for example, an infinite regress of rules of judgment - a 
limitation to which the Buddhists are equally subject and of which they are aware.
One example of this awareness can be found in a book by S. Mookerjee290 
on the philosophy of Dignaga.291 Chapter XX, entitled “Self-cognition”, is 
devoted to a consideration of Yogacara views on the relationship between 
consciousness and self-consciousness and to objections to these views. It is in this 
context that we find a Buddhist consideration of what in essence is the problem of 
judgment. The problem is framed in terms of how objects are illuminated by the 
mind and so lacks the structural details of Kant’s rule-based formulation. 
Nevertheless, the general strategy adopted is the same - the performance of a 
reductio ad absurdum on the notion that those “processes” through which the 
world becomes manifest can be guided. Mookerjee writes:
If a cognition cannot shine in its own light but only in the borrowed light of 
another cognition, how can the second cognition, which equally lacks 
original light like the first, make it shine? Certainly there must be light
288 Without individual minds, Mind would remain in a state of shunyata.
289 This is also true of the original synthetic unity of apperception (cf. B132, and A401-2). Hence, 
we should not be surprised that Kant’s attempt to rebuff Hume’s sceptical challenge should result 
in an overtly inconsistent doctrine, i.e., that “original synthesis” cannot in practice be separated 
from “empirical synthesis”.
290 Mookerjee, 1935, cf. n. 242 above. For more examples see the discussion of reflexive self- 
consciousness in chapter 6 below.
291 Dignaga (480-540) was a principal teacher of Yogacara Buddhism.
somewhere and in its own right and if it is supposed to belong to some 
remote cognition, what is the harm if it is conceded to the first? If you deny 
original light to any cognition whatsoever, perception of objective reality 
will become impossible, and darkness cannot remove darkness. And the 
alternative of shining in borrowed light is exposed to the charge of 
regressus ad infinitum. Thus, if a cognition is unrevealed in and by itself 
and is only revealed by another cognition before it can reveal the object, 
that other cognition being equally unrevealed will again require a third and 
the third again a fourth and so on to infinity. The upshot will be that the
1Q1object will not be known - a position extremely absurd.
From considerations such as this the Buddhists conclude that Ultimate truth 
cannot be grasped. The ultimate truth is, as we have gleaned from our discussion 
of Eckhart, that the object of consciousness is neither identical to nor different 
from consciousness itself. Furthermore, the cognizing consciousness, i.e., the 
subject, can neither be grasped nor can it be unknown. Hence it seems that 
somehow the revelation of an object by consciousness is simultaneously a 
revelation of consciousness itself. But exactly how this is to be understood is 
unclear and a subject of great debate within Indian philosophy.29 394
In the end, however, Buddhism suggests that the matter is one of where 
you wish to place emphasis, on the determinate or the determining.295 In any 
account of experience it seems that both must be accorded a degree of
292 Ibid., pp. 325-6. For a Mahàyâna argument that procédés along similar lines see Nàgârjuna’s 
“Averting the Arguments”, points 30-2, in Streng, p. 224.
293 Hence, the Yogâcàra philosopher Dharmakïrti (7th century) writes: “Perception of an object is 
impossible if  perception itself is unperceived” (Mookerjee, p. 325).
294 Cf. Dreyfus’ discussion of theories of perception for a review o f some of the relevant debates, 
1997, in particular pp. 335-48.
295 Ibid., cf. pp. 340-1.
independent reality and yet outside of their meeting they are, strictly speaking, 
nothing. As Mookerjee writes: “The reference to the subject and object in a 
judgment is a question of emphasis and is possible only if there is a recognition of 
the fact of knowledge.”296 The fact of knowledge is the fact that any product of 
interdependent arising is always a meaningful whole.297 According to the 
Buddhists there is nothing before or after this whole. Providing an explanation of 
the manifestation of any whole, however, seems to require some variation on the 
theme of a cooperation between a cognizing consciousness and a percept, as it is 
presented through one or more of the six cognitive groups. In such an account a 
“resultant object” necessarily reflects something of the “consciousness” which 
made it possible. Both are idealizations but must, in any account of experience, be 
acknowledged to possess a kind of substantial permanence. As Mookerjee 
observes with respect to the “consciousness” side of the equation, if one only 
acknowledges the momentary as existent, and the subject is completely denied 
reality in experience, remaining “unknown and unknowable, what is there to 
cement the discrete experiences and thoughts into one subjective whole”?298 And 
yet for Buddhism, this combiner of phenomena, like any other existent, can only 
lay claim to a momentary existence, and so cannot be a permanent “self’.
4. The tension between the logical demand for a permanent “self’, or base­
consciousness, to supply intelligibility to experience and the canonical claim of 
the momentariness of all existents runs throughout Buddhist philosophy. In 
Buddhism, however, philosophy is not granted the last word. Buddhism maintains
296 Ibid., p. 327.
297 Ibid., cf. p. 322, and p. 331.
298 Ibid., p. 328.
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that relief from this tension requires the “attainment”299 of an Ultimate truth, 
which cannot be achieved through philosophical activity alone. Rather the 
“attainment” in question takes the form of a way of life, which is generally 
referred to as the eightfold path. The eightfold path can be broken up into three 
main areas - the trishiksha (“threefold training”). These areas are composed of 1) 
training in moral discipline; 2) training in mind; and 3) training in wisdom. With 
respect to training in moral discipline Buddhism divides intentional states into 
three types: wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral. This division falls naturally 
enough along just those lines one would expect. “Wholesome” states are those 
which one would normally call “good” (e.g., states of compassion, generosity, 
justice, wisdom, etc.). “Unwholesome” states are those which one would normally 
call “bad” (e.g., lying, slander, murder, etc.). “Neutral” states are those which do 
not fall into the other two groups.300 301By training in moral discipline is meant 
avoidance of karmically unwholesome activities. Training in mind is done 
through meditative practices. Training in wisdom involves the cultivation of 
prajna. These three elements mutually support each other. Cultivation of only one 
of them cannot lead to the intended goal - liberation (vimukti).302
Generally speaking the eightfold path contains the strategy for elimination 
of craving and the dispelling of ignorance. It consists of the development of 
“perfect” (samyak) view, resolve, speech, conduct, effort, mindfulness, and
299 The “attainment” of the ultimate truth involves the dissolution of the “se lf’ and so cannot, 
strictly speaking, be an “attainment”.
300 This division itself presupposes an a priori universal and normative “structure".
301 Meditative practice is not here dealt with to any extent. A few words, however, may be 
appropriate. “A common mark of all forms of meditation is that practice of the meditation 
concentrates the mind of the practitioner, calms and clarifies it like the surface o f a turbulent body 
of water, the bottom of which one can only see when the surface is still and the water is clean” 
(Kohn, p. 142).
302 Kohn, p. 231.
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concentration. The details of these need not concern us, but the effect of the 
elimination of craving through consistent practice of the path can be readily 
understood through examining its impact on the functioning of the pratitya- 
samutpada series. We will recall that in this series “sensation” precedes “craving” 
which, in turn, precedes “clinging.” Now, we have said that “clinging” is that 
which is responsible for the “contents of consciousness” feeding back into the 
alayavijnana and cultivating the seeds of future “existences”. The effect of the 
elimination of craving then is simply to break the causal chain of pratTtya- 
samutpada before one begins to cling - that is, precisely at that point where the 
“products” of consciousness normally turn and feedback into the source of 
production. Once again, from the Yogacara perspective, the process of feeding 
back into the alayavijnana, of developing the “seeds” into “latent dispositions” 
which then burst forth supraliminally to feedback again ad infinitum, is the 
immediate cause of its karmic “conditionedness” and the mediate cause of the 
apparent “existence” of subject and world. Consequently, the elimination of 
craving starves the alayavijnana of the feedback responsible for its “conditioning” 
and this, in turn, effects ones’ impression of “reality”. Although it is the 
overcoming of the first step in the series, i.e., ignorance, which is the necessary 
and sufficient condition for liberation, in practice this cannot be accomplished as 
long as the karmic forces of the alayavijnana are still active and operative. In 
other words, the wisdom (prajna), which dispels ignorance (avidya),m  only 30
303 This view is most closely associated with the Madhyamika system. “In the Yogacara view 
avidya means seeing the object as a unit independent of mind”, overcoming avidya involves 
seeing the object not different from it (Kohn, p. 15). Recall, however, that “mind”, in Yogacara 
Buddhism, is generally synonymous with the Absolute.
comes about after one has become released from craving and one’s heart is at 
rest.304 3056
In the task of eliminating desire, or craving, training in moral discipline 
plays a particularly significant role. Although the appearance of “wholesome” 
states is consistent with the continued impression of a substantial subject and 
world the occurrence of these states functions to, in some sense, weaken such 
impressions because the “wholesome” states are of the whole, i.e., o f the 
incorruptible Unconditioned, or Base-consciousness considered as Absolute,
i n «
which contains no seeds or latent dispositions. This is to say that the 
wholesome states are of the nature of the Absolute. We have, up to now, defined 
the Absolute as a Unity which admits of no distinctions and as an idealization. But 
the Buddhists maintain that the Absolute is not just an idealization. Being Unity, it 
has an affiliation with qualities such as peacefulness, simplicity, and with such 
conceptually affiliated capacities/states such as “goodness”, “justice”, “wisdom”, 
and “love”. When these states are active and present to mind they tend to 
counteract the appropriating activities of consciousness. This counteraction 
effectively stills the mind, reduces attachment, diminishes the role of the active 
conditioned mind in experience, and paves the way for the Unconditioned, or 
Absolute, to communicate, or share, itself - that is, to permit a mode of
304 Consider the following: “Bodhis referred originally to the four stages o f the supramundane path 
(arya-marga) and was attained through the completion of the thirty seven prerequisites of 
enlightenment (bodhipakshika-dharma) and the dissolution of ignorance (avidya), that is, through 
the realization of the four noble truths.” (Kohn, p.22) The four noble truths are 1) the truth that all 
“existence” is characterized by suffering; 2) the truth that the origin of “suffering” is craving, 
desire, or thirst which breeds “attachment” and thus, further arising and passing away; 3) the truth 
that the absolute elimination of craving brings the cessation (nirodha) of suffering; 4) the truth of 
the eightfold path that leads to the cessation of suffering. The nonrecognition of the four noble 
truths constitutes “ignorance” {avidya).
305 Waldron, 1995, p. 38n.
306 Cf. Blakney, 1941, p. 273; and Suzuki, 1957, p. 75. Eckhart writes: “What is the good? That 
which communicates itself.” (Blakney, 1941, p. 220); or “That which shares itself.” (M.O’C.
knowing which does not rely on grasping and hence, is, in an important way, free 
from the influence of the “subject”. In this way cultivation of the wholesome 
states is effectively aligned with training in wisdom (prajna).307
But it is entirely unclear how the Unconditioned can be influential in 
experience. The idea of the unconditioned mind can only refer to the mind in so 
far as it has neither been determined by experience nor acts to determine any 
particular experience. Hence, it can refer only to the general capacity of the mind 
to unify in absence of any particular determination or determinate. Consequently, 
it is difficult to understand how the Unconditioned nature of the subject, can in 
any way relate to an, as yet to be determined, “object”, within a process of 
determination, and yet if they are not brought together content, it seems, will not 
be possible. A related line of thought leads Mookerjee to argue that:
The particular cognition of an object is to be supposed to be engendered by 
a common set of causes and conditions, which ushers into existence the 
object and the cognition as co-products at one and the same time. The 
cognitive relation between the two factors is to be explained by a law of
Walshe, 1981, p. 151) In Buddhism’s description of, what appears to be, the analogue o f “God 
acting in place o f the active intellect” (i.e., Eckhart’s detachment (abgescheidenheit), or 
releasement (gelazenheit)), avidya, as the source of that which appears, is vanquished and prajna 
takes its place.
307 However, the Yogacarins observe that even in states where “wholesome” acts occur such as 
generosity, and compassion, there is still clinging to a persistent subject beyond the immediate act. 
It is ultimately the dlayavijhana which provides the support for this kind of attachment. This sense 
o f a persistent self is sustained even in individuals who are far along the “Path of Seeing” and 
those capable of enlightenment and is only truly absent during nirodha-samapatti (cf. Waldron, 
1995, pp. 43-44n.). They argue that if there were no alayavijnana, but only momentary mind, 
entrance into nirvana would occur simply upon any fully “wholesome act” because momentary 
mind can only entertain mind-states serially. Waldron notes: “If there were no mind with all the 
seeds, this would entail the further consequence that when a supramundane moment o f mind 
occurs in the Formless Realm, the other mundane cittas [minds] would be non-existent, that i s , ... 
“when the counteractant (pratipaksa) is present, then since all o f the counteracted (vipaksa) have 
ceased, nirvana without remainder (nirupadhiSesanirvana) would be attained naturally and 
without effort.” (pp. 27-28) Thus, it is the persistent influence o f  the alayavijnana in each moment 
that supports the experience of a “se lf’ far along the “Path of Seeing”.
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harmony or mutual affinity inherent in the constitutional peculiarity of the 
subjective and objective factor. And this is the only possible explanation of 
the etiology of perceptual knowledge and the Buddhist shares the 
difficulties or advantages of this theory equally with the non-Buddhist 
schools.... [Unfortunately]... the relation of awareness and object cannot be 
explained, as there is no connecting medium between the two. Awareness 
will be pure, indeterminate awareness and not awareness of this or that, 
unless the two are supposed to be brought together.308
Hence, according to Mookerjee, it seems that we are left to postulate some such 
“mechanism” as interdependent arising either by itself or possibly in concert with 
a “harmonization of the cognitive faculties” to account for the influence of the 
Unconditioned in experience.
Ultimately, the Yogacarins suggest that the way to the Truth is by means o f an 
abandonment of clinging (sopadana) to the alayavijnana and a “return”, or “reversal” (paravrtti), 
of the mind to itself as the Absolute from which all things spring.309 Since the Absolute is one and 
simple such a return may seem to necessitate the complete extinction of all perceptual and mental 
activity, as in nirodha-samapatti.310 However, the the reversal in question does not necessitate 
such a state. As the Lanka vatarasUtra311 states:
... (People) who seek Nirvana (because they are) worried by the fear of suffering which 
(arises) from the discrimination (that) Samsara (is distinct from the Absolute), do not know 
that Samsara and Nirvana are identical. As (things which seem) real by discrimination have 
(in truth) no reality, they think that Nirvana (is realized) through future abandonment o f the
308 Mookerjee, pp. 78-9, cf. also pp. 82-3.
309 Schumann, p. 153, and Waldron, 1995, p. 38n.
310 Nirodha-samàpatti is a state in which the âlayavijhâna and its operations are temporarily but 
completely suspended. Waldron, 1995, p. 47n.
311 The Lankâvatàrasütra is a central text of the Mahâyàna tradition. It proclaims a doctrine that is 
also held by the Yogâcârins.
senses and sense-spheres... (They do) not (know that Nirvana) is the Store-consciousness 
(vijfianalaya) which, after a reversal has taken place, has itself for the final goal.312 
Hence, it seems that the relevant “reversal” brings about a revelation in which the 
Base-consciousness (alayavijnana), in its functioning to bring about content 
(i.e.,Samsara), is not fundamentally different from Absolute consciousness - a 
Truth which is apparently not available through the employment of reason alone.
Such insights as these lead Nagarjuna to suggest that truth is two-levelled. 
The truth that one encounters in everyday life and which one employs in reason, 
discrimination, and judgment is conventional, or “relative”, (lit. ‘veiling’) truth 
(satnvrti-satya). It is this everyday truth that leads us to the view that Samsara and 
Nirvana are different. The “reversal”, however, permits the revelation of ‘Truth in 
the Supreme Sense’ (paramartha-satya) in which the world of conditioned 
appearances is seen, in some trans-logical fashion, to be Unconditioned.313 This 
two-fold analysis of truth, which Nagarjuna emphasizes, is consistently applied to 
his own theoretical constructs. The theory of the pratltya-samutpada series, and 
all the concepts on which it relies (e.g., dharmas), although of some value in 
helping us to understand the nature of experience, must be considered on the 
conventional level of “relative truth”. They should not be taken to express or refer 
to any absolutely existing entities and hence should not be expected to provide 
profound insight into an objectively existing ground. Non-attachment must apply 
equally to experience and to any explanatory constructs designed to account for 
experience (e.g., pratitya-samutpada). Seeing in the light of prajna, therefore, 
does not refer to a mode of apprehension. It rather involves a dissipation of the
312 LS 2 p. 61f., in Schumann, 1973, p. 153. Whereas relative truth applies to the subject and 
world as revealed by relation and reason, Supreme Truth applies to Unity.
313 Ibid., p. 145.
need to construct and cling to accounts of experience by means of an unmediated 
recognition of the emptiness314 of all apparent “self-existents”. Nagarjuna 
suggests that the wisdom of emptiness (i.e., prajna) which recognizes that “there 
is only one state of existence: that things rise and dissipate through dependent co­
origination”315 316also involves “the cognition of daily life without the attachment to 
316
To fully investigate the concept of emptiness would take us too far from 
our intended program and would be unlikely to bring us nearer to the goal of 
explaining the ground of experience. But briefly one way of coming to terms with 
the idea of the emptiness of self-existents is as follows: For ultimates like 
dharmas to be capable of being legislative for experience they must possess a 
transcendental status, but to assert that legislative ability they need an empirical 
status. In other words, only while an ultimate is transcendental can it be a 
“producer”, but to be transcendental is to be non-existent, and non-existents 
cannot “produce” anything. Once an ultimate becomes existent it is empirical. 
Unfortunately, it then is no longer a “universal producer” but rather a “particular 
something produced”. Hence, such ultimates can neither be grasped by the 
understanding nor abandoned by it. Buddhism, once again, holds that escape from 
this bind cannot be achieved but it can only be let go of with the realization of the
314 Schumann illustrates the concept of emptiness as follows: ‘‘Whereas Nagarjuna uses the 
adjectives ‘non-essential’ (asvabhava) and ‘empty’ (shunya) as synonyms, he does not regard as 
such the noun ‘non-essentiality’ (asvabhavata or nihsvabhavata) and ‘emptiness’ (shunyata).
Stating the non-essentiality of a thing is always a negative judgment; stating its 
emptiness, however, is an ambivalent judgment. On the one hand ‘emptiness’ signifies the non­
existence of an individual Soul or Self, on the other hand essential liberatedness. For just because 
there is no Soul in beings but emptiness, they are essentially liberated. The Emptiness of every 
being which is identical with the Emptiness of all others, possesses all the characteristics of the 
essence. To become aware of one’s essential Emptiness is to achieve liberation. In the 
Madhyamaka system as in the Prajndpdramita texts Emptiness is the Absolute”, (p. 144)
315 Streng, p. 146-7.
316 Ibid., pp. 159-60.
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Truth of the emptiness of all things. But lest one should hold emptiness as a 
viewpoint Nagarjuna warns:
If something would be non-empty, something would [logically also] be 
empty. But nothing is non-empty, so how will it become empty? Emptiness 
is proclaimed by the victorious one as the refutation of all view-points; But 
those who hold “emptiness” as a viewpoint - [the true perceivers] have 
called those “incurable” (asadhya)?11
5. Before continuing with our account of the implications of the alleviation 
of desire for Buddhist philosophy and for the problem of content a brief aside into 
Western philosophy is in order. If the idea that the elimination of craving could 
somehow impact on one’s experience of the ontological status of objects seems 
odd or extreme it will be interesting to note that Kant maintains some sympathetic 
views. In the third Critique Kant states: “For the power of desire, considered as a 
higher power governed by the concept of freedom, only reason (which alone 
contains that concept) legislates a priori.” In the same context he defines “the 
power of desire as the power of being the cause, through one’s presentations, of
o i o
the actuality o f the objects o f these presentations." This suggests that freedom, 
or spontaneity, legislates a priori to that aspect of the “soul”, or mind, (i.e., 
desire), which, in some sense of the term, causes things to appear as “actual”! 
Here Kant’s use of the term “actual” concerns the existence of objects. Kant 
writes:
But our entire distinction between the merely possible and the actual rests 
on this: in saying that a thing is possible we are positing only the 3178
317 Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarikas, 13.7-8, in Streng, p. 198.
318 Ak.V, Pluhar, 1987, p. 16, n. 19.
presentation of it with respect to our concept and to our thinking ability in 
general; but in saying that a thing is actual we are positing the thing itself 
[an sich selbst] (apart from that concept). Hence the distinction between 
possible and actual things holds merely subjectively, for human 
understanding. For even if something does not exist, we can still have it in 
our thoughts; or we can present something as given, even though we have as
319yet no concept of it.
Hence, in the aforementioned italicized passage, Kant is suggesting that freedom 
legislates a priori to the power of desire as that power which is responsible for the 
existence of objects relative to human understanding - the only kind of 
understanding of which we are capable.
In the context of this discussion of §76 Kant refers to the possibility of 
“intuitive” understanding. He suggests that: “If our understanding were intuitive 
[rather than discursive, i.e., conceptual] it would have no objects except actual 
[ones].”319 20 But here Kant seems to mean a form of “actuality” which is not the 
counterpart to possibility. Kant observes; “reason forever demands that we 
assume something or other (the original basis) as existing with unconditioned 
necessity, something in which there is no longer to be any distinction between 
possibility and actuality; and for this idea our understanding has absolutely no 
concept, i.e., it cannot find a way to present such a thing and its way of 
existing.”321 From this Kant concludes that the two propositions, “that things can 
be possible without being actual, and that consequently one cannot infer actuality
319 Ibid., p. 285. Pluhar notes that “no noumenon seems to be intended here” (n. 20). For further 
clarification on this issue cf. § 76, Ak. 401-404; cf. also §2 Ak. 204, p. 45.
320 Ibid., Ak. 402, p. 284.
321 Ibid., Ak. 402, p. 285.
145
from mere possibility,” do not hold of things as they would appear to an intuitive 
understanding. This realm of free lawfulness is, however, outside the domain of 
reason.
Although Kant maintains that such an intuitive understanding is 
unattainable. He does think that it is possible to minimize the negative effects of 
desire. Since the “power of desire is necessarily connected with pleasure or 
displeasure” which, in turn, has the power to lead reason astray, the role of 
disinterestedness, or nonattachment, in the appearance of things becomes obvious. 
Nonattachment is vital to the capacity of freedom, or spontaneity, to permit reason 
to legislate “unconditionally”. Unfortunately, since “judgment lies between 
understanding and reason”, reason functions through utilizing that which is 
revealed in “judgment”.322 But, as we saw in the first chapter, “judgment” can 
only be determinate to the extent that there is some interest in the object. Hence, it 
seems that the transition from understanding to reason must always, to the extent 
that things are “grasped” and reasoned about, be influenced by desire. And 
although reason may, in some way, in its totality be wholly unconditioned, in its 
application it must always, or so it seems, be conditioned.
6. While the truth of emptiness may ultimately condemn philosophers to an 
endless pursuit of metaphysical unrealities there is an account within the general 
rubric of Buddhism that permits us to theorize about how the Unconditioned 
might be influential in experience. It is an account in which the concept of prajna 
plays a central role. Buddhists generally use prajna to mean a kind of “insight” 
and contrast it with vijhana, which, as we have seen, is associated with cognizing
322 Ibid., Ak. 178, p. 17, cf. also Ak. 197, p. 37.
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activities and rationality. Access to prajnd is purported to have the virtue of being 
able to provide a direct access to the Truth so as to transcend the need for the 
contradictory theoretical constructs that we have been considering. The Buddhist 
account of how a self and world appear and are sustained, as we have noted, 
requires the postulation of entities such a dharmas and the alayavijnana. These 
entities, although perhaps going someway towards elucidating the nature of 
experience, possess contradictory ontological qualities such as permanence and 
momentariness. By rejecting rationality as the appropriate means to reveal the 
Ultimate truth the Buddhist concept of prajnd points to a redirection of mental 
energies caught in the web of discourse.323 As Streng observes: “Perfect wisdom, 
in its indifference to all (empty) forms, does not assert a teaching; the only 
“answer” one can receive from wisdom (prajnd) is silence.324 325But even though 
prajnd does not itself offer a discourse it is possible to productively utilize the 
concept to more thoroughly understand the “mental processes” underlying 
experience.
In his accounts of how experience comes about D. T. Suzuki suggests that 
the discriminating activities of vijnana cannot exist without prajnd's creative role 
in supplying the material to be discriminated. He defines prajnd as that “whereby 
a synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes possible” and so substitutes the 
word prajnd for the functions that Buddhism traditionally assigns to the 
dharmas.225 Instead of the dharmas working through individual mind to constitute
323 Tokusho (890-971), one of the great masters of Kegon philosophy and Zen Buddhism, writes: 
‘If there is one dharma (i.e., universal law) the Dharmakaya (i.e., universal concrete) is not 
complete; if there is no dharma the Dharmakaya is not complete either. For here lies the whole 
truth ofpra/na-intuition.’ In Suzuki, p. 99.
324 Streng, p. 89.
325 Suzuki, p. 124n; Suzuki actually refers to prajha in this quote as “the fundamental noetic 
principle whereby...”. I have dropped his reference to it as a principle because he clearly does not
experience prajna is theorized as providing the necessary constitutive power. In 
providing vijnana with constitutive guidance prajna, like the harmonizing of 
cognitive faculties, is held to operate as a kind of free lawfulness. Suzuki 
suggests that prajna can be described as an undifferentiated continuum which is 
differentiated in endless ways through various structures of consciousness. In 
speaking of this “process” Suzuki writes that,
we must not think that this process of differentiation as a function given to 
the continuum from an outside source. The differentiation is evolved from 
within the continuum (i.e., from prajna itself), for it is not the nature of the 
prajnd-contimum to remain in a state of sunyata, absolutely motionless. It 
demands of itself that it differentiate itself unlimitedly, and at the same time 
it desires to remain itself. Prajna is always trying to preserve its self identity 
and yet subjects itself to infinite diversification. That is why sunyata is said 
to be a reservoir of infinite possibilities and not just a state of mere
. 327emptiness.
This way of speaking is somewhat poetic. But that is in keeping with the fact that 
understanding cannot grasp prajna directly. To understand the passage more fully 
we must realize that as Suzuki suggests: “Prajna is the ultimate reality itself’.326 728 
In other words, prajna is the epistemological manifestation of the metaphysical
intend it to function as such. He also, for instance, writes; “Prajfia is not the principle of judgment 
whereby a subject becomes related to [an] object. Prajna transcends all forms of judgment and is 
not at all predicable.” (p. 94) Hence, to “think that there is a special faculty called prajna", or to 
call prajna a noetic principle which permits synthetic apprehension is to court confusion. It is, as 
he suggests, “to make prajna an aspect o f vijnana." (p. 94) Finally, he suggests that standard 
philosophical terminology is not “sufficient” to express what he has in mind (p. 85).
326 As Suzuki suggests: It “has no premeditated methods; it creates them out o f itself as they are 
needed.... [but] this does not mean that it is erratic and recognizes no laws.” (p. 100)
327 Ibid., p. 123, Shunyata is written here as sunyata-, Eckhart writes: “God becomes as phenomena 
express him." (Blakney, p. 225)
328 Ibid., p. 100.
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reality of shunyata, (i.e., “Voidness”, “Emptiness”).329 Keeping this in mind the 
thrust of the above passage can be restated as follows: Since prajha is the 
epistemological form of the Absolute, and the Absolute is all there is, prajha must 
also be the a priori epistemological ground of the possibility of all appearances.
In other words, for “the world” in all its diversity to appear to a subject the 
Absolute must work through the form of the consciousness to which it gives itself. 
Being through the form of “consciousness” means that the embodied form of that 
individual “consciousness” (e.g., the alayavijhana) gives recognizable form to the 
Absolute. And here we can add that the price of the resulting differentiation is 
separation. Differentiating we find ourselves separate existents. The existent, 
which arises interdependently with its object, is thus the conditioned product of 
prajha’s cooperation with vijhana.
But throughout the conditioning process prajha remains fundamentally 
intact and unconditioned330 31- a fact which permits prajha to be “awakened to 
itself’. As Suzuki writes: “The body, the will, and the individual self are concepts 
worked out by the analytical vijhana, but the inner creative life as it creates all 
these concepts through vijhana is immediately apprehended only by prajhd”?n 
Since “the inner creative life as it creates concepts” is prajha at work, this passage
329 Since God is the active form of Godhead (i.e., Void) this claim appears analogous to Eckhart’s 
assertion that, God’s being is his knowledge.
330 If one were to speak metaphorically here one might say that the light shines even in the 
darkness though the darkness does not comprehend it. Eckhart for example writes: “The word, 
Logos or idea of things exists in such a way and so completely in each of them that it nevertheless 
exists entire outside each. It is entirely within and entirely without. This is evident in living 
creatures, both in any species and also in any particular example o f the species. For this reason 
when things are moved, changed or destroyed, their entire idea remains immobile and intact. 
Nothing is as eternal and unchangeable as a destructible circle. How can that which is totally 
outside the destructible circle be destroyed when it is? The idea then ‘the light in the darkness’ of 
created beings that is not confined, intermingled or comprehended. This why when John said, 
‘The light shines in the darkness’, he added, ‘and the darkness did not comprehend it’.” (College 
and McGinn, p. 126. Cf. also Ch. 3 in its entirety, pp. 122-173 where Eckhart makes much of this 
biblical passage)
331 Suzuki, p. 106.
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suggests that prajñü offers a window on its own operations. Hence, we find that in 
addition to being that whereby a synthetic apprehension of the whole is possible 
prajñü also refers to, “an immediately experienced intuitive ‘seeing’ that cannot 
be conveyed by concepts or in intellectual terms”.332 Suzuki refers to this 
immediate way of knowing as prajñü-intuiúon. The awakening of pra/ñá-intuition 
is the Absolute becoming conscious to itself. And since the unconditioned subject 
is itself the Absolute (i.e., shünyüta) the subject who lives in prajñü does not 
experience things in the usual sense. There is a sense in which she does not 
discern, or “judge”, things to be thus and so but somehow realizes knowledge in a 
direct manner through her being,333
The reason that prajñü-intmtion must remain an inexplicable “seeing” is 
that since the possibility of all discernment requires the differentiation of entities, 
to the extent that phenomenal states approach prajñü itself (i.e, the Absolute) they 
cannot, properly speaking, be discerned. Thus, if you think that you’ve got “It”,
332 Kohn, p. 171.
333 A related claim, which might be o f some assistance in coming to terms with this claim, can be 
found in Eckhart. In order to explicate his distinction between that which illuminates and that 
which is illuminated Eckhart asks us to consider the claim that “goodness”, as an unabstracted 
Principle, is the same as “goodness” or “whiteness”, as an idea derived from the experience of 
particular “good” and “white” things. Eckhart’s reply to this claim is that “goodness" (as a 
Principle) cannot be known in the same manner as “whiteness”, so conceived. While “elementary 
qualities [like whiteness] receive being univocally from a subject, through a subject, and in a 
subject... It is not so with justice, for example, or truth, or qualities of this sort, but contrariwise. 
They do not receive being from a subject but a subject receives from them its just, true, good, 
being, and so on: qualities which are prior to their subjects and which remain after their subjects 
are corrupted, as is beautifully taught by Augustine, The Trinity, Book VIII, chapter 3.” (Blakney, 
pp. 276-77) Eckhart does not deny that one can get a reasonably clear idea o f goodness by 
abstracting from experience. However, he holds that whatever is grasped in this manner is not the 
“qualities” o f which he speaks. The “goodness” of which Eckhart speaks as giving being to the 
subject is “that which illuminates” and hence, cannot be known. Thus, elsewhere we find Eckhart 
claiming: “God is not an ‘object’ for human understanding. He utterly transcends knowledge, and 
everything one says of Him is untrue. Be still and prate not of God (i.e., Godhead), for whatever 
you prate in words about Him is a lie and is sinful. If I say God is good, it is not true; for what is 
good can grow better: what can grow better can grow best. Now these three things (good, better, 
best) are far from God, for He is above all, [i.e., all such distinctions].” (in Suzuki, 1957, p. 75) To 
the extent that the properties of God are being discerned they are not One and hence do not differ 
fundamentally from abstracted ideas like “whiteness”.
you don’t, ipso facto. The need for differentiation between the knower and the 
known extends to all forms of mental activity in which grasping is implicated 
(e.g., thinking, perceiving, understanding). Consequently, it is precisely this 
grasping mind that must either be “suspended” as in nirodha-samapatti, or 
abandoned/transcended through non-attachment, as in the manifestation of prajnd. 
Since the former state requires, more or less, the obliteration of all phenomena it 
is of no concern to us here. Nirvana, however, as was suggested above, is reached 
not by annihilating all thought and sense perception but rather by coming see 
phenomena in new a light. In this light the activity of discernment, or “judgment”, 
may go on unhindered but the lack of desire and clinging in the manifestation 
“process” fundamentally alters the character of the resultant emergents (i.e., 
subject and world) such that the impression of their essentiality, or actuality, is 
compromised.334 Furthermore, a new insight is held to emerge such that, in some 
manner, that which would be discerned, and the true identity of the subject which 
would do the discerning, turn out to be the same entity/non-entity.335 
Unfortunately, in such an account as this the law of identity is transgressed and 
we are left beached on the sands of reason.
7. Interestingly, it has been argued that Kant himself underwent a prajnd 
perception.336 Since, as we have seen, prajnd provides insight into itself, if this 
were true then Kant would have gained some insight to that whereby a synthetic
334 In fact, their character as "resultants” would seem to be effected. If “intention-consequence” is 
one movement in which experiences “occur” the division itself becomes suspect.
335 Eckhart writes: “As long as a man has an object under consideration, he is not one with it. 
Where there is nothing but One, nothing but One is to be seen. Therefore, no man can see God 
except he be blind, nor know him except through ignorance, nor understand him except through 
folly.” (Blakney, p. 200)
336 David Appelbaum, “The Fact o f  Reason: Kant’s Pra/na-Perception of Freedom,” Journal of 
Indian Philosophy, (1987), 15, 87-98.
apprehension of the whole is made possible, that is, he would have had a kind of 
direct experience of the foundation of cognition and judgment. So it will be of 
interest to us to know what aspect of Kant’s philosophy this insight supposedly 
precipitated? According to David Appelbaum evidence for the insight in question 
is to be found in the second Critique where Kant arrives at the fact that pure 
reason is practical.
In order to ferret out the implications of this “fact” both for Kant and for 
our project first consider the following:
‘Critique,’ in Kant’s sense of the term, consists in examining the scope and 
limits of our cognitive powers (‘reason,’ in the broadest sense in which Kant 
uses the term) in order to decide to what extent, if any, metaphysics is 
possible for us human beings. Metaphysics consists in the discovery of 
truths (true propositions) about the world that are not empirical (dependent 
on experience), in which case they would be contingent, but are necessary 
and hence a priori (knowable independently of experience). If such 
propositions not only are a priori but do not involve even an empirical 
concept (e.g., the concept of change, or of matter), then Kant calls them 
“pure”.337
Now, for Kant, something is “practical” if it can determine the will in action. 
Hence, to suggest that pure reason is practical is to suggest that reason in pursuit 
of universal or metaphysical truth, unaided by experience, is able to determine the 
will in action. According to Kant, this “fact” is shown, in the second Critique, 
where he demonstrates, by reason alone, that the act of constructing maxims for
337 Pluhar, 1987, p. xxx.
the will immediately reveals that, “freedom and unconditional practical law 
reciprocally imply each other”.338 From this insight Kant concludes that pure 
reason contains a practical ground in the form of an unconditioned free 
lawfulness, which is capable of determining the will.
In the Deduction of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason Kant continues 
this line of thought by suggesting that the fact that pure reason is practical “points 
to a pure intelligible world [as opposed to a sensuous world] - indeed, it defines it 
positively and enables us to know something of it, namely a law [i.e., the 
categorical imperative]”.339 Now, as we have seen, Kant also identifies the 
“intelligible” with the morally good in the third Critique and suggests furthermore 
that this “intelligible” is what taste has in view with the harmonization of the 
cognitive faculties. In the second Critique we also find the moral and the 
“intelligible” related. Here Kant suggests that the moral law is o f the 
unconditioned intelligible world, which he characterizes in terms of “causality 
through freedom”.340 This is intriguing because it suggests a common basis for 
both the appearance of things in receptivity (i.e., the spontaneity of the 
understanding) and the activity of the faculty of reason in freedom.341 Having 
established “causality through freedom” as the basis of pure reason Kant affirms 
and provides a positive content to the supposition of freedom made in the
338 1. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, L. W. Beck, trans., New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1788-1956, p. 30; cf. also p. 46.
339 Ibid., p. 43; cf. also p. 48.
340 Kant writes: “The moral law is, in fact, a law of causality through freedom and thus a law of 
the possibility of a supersensuous nature...” (ibid., p. 48); and also, “Pure practical reason now 
fills this vacant place [i.e., the ground of speculative reason] with a definite law of causality in an 
intelligible world (causality through freedom). This is the moral law.” (ibid., p. 49)
341 Notice that to suggest a common basis for “spontaneity” and the freedom required for reason 
and morality is not to confuse them in any way.
Dialectic of the first Critique?*2 Kant suggests that “the moral law is, in fact, a 
law of causality through freedom...” - the same causality which “theoretical 
reason had to assume at least the possibility of in order to fulfill one of its own 
needs”.343 This concept of freedom, he then observes, being of the intelligible 
world must forever remain outside of the reach of human reason. He writes:
on the one hand, in the explanation of natural occurrences, including the 
actions of rational beings, I leave to the mechanism of natural necessity the 
right to ascend from conditioned to conditioned ad infinitum, while, on the 
other hand, I hold open for speculative reason the place which for it is 
vacant, i.e., the intelligible, in order to put the unconditioned in it.344
Thus, the concept of freedom is rendered as a regulative principle of reason, 
which can in no way augment the reach of reason beyond the realm of the 
sensuous. The only way one could reach into the realm of the intelligible, Kant 
suggests, would be to use “the logical relation of ground and consequence ... with 
another kind of intuition than the sensuous..., [And] This reason cannot do,...”.345 3425
342 Kant suggests: “The determination o f the causality of beings in the world of sense as such can 
never be unconditioned, and yet for every series of conditions there must be something 
unconditioned, and consequently a causality which is entirely self-determining.” (in Beck, 1956, 
p. 48). With this line of thought in mind Beck observes: “If the empirical events which are the 
objects of scientific knowledge were events among things in themselves, the principle of natural 
causation would be absolutely true without restriction, there would be an irresolvable conflict 
between freedom and causal determinism, and freedom would have to be surrendered. But if the 
events we observe are only phenomena, i.e., appearances of things in themselves as organized by 
our own sensibility and understanding, as he believes he has shown...to be the case, then the 
causality of freedom might be true of the relation of realities to appearances while mechanical 
determinism would still hold of the connections among the observed events themselves. The two 
principles might therefore be true, each in its own context. Thus the Critique of Pure Reason 
shows that freedom is not incompatible with natural necessity and is thus a possible concept. But 
the first Critique does not give any reason for believing that it is actual, i.e., that there is freedom." 
(ibid., p. xvii-xviii)
343 Ibid., p. 49.
344 Ibid., p. 49.
345 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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Whether Kant arrived at the “fact” that pure reason is practical by means 
of a prajña-perception is, I suspect, primarily a matter of speculation. However, 
here we can observe that all three of Kant’s Critiques can be seen to plot paths 
through which the unknowable realm of the supersensible, or intelligible, is able 
to impact on the sensuous in order to guide our cognitive powers to universal 
truth. As Pluhar observes:
... Kant considers the supersensible basis of nature’s subjective 
purposiveness to be the same supersensible substrate of both objects and 
subjects and the supersensible that “the concept of freedom contains 
practically”; this “same” supersensible is referred to in all these ways in the 
context of the solution to the antinomy of aesthetic judgment. Sometimes, 
however, still in that same context, Kant refers to it simply as the 
supersensible “within us” (see esp. Ak. 341).346
In this task “causality through freedom”, either in the form of pure reason or 
subjective harmonization, plays a central role. A free causality is, of course, a 
logical contradiction, but it is exactly the kind of logical contradiction that is used 
to describe the way prajña operates in the world. Consequently, although there 
are essential differences, both the fact that pure reason is practical and the idea of 
the harmonization of the cognitive faculties captures something of the nature of 
prajña.
8. We will now briefly attempt to develop a deeper understanding of how 
prajña is purported to function by means of a route which, at least to some extent, 
attempts to bypass reason. Since prajña is immediately available only through
346 Pluhar, 1987, p. xcvi. n.101, cf. also p. xxxviii.
prajna itself it is not possible, as Kant would say, to permit a synthesis of this 
concept. For as soon as this synthesis is complete and we have settled on a “what- 
it-is”, “that” on which we have settled, cannot itself be prajna. These facts 
account for the disdain which Zen Buddhism shows for rationalism and its 
preference for more “direct” approaches to prajna-intuition. One of these 
approaches takes the form of mondo - question and answer stories designed to 
assist the practitioner to bring about the necessary insight. Although one could 
easily devote an entire book to these mondo we will restrict ourselves to two 
particularly illuminating examples before, once again, resorting to discursive 
means.
The first mondo is useful as an illustration of the limitation of rational 
means as an approach to prajna. It reads:
A monk asked Yomyo: “I have been with you for a long time, and yet I am 
unable to understand your way. How is this?”
The master said: “Where you do not understand, there is the point for your 
understanding.”
“How is any understanding possible where it is impossible?”
The master said: “The cow gives birth to the baby elephant; clouds of dust 
rise over the ocean”.347
Realizing the inadequacy of reasoning to the task at hand and hence, the 
impossibility of providing a satisfactory “answer” to the monk’s query, the master 
substitutes a metaphorical allusion for a reason. This strategy carefulL^is designed
347 In Suzuki, p. 114.
to simultaneously frustrate of the monk’s attempt to grasp at an answer and to 
stimulate an awakening of prajna to itself. In answering Yomyo’s second question 
the master might well have said: “Other than by understanding”, but this would 
have been to simply point again at something which cannot be seen in the usual 
way. The answer that the master does provide is not as meaningless as it may first 
appear. He refers to an unfathomable “process” which precipitates “clouds of 
dust”, i.e., the multiplicity of dharmas, to arise from “the ocean”, i.e., the ocean of
, 348 sunyata.
The second mondo illustrates that “stage of being” in which prajna reigns 
and which permits one to recognize the a priority of prajna as that whereby a 
synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes possible. The master in question in 
this story is Kwasan who died in a.d. 960. It reads:
A monk came up and asked: “What is the stage of Truth?”
The master said: “I know how to beat the drum.”
Another time a monk asked: “What is the first principle?”
“I know how to beat the drum.”
The master’s response was the same when he was asked by still another 
monk: “I do not ask about ‘Mind is Buddha’, but I wish to know what is 
meant by ‘Not Mind, Not Buddha’.”
“I know how to beat the drum”, quickly came from the master.... *
34 Fa-tsang (643-671) founder of the Hua-yen school writes: “This little particle o f dust arises 
through causes. This means a dharma... this dust and other dharmas depend on and involve each 
other-all dust is formed through causation: this is matter... the theory o f  all things coming into 
existence through causation is unfathomable. All things are exhaustively combined as one, and all 
infinities are embraced to form a totality.” (in Appelbaum, 1987, pp. 94-95)
Suzuki goes on from this to note that the master:
was probably once a drum-beater in his career as a monk, and it is likely 
that not only did he say, “I know how to beat the drum”, but that, so saying, 
he actually beat the drum, or at least he went through the whole process, 
keeping time, “Do-ko-dong, do-ko-dong!”349
From this last mondo we can observe that whenever one uses any concept, 
regardless of its abstractness and universality, that use singles out a “particular”, 
even if only a particular “use.” But in the case of “that” which permits all things, 
“that” which is to be understood is not a “that” and consequently cannot be 
grasped.350 The employment of concepts is held by Zen to be a fruitless path, 
which can never arrive at the intended goal. In order to avoid falling into this trap 
the master resorts to actually beating the drum, or hitting the questioner, or getting 
up and walking out of the room!
Here, once again, we are in a position to observe something of significance 
to the problem of judgment and to understanding generally. From the above 
mondo we can conclude that if one were to ask the master how it is that one 
knows how to beat a drum, he would respond by simply beating the drum. 
Substituting for this last query that of, how it is that one knows how to 
understand, apply a concept, or subsume a particular under a universal, it follows 
that, assuming that we and the master are correct in our assumptions, if one does
349 In Suzuki, p. 77.
350 This is not to say that concepts are useless in coming to prajna. Most scholars of Madhyamika 
Buddhism view analytical means as a necessary preparation for the emergence of insight prajha. 
This, however, does not appear to be the case with Zen Buddhism which follows Nagarjuna’s lead 
in regarding analysis as neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the arising of prajna (Cf. 
C. Dean, The relationship between analysis and insight (prajna) in Madhyamika Buddhism: Some 
western interpretations, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXI, No. 4, 1994, pp. 347-53).
not wish a direct encounter with the limits of rationality (e.g., a demand for an 
infinite regress of rules of judgment), the most appropriate thing to do is to 
demonstrate an example of this “talent” by suggesting that, for instance, “The 
master is a very good drum beater!” Such an approach, of course, explains 
nothing and has the further consequence of seeming to make the act of 
understanding dependent on a particular talent, skill, capacity, or practice. 
Unfortunately, if judgment is a particular talent, we are, once again, left with the 
problem of how this talent can be made non-arbitrary - that is, how is it that one 
can know, for example, that the master is a very good drum beater.
In chapter 1 of this text Kant’s answer to this problem was seen to hinge 
ultimately on the ability of the supersensible to rule contingency out of the 
harmonizing function. Once again, the harmonization of the cognitive faculties, 
which is implicated in concept formation and application, is characterized in 
terms of an unconditioned, or free, lawfulness.351 This free lawfulness is attuned 
to “the form of finality”, which Kant also characterizes as “the morally good”, and 
the “intelligible”, (i.e., supersensible), as it is found in the sensuous world. But 
since nothing can be known about the supersensible, as it admits of no predicates, 
it was no surprise to discover that the harmonization of the cognitive faculties 
must largely be left as a mysterious process. Although, as we have argued, the 
problem of judgment does not arise for Buddhism, the problem of how a stable 
subject and world appears does. The Buddhist answer to this question has been 
shown to hinge on the cooperation of the Unconditioned with a conditioned and 
conditioning mind, e.g., prajna and \ijmna. But since nothing can be known
351 Cf. Pluhar, 1987, pp. lxi-lxvi; and ch.l above.
about prajna, as it admits of no predicates, it should come as no surprise to 
discover that the functioning of prajna must largely be left as a mystery. 
Fortunately, the Buddhists have not left us entirely bereft.
As we have observed prajna is both the Absolute itself and that through 
which the Absolute is seen, both that which plays a fundamental creative role in 
the appearance of all things and that “whereby a synthetic apprehension of the 
whole becomes possible.” The Buddhists do not have a philosophically 
sophisticated account of a “process” through which prajna functions because, 
once again, the Unconditioned is held to be fundamentally unfathomable. 332 But 
there is an interesting fact about prajna that enables us to directly know 
something of its nature. As with the harmonization of the cognitive faculties “the 
morally good” is, albeit in a general way, implicated in the functioning of prajna. 
353 This conclusion follows simply from the following facts. The morally 
wholesome states are, as we have observed, of the Unconditioned mind. And, as 
we have also observed, prajna is in essence the Unconditioned mind. Hence, the 
morally wholesome states are of prajna. In other words, since prajna is the 
epistemological form of the Absolute, and the wholesome states share something 
of the nature of the Base-consciousness as the Absolute, the wholesome states 
share something of “that whereby a synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes 352
352 Here it is interesting to observe a comment that Kant makes in “On Methodology Concerning 
Taste” - his brief appendix to Part I o f the third Critique. He writes: “Plainly, then the 
propaedeutic that will truly establish our taste consists in developing our moral ideas and in 
cultivating [Kultur] moral feeling; for only when sensibility is made to harmonize with this feeling 
can genuine taste take on a definite, unchangeable form.” (Pluhar, 1987, CJ 356 p 232)
353 Suzuki suggests that prajna is value-giving, it makes things significant, and full of meaning
(pp. 122-3). B
possible”.354 This means that the morally wholesome states are somehow 
implicated as foundational to experience or, in Kantian terms, to “judgment”.
One interesting implication of this participation of the wholesome states in 
the “ground” of judgment is that it suggests a reason as to why “goodness”, 
“justice”, “virtue”, “wisdom”, etc., constantly elude attempts to understand and 
render them determinate. Put simply, since the wholesome states are of the 
fundamentally ungraspable “that which permits understanding generally” they 
cannot be a “that which is understood”. The attempt to understand the wholesome 
states can be likened to someone holding a candle and examining objects as a 
means to determine what is illuminating them. Or alternatively, think of Socrates 
wandering around the polls trying to determine what justice is. On our reasoning 
Socrates is justice incarnate. The fact that Socrates can’t grasp and render 
“justice” determinate is a direct result of its and his Nature. To the extent that 
“justice” can be discerned or grasped in some way, it is not any longer “that 
whereby a synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes possible”. To speak with 
Eckhart, “what is just, in that it is inferior, does not comprehend justice”, it is a 
posteriori knowledge, only justice itself, in so far as it is complete both within and 
without every just man and thing and is unknown, is it “the light of what comes 
from it”.355
9. In this chapter the crux of our investigation has, not surprisingly, been 
intimately tied to the apparent need for agency in cognition. Through comparing
354 This claim is, of course, a “relative truth” which captures only something of the reality o f the 
situation. The claim is akin to what Scheler has in mind when he says that, “love is the mother nf 
spirit and reason itself’ (X 356, in Frings, 1996, p. 44). °S
™ College and McGinn, p 128; Eckhart also writes; “Put another way, it is universally true that 
the principle is the light of what comes from it, and a superior illuminates an inferior ” (Colleee 
and McGinn, P; 128) For Eckhart, as we have seen, “justice”, “goodness”, etc., are virtually 
synonymous with God as the active form o f  Godhead.
core aspects of Buddhist philosophy against the backdrop of core aspects of 
Kantian philosophy we have, among other things, provided support for the idea 
that providing an account of experience requires distinctions to be made which all 
but entail the postulation of some type of permanent existent. As we have seen, 
however, providing form and content to the requisite “cognizing permanent” has 
the effect of evaporating its status as a cognizer and turning it into a “that which 
has been cognized”. In an attempt to provide some insight into the source of this 
philosophical tension we have ventured onto ground that may seem 
philosophically disreputable. This venturing, however, has enabled us to make 
some progress toward developing a more comprehensive view of the foundations 
of experience.
Perhaps the most important component of this progress is our support for 
the view that experience results from a recursive and dynamic process in which 
“self* and “object” arise interdependently. On this view “active” and “receptive”, 
as terms applied to the mind, are two ways of viewing one continuous process.
The driving force behind this process is held to be desire, or craving. On the 
Yogacara account of this process experience is made possible through a clinging 
to, and appropriation of, a Base-consciousness by a product of the desire driven 
process. Since the Base-consciousness (i.e., dlayavijhana) is that through which 
dharmas are effectively able to constitute the world, clinging to the Base­
consciousness has the effect of appropriating and focusing the constitutive power 
of the “relevant” dharmas, which somehow lie a priori “in the Base­
consciousness”, on the as of yet uncognized “contents” of the cognitive groups. In 
other words, experience is made possible by means of a product of the
aforementioned desire driven process (i.e., manovijmna) turning back and 
appropriating the Base-consciousness, and so with it the source of production, 
relative to some “intuition(s)”. In this way the manifold, if you will, is rendered 
determinate and is infused with impressions of permanence and essentiality.
In the end, however, Buddhism dissuades us from placing too much 
weight on any such account. The elements of such accounts, they warn, should not 
to be taken as referring to any absolutely existing entities. Although Buddhist 
accounts of experience may reveal something of the Ultimate reality of the mind 
we must remember that any “that” which can be grasped cannot be “that” through 
which grasping is itself made possible. Further insight into the nature of 
experience, as well as relief from the philosophical tensions created by the attempt 
to ground experience, as they suggest, may only be attained through the 
development of a way of life which demands the elimination of the driving 
element behind the conscious appropriation of the world, i.e., desire. And this 
may ultimately require accepting both that discursive means are not fully adequate 
to the task at hand and that it is perhaps only through a “practice” that a 
philosopher may obtain peace.
Chapter 5
John McDowell and the Determination of Experience
1. I would now like to bring further clarity and a tighter focus to our 
discussion of “judgment/content” through an examination of some recent 
literature on the matter. John McDowell’s book, Mind and World, is a particularly 
good point of departure for its main purpose dovetails with our own. Generally 
speaking McDowell is concerned “to propose an account, in a diagnostic spirit, of 
some characteristic anxieties of modem philosophy - anxieties that centre,... on 
the relation between mind and world”356 More to the point he is concerned with 
“the way concepts mediate the relations between minds and the world”.357 The 
bifurcation of mind and world, he observes, ultimately demands normativity in 
judgment. As he writes: “A belief or judgment to the effect that things are thus 
and so...must be a posture or stance that is correctly or incorrectly adopted to 
whether or not things are indeed thus and so.”358 Hence, normativity ultimately 
demands that the world be accessible and legislative. Unfortunately it is not clear 
how these “things” of the world can return a verdict on our experience.
The main problem as McDowell outlines it is that for some experience to 
be able to count as an experience of the world, and so be legislative for some 
understanding, it must be capable of being placed within the space of reasons. But
356 J. McDowell, Mind and World, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996, p. xi.
357 Ibid., p. 3.
358 Ibid., pp. xi-xii.
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for something to be capable of being a reason is for it to possess rational relations 
to an existing network of understanding. Hence, it seems that all experience must 
be determined in accordance with that network, i.e., conceptually determined. 
Now, if all experience is conceptually determined then reason can appear to be 
unconstrained in its explorations. This leads to the at least apparent threat of 
“coherentism” followed by the yearning for experience to somehow extend 
beyond the space of concepts. In other words, the possibility of legislative 
experiences, given the possibility of this apparent threat, seems to require an 
extra-conceptual given which is able to impinge upon the space of reasons. 
Unfortunately, the idea of such a given is inconsistent with the demand the all 
experience be conceptually determined. The space of reasons, it is argued, cannot 
extend beyond the space of concepts. McDowell writes:
Even if we take it that answerability to how things are must begin with 
answerability to the empirical world, it nevertheless seems right to say this: 
since our cognitive predicament is that we confront the world by way of 
sensible intuition (to put it in Kantian terms), our reflection on the very idea 
of thought’s directedness at how things are must begin with answerability to 
the empirical world. And now, how can we understand the idea that our 
thinking is answerable to the empirical world, if not by way of the idea that 
our thinking is answerable to experience? How could a verdict from the ' 
empirical world - to which empirical thinking must be answerable if it is to 
be thinking at all - be delivered, if not by way of a verdict from (as W. V. 
Quine puts it) “the tribunal of experience”?359
359 Ibid., p. xii.
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Since anything which can be legislative for a tribunal must fall within the space of 
reasons it would seem that all experience must be conceptually determined and 
the idea of an extra-conceptual given is a myth. And so we are once again led to 
the threat of coherentism.360
As we observed in chapter 1, for Kant, the use of concepts is “based on the 
spontaneity of thought”- that is, on the understanding as the power of judgment.361 362
This description of understanding as the faculty of spontaneity reflects Kant’s 
position on the relation between reason and freedom: rational necessitation is not 
just compatible with freedom but constitutive of it. In other words, as McDowell 
observes, “the space of reasons is the realm of freedom”. According to 
McDowell, it is misunderstanding this relationship and its implications for both 
“reason” and “freedom” that leads us to the kind of familiar problem which we 
have just outlined. The idea that the “freedom” of reason is total can seem to 
render our rational endeavours as a kind of ungrounded creativity. “And” 
McDowell writes:
surely there must be such grounding if experience is to be a source of 
knowledge, and more generally, if the bearing of empirical judgments on 
reality is to be intelligibly in place in our picture at all. The more we play up 
the connection between reason and freedom, the more we risk losing our 
grip on how exercises of concepts can constitute warranted judgements 
about the world. What we wanted to conceive as exercises of concepts
360 For a detailed account o f the historical development o f this problem see M. Friedman, 
Exorcising the Philosophical Tradition: Comments on John McDowell’s Mind and World, The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 105, No. 4, 1996.
361 A 68-9/B 93-4, Pluhar, 1996, p. 122-3; cf. also A 79/B 105, p. 131; and A 126, p. 171.
362 McDowell, p. 5.
threatens to degenerate into moves in a self-contained game. And that 
deprives us of the very idea that they are exercises of concepts.363
Such thinking as this inevitably generates a desire to bring rationality under 
external control through reference to some extra-conceptual “given”. But since it 
is simply not clear how the relations in virtue of which a judgment becomes 
warranted can extend beyond the space of concepts the appeal to such a given 
cannot help.
2. McDowell argues that the idea of a “given” can be seen to be a myth in 
light of the original Kantian insight that the appearance of anything whatsoever 
for a human understanding requires that the faculty of concepts cooperate with 
sensible intuition. As the Kantian slogan reads: “Thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”.364 McDowell interprets this to mean 
“the world’s impressions on our senses are already possessed of conceptual 
content”.365 And, he suggests, insight into this truth alleviates the desire for the 
space of reasons to extend beyond the space of concepts by providing us with an 
understanding of “givenness” which is free from implications of extra-conceptual 
impingements. The resulting picture of the relationship of mind and world has it 
“that when we enjoy experience conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity, 
not exercised on some supposedly prior deliverances of receptivity”.366 This 
means that the very same network of conceptual capacities that is implicated in
363 Ibid., p. 5.
364 A51/B75, Pluhar, 1996, p. 107. Note also: McDowell suggests that the difficulty of getting 
one’s head around the matter results in part from the general passivity of experience which “does 
not by itself provide a good fit for the idea of a faculty of spontaneity” (p. 10-11).
365 McDowell, p. 18.
366 Ibid., p. 10.
“free” active thought is also implicated in “spontaneous” experience where we 
seem to be passively burdened with “content”.
Having the same conceptual capacities operative in both activity and 
passivity provides for a convenient way of explaining how experiences can be 
integrated back into a subject’s “network of conceptual capacities”. Since the 
same conceptual capacities are operative in both activity and passivity there is no 
block to having experiences stand in rational relations to judgment. As McDowell 
observes:
In “outer experience”, a subject is passively saddled with conceptual 
contents, drawing into operation capacities seamlessly integrated in a 
conceptual repertoire that she employs in the continuing activity of 
adjusting her world-view, so as to enable it to pass the scrutiny of its 
rational credentials. It is this integration that makes it possible for us to 
conceive experience as awareness, or at least seeming awareness, of a 
reality independent of experience.367 68
The basic idea is that since the conceptual capacities that are operative in activity 
are part of a rationally integrated system of conceptual capacities, and the very 
same conceptual capacities are operative in passivity, any given experience has 
extended to it the sense that it participates in a wider reality - a reality of rational 
relations. In this way experiences are granted the degree of subject-independence 
which is required in order to permit them to be legislative.369
367 McDowell writes: “The conceptual capacities that are passively drawn into play in experience 
belong to a network o f capacities for active thought, a network that rationally governs 
comprehension-seeking responses to the impacts of the world on sensibility.” (p. 12)
368 Ibid., p. 31.
369 McDowell writes: “The understanding - the very capacity that we bring to bear on texts - must 
be involved in our taking in of mere meaningless happenings.” (p. 97)
But, of course, at this point McDowell has simply assumed that the 
“rational” linkages through which the activity of integration proceeds have a 
requisite independence from the network itself. The point of the postulation of an 
extra-conceptual given is that it seems to provide the possibility of an independent 
constraint on the process of rational integration. If McDowell is to relieve the 
philosophical yearning for a given he needs to make plausible the idea that the 
network is, in some way, independently regulated. Since, as he argues, that 
regulation cannot be from a source external to the network of conceptual 
capacities it must come from within it.370 3712In this respect McDowell follows the 
Kantian lead. In the first Critique Kant suggests that the concepts operative in 
receptivity belong to the faculty of spontaneity - that is, the understanding. Since, 
as McDowell suggests, “the spontaneity of understanding is sui generis in the way 
suggested by the link to the idea of freedom” , the network of conceptual 
capacities of which the understanding is comprised must also be linked to
• 372spontaneity.
370 McDowell’s arguments against the possibility o f an extra-conceptual given are impressive. But 
to examine them in depth here would take us too far from our main course. We are primarily 
interested in his positive project of attempting to direct us to “the discovery that gives philosophy 
peace” (p. 86).
371 Ibid., p. 67. It is perhaps appropriate at this point simply to note the following dilemma that 
arises in light of attribution of sui generis existence. As Mookerjee observes with respect to the 
categories, of space, time, substance, etc.: “Is this sui generis existence something different from 
existence as such or not different? In the former alternative, it will be non-existence and the 
categories concerned will be unreal. In the latter, the sui generis existence will be unmeaning, as 
there is nothing to differentiate it from existence as such and the categories will be lumped into 
one.” (p. 6)
372 McDowell writes: ‘The power o f spontaneity comprises a network o f conceptual capacities 
linked by putatively rational connections, with the connections essentially subject to critical 
reflection.” (pp. 124-5) And elsewhere: “The faculty o f spontaneity is the understanding, our 
capacity to recognize and bring into being the kind of intelligibility that is proper to meaning ” (p 
71)
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A line of thought such as this leads McDowell to introduce and rely on a 
notion of “spontaneity at large”.373 In considering the way colour concepts 
function in experience, for example, he writes:
Even here, where the linkages into the whole system are minimal, the 
relevant conceptual capacities are integrated into spontaneity at large, in a 
way that enables the subject to understand experiences in which those 
conceptual capacities are drawn into operation as glimpses, or at least 
seeming glimpses, of the world:... If a colour concept is drawn into 
operation in an experience..., the rational connections of the concept enter 
into shaping the content of the appearance, so that what appears to be the 
case is understood as fraught with implications for the subject’s cognitive 
situation in the world: for instance, that she is confronted by an object with 
a facing surface illuminated in such-and-such ways.374
This passage suggests that experiences gain their rational legislative ability 
through the integration of receptively operative conceptual capacities into 
“spontaneity at large”. But it is not clear how a “capacity” can be integrated into 
“spontaneity”, conceived along Kantian lines, and in the next paragraph 
McDowell alters the point slightly. He writes:
The object of experience is understood as integrated into a wider reality, in 
a way that mirrors how the relevant concepts are integrated into the
373 McDowell writes: “What is needed is that the very same capacities [that are exploited in 
receptivity] can also be exploited in active judgements. And what secures this identification, 
between capacities that are operative in judgements, is the way appearances are rationally linked 
into spontaneity at large: the way appearances can constitute reasons for judgements about 
objective reality - indeed, do constitute reasons for judgements in suitable circumstances ( ‘other 
things being equal’).” (p. 62)
374 Ibid., p. 32.
repertoire of spontaneity at large. Even in the case of colour experience, this 
integration allows us to understand an experience as awareness of 
something independent of experience itself: something that is held in place 
by its linkage into the wider reality, so that we can make sense of the 
thought that it would be so even if it were not being experienced to be so.375
Since understanding an object of experience as integrated into a wider reality can 
only provide a legislative power sufficient to dispel the yearning for an extra- 
conceptual given just in case the relevant concepts move in a network of 
“rational” relations - that is, sui generis relations - McDowell suggests that those 
concepts which are “passively” drawn into operation also participate in a kind of a 
priori network of rational relations.376 Putting the matter this way, however, 
encourages the reader to picture “spontaneity at large” in rampantly platonistic 
terms,377 - that is, as an a priori unity of integrated universals possessing a 
“radical independence” from the subject. But this is not the picture at which 
McDowell is ultimately aiming.
If, as McDowell argues, “intuitions” cannot make an even notionally 
separable contribution to experience then a shift of philosophical focus from the 
operation of “concepts” and “intuitions” to the functioning of “conceptual 
capacities” - e.g., the ability to see black things - is warranted. The adoption of 
this strategy enables McDowell, in Wittgenstenian fashion, to flow quite freely
375 Ibid., p. 32.
376 An experience, it seems, can only constitute a reason for a judgment about “reality” by means 
of an ideal. McDowell observes: “[Davidson] urges that concepts o f “propositional attitudes” 
make sense only as governed by a ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’. In the terms 1 have been 
using, the claim comes to this: the fundamental point of those concepts is to subserve the kind of 
intelligibility that is proper to meaning, the kind of intelligibility we find in something when we 
place it in the space of reasons, (n. I am taking Davidson’s thought to concern what I have been 
calling, in Kantian terms, ‘the spontaneity of understanding’. . . .)” (p. 74)
377 Cf. ibid., p. 77.
back and forth between discussing “the use, or exercise, of concepts” and the 
employment of “conceptual capacities”. This ease is augmented further by his 
idea that the very same conceptual capacities must be operative in both receptive 
experience and active thought. McDowell observes:
Quite generally, the capacities that are drawn on in experience are 
recognizable as conceptual only against the background of the fact that 
someone who has them is responsive to rational relations, which link the 
contents of judgements of experience with other judgeable contents. These 
linkages give the concepts their place as elements in possible views of the 
world.378
In order to identify concepts and their application it is necessary therefore to 
attend to the “rational linkages” which become apparent as events unfold. 
“Concepts , so conceived, are derivative on, or abstracted from, experience On 
McDowell’s account both active thinking and receptivity employ conceptual 
capacities. But how concepts and intuitions are operative in experience is a 
question, he argues, that can be safely ignored.379
McDowell, however, has no intentions of dispensing with the notion of 
“concepts”. In fact, he needs the notion of “concepts” because of the role 
“spontaneity at large”, in the guise of rationality, must play in experience. The 
idea that our thoughts are about the world demands, once again, normativity in 
belief and judgment. Since that normativity cannot be provided by an extra- 
conceptual given it must be provided within the space of concepts - that is, the
378 Ibid., p. 11-12.
379 Cf. ibid., pp. 87-8; and pp. 112-3.
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space of sui generis rational relations governed by “spontaneity at large”.380 
Moreover, according to McDowell, reason can only make demands on a network 
of conceptual capacities if it is already determined in a manner that is responsive 
to those demands.381 382Hence, since the determination of the network occurs by 
means of discovering relations in the world, and the network of conceptual 
capacities has a constitutive role to play in determining those relations, the 
relations must possess a kind of a priority. Thus, for example, although I am free 
to use the colours on my palette in anyway I please, mix them together to create 
new colours, etc., the activity is essentially one of discovery. Since, however, my 
“conceptual capacities” played a constitutive role in the appearance of these 
colours, and there is no “given” to regulate the functioning of these capacities, the 
network of conceptual relations, which these capacities employ in being 
“conceptual”, must be, at least potentially, “predetermined”. Hence, once again, 
McDowell needs to rely on the idea that there is some, to be discovered, way in 
which the network of conceptual linkages is a priori related.
This is, once again, not to suggest that the spontaneity of the 
understanding has some kind of “radical independence” from the network of 
conceptual capacities through which experiences are constitutively rendered. In 
claiming that our network of conceptual capacities is necessarily linked to 
spontaneity at large McDowell is suggesting, “that our responsiveness to meaning
Notice that if  McDowell were to accept an a posteriori network of concepts as sufficient he 
would be subject to the kind o f argument against abstractionist accounts o f  concept formation that 
we addressed in previous chapters -  not to mention the threat of that which he is actively seeking 
to avoid, i.e., coherentism. J
381 McDowell observes that, “one can reflect only from the midst o f  the way o f thinking one is 
reflecting about” (p. 81). Cf. also where he writes: “The fact that the demands bear on us is just, 
irreducibly, itself. It is something that comes into view only within the kind of thinking that 
conceives practical situations in terms of such demands.” (p.83)
382 Friedman, 1996, writes: “Are we not here very close indeed to the traditional idealist doctrine 
that the world to which our thought relates is a creature of our own conceptualization?” (p. 464)
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cannot be captured in naturalistic terms”383 but this does not mean that such 
responsiveness is not “natural” to human beings. He writes:
It can seem that we must be picturing the space of reasons as an autonomous 
structure - autonomous in that it is constituted independently of anything 
specifically human, since what is specifically human is surely natural (the 
idea of the human is the idea of what pertains to a certain species of 
animals), and we are refusing to naturalize the requirements of reason. But 
human minds must somehow be able to latch on to this inhuman structure.
So it looks as if we are picturing human beings as partly in nature and partly 
outside it. What we wanted was a naturalism that makes room for meaning, 
but this is no kind of naturalism at all.384
Such characterizations are unacceptable to McDowell because he believes that 
they render an essentially human capacity external to our natural being and 
threatens to re-introduce a supematuralism into explanations of human thought 
and experience. McDowell wishes to “keep nature as it were partially enchanted, 
but without lapsing into pre-scientific superstition or rampant platonism”.385 
While it is true that “spontaneity at large” must be permitted to be legislative for 
the “wider reality” into which, and through which, experiences are understood 
McDowell believes that the “occult” quality of this basic explanatory framework 
can be exorcised.386 He suggests that in order to do this: “We need to recapture
383 Ibid., p. 77.
384 Ibid., pp. 77-8.
385 Ibid., p. 85.
386 He writes: “The object o f an experience, the state of affairs experienced as obtaining is 
understood as part o f a whole thinkable world. Since the whole is independent o f this particular 
experience, we can use the linkage into the mostly unexperienced whole to hold the object o f this 
particular experience in place, while we ask how things would have been if  the experience had not 
occurred. This depends on a specific way m which concepts are integrated into spontaneity at 
large, a way that, as I have claimed, is minimally exemplified by colour concepts ” (p 36)
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the Aristotelian idea that a normal mature human being is a rational animal, but 
without losing the Kantian idea that rationality operates freely in its own 
sphere”.387 But, as we will see, this is not as straightforward as it sounds.
3. McDowell’s strategy for relieving us of our philosophical yearnings for an 
extra-conceptual given is comprised of a negative and a positive project. The 
negative project consists largely in the performance of a series of reductio 
arguments on the possibility of a given.388 389The positive project attempts to move 
the reader to adopt a version of the aforementioned Kantian perspective that does 
not require the augmentation of a transcendental framework. These two general 
strategies are combined in an attempt to loosen the grip of the kind of 
philosophical thinking that leads to a yearning for extra-conceptual constraint - a 
kind of thinking which, McDowell argues, came into being with the idea that
'IRQnature is a realm of law. The desire for an extra-conceptual given is, according 
to McDowell, a natural result of the attempt to unite the realm of meaning with 
the realm of nature, conceived in the traditional fashion. As a result McDowell’s 
positive project includes an attempt to generate a conception of nature that is 
neither naively scientific nor supernatural.390 In this way, he attempts to render as 
“natural” the acquisition and employment of sui generis rational spaces.
The best way he knows of to work into the kind of conception that he has 
in mind is by reflecting on Aristotle’s ethics.391 He begins by offering an account
387 Ibid., p. 85.
388 Cf., for example, p. 7; or cf. also his consideration of the Wittgenstein’s private language 
argument on p. 19. Generally speaking his arguments are cogent and powerful. Unfortunately to 
investigate them in depth here would take us too far from our main course.
389 McDowell writes: “What I suggests is that our philosophical anxieties are due to the intelligible 
grip on our thinking of a modem naturalism, and we can work at loosening that grip.” (p. 177)
390 Cf. for example, ibid., p. 72 and p. 78
391 Ibid., p. 78. McDowell writes: “In Aristotle’s conception, the rational demands of ethics are not 
alien to the contingencies o f  our life as human beings.”(p. 83)
of Aristotle’s notion of “practical wisdom” (phronisis). “Practical wisdom”, he 
suggests,
is a responsiveness to some of the demands of reason (though that is not 
Aristotle’s way of putting it). The picture is that ethics involves 
requirements of reason that are there whether we know it or not, and our 
eyes are opened to them by the acquisition of “practical wisdom”. So 
“practical wisdom” is the right sort of thing to serve as a model for the 
understanding, the faculty that enables us to recognize and create the kind of 
intelligibility that is a matter of placement in the space of reasons”.392
The image at which McDowell is aiming has it that being human involves, all 
things being equal, the acquisition of interrelating sets of conceptual capacities 
that enable us to differentiate ourselves from objects and so to have “worlds”. The 
ability to be responsive to the demands of ethics is, developmentally speaking, a 
late addition to the “network”. But McDowell sees in Aristotle’s conception of 
“practical wisdom” a general framework, which can be applied to the way the 
understanding functions.
In order to bring this picture further into focus McDowell introduces the 
conception of a second nature and then uses his account of practical wisdom to 
explicate it. He writes:
The notion is all but explicit in Aristotle’s account of how ethical character 
is formed. Since ethical character includes dispositions of the practical 
intellect, part of what happens when character is formed is that the practical 
intellect acquires a determinate shape. So practical wisdom is second nature
392 Ibid., p. 79.
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to its possessors.... Human beings are initiated into this stretch of the space 
of reasons by an ethical upbringing, which instils the appropriate shape into 
their lives. The resulting habits of thought and action are second nature.393
The general point, he suggests, can be extended to the acquisition of all 
conceptual capacities.
Moulding ethical character, which includes imposing a specific shape on the 
practical intellect, is a particular case of a general phenomenon: initiation 
into conceptual capacities, which include responsiveness to other rational 
demands besides those of ethics. Such initiation is a normal part of what it is 
for a human being to come to maturity, and that is why, although the 
structure of the space of reasons is alien to the layout of nature conceived as 
the realm of law, it does not take on the remoteness from the human that 
rampant platonism envisages.394
Thus McDowell, in introducing the notion of a second nature, is suggesting that 
the acquisition and employment by the understanding of any previously 
inaccessible tract of the space of reasons is a natural endowment - albeit a 
potential one - of human beings. Initiation into a tradition, or wider reality of 
some kind, permits the acquisition of conceptual capacities that are, as it were, 
“slightly enchanted” by virtue of their relationship to the sui generis rational 
linkages of “spontaneity at large”. In other words, the acquisition of a set of 
conceptual capacities can be understood as the acquisition of: a) the ability to 
actively utilize a tract of spontaneity at large which the understanding was 
previously unable to employ, and b) the ability to have that same previously
393 Ibid., p. 84, McDowell has Book 2 in mind.
394 Ibid., p. 84.
inaccessible tract of spontaneity at large applied, receptively, in making sense of 
the world. Hence, to say that our eyes are opened to a tract of the space of reasons 
by the acquisition of a set of conceptual capacities implicit in a wider reality, or 
tradition, is just to say that initiation into the wider reality is necessary for 
spontaneity to gain hold of, or be constitutively active in, the experiential domain 
circumscribed by that tradition.
The picture at which McDowell is ultimately aiming leaves the possession 
and employment of concepts by the understanding mysterious. But it denies that 
there is anything “unnatural” about this possession and employment. As 
McDowell observes: “Given the notion of second nature, we can say that the way 
our lives are shaped by reason is natural, even while we deny that the structure of 
the space of reasons can be integrated into the layout of the realm of law”.395 
McDowell doesn’t object to the idea of spontaneity being active in experience but 
only to the sense that there is something “spooky” about its involvement.396 He 
argues: “We can claim both that the notion of spontaneity functions in a 
conceptual framework that is alien to the structure of the realm of law, and that it 
is needed for describing actualizations of natural powers as such”.397 But, he 
continues:
This is not to lapse into a rampant platonism. In rampant platonism, the 
structure of the space of reasons, the structure in which we place things 
when we find meaning in them, is simply extra-natural. Our capacity to 
resonate to that structure has to be mysterious; it is as if we had a foothold
395 Ibid., pp. 88-9.
396 Cf., for example, ibid., p. 95 and p. 176.
397 Ibid., p. 88.
outside the animal kingdom, in a splendidly non-human realm of ideality.
But thanks to our notion of second nature, there is no whiff of that here....
Meaning is not a mysterious gift from outside nature.398
McDowell is quite correct. Assuming the cogency of his arguments he will have 
succeeded in altering the idea of what is natural to include a place for the 
acquisition and employment of sui generis conceptual capacities by the 
understanding. Now while it is certainly true that Aristotle conceived of the 
acquisition and employment of practical wisdom as natural, he was also aware of 
the role that active “form-like” potentialities, or ultimates, must play in that 
acquisition and employment. But McDowell makes no reference to this fact in 
relying on practical wisdom to provide content to his notion of second nature. Let 
us then examine Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom in more detail to see what 
impact this potential oversight might have on McDowell’s suggestions for the 
reconciliation of reason and nature.
4. McDowell’s reliance on Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom as a model 
for the understanding is basically sound. In book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle, for example, suggests that, “the virtues are implanted in us neither by 
nature nor contrary to nature: we are by nature equipped with the ability to receive 
them, and habit brings this ability to completion and fulfillment”.399 This way of 
putting the matter makes the emergence of practical wisdom appear almost 
mundane. But, as we will see below, a closer examination of what Aristotle says 
about the acquisition of the characteristic of practical wisdom reveals a reliance
398 Ibid., p. 88.
399 Aristotle: Nicomahpean Ethics, M. Ostwald, trans., New York: Bobbs-Meirill Company IQfi?
1103a24, p. 33. In book 6 we discover that “practical wisdom is an excellence o virtue” ’1140b24. acute or virtue ...
on the kind of augmented platonism to which he refers in DeAnima.400 The notion 
of a second nature that McDowell derives from the Aristotelian context is, as 
McDowell acknowledges, part of a theory of understanding with transcendental 
implications of a platonic nature.401 But McDowell’s extrapolation of the notion 
of a second nature from the Aristotelian context makes no reference to Aristotle’s 
own transcendentalism.402 This, of course, does not render McDowell’s reliance 
on the concept of a second nature somehow illegitimate. But his main target in 
introducing the notion of a “relaxed platonism made possible by a naturalism of 
second nature” is to exorcise, in Wittgenstenian fashion, the “sense of spookiness” 
which attaches itself to the idea that the emergence of a meaningful world 
demands the governance of a sui generis space of concepts. If the acquisition of 
practical wisdom requires a transcendental framework of some kind it may lack 
the mundane nature that McDowell requires to exorcise the offending sense of 
“spookiness”. What is primarily at issue, therefore, is whether Aristotle’s account 
of the acquisition of practical wisdom requires the augmentation of a form of 
Platonism that is “unnatural” in a sense with which McDowell would have to take 
issue.
The first thing to observe with respect to Aristotle’s theory of practical 
wisdom is that he does not identify it with, or use it as a model for, understanding. 
As we observed in chapter 1 Aristotle already has a conception of understanding 
(synesis) that he distinguishes from “practical wisdom”.403 Although Aristotle
400 Cf. this text chapter 3, n. 179.
401 Cf. McDowell, p. 83.
402 McDowell suggests that the view he is attributing to Aristotle is not a form o f “rampant 
platonism” (p. 83). It is, however, unclear whether McDowell would consider Aristotle’s position 
on the forms in DeAnima under the general category of “rampant platonism”.
403 Ostwald, 1143a7, p. 164.
says little about the understanding he does suggest that the understanding only 
passes judgment - “for good understanding means that the judgment is right”.404 
This suggests that “understanding” is a notion that Aristotle restricts to active 
thought. But the application of this active understanding cannot, it seems, work in 
isolation from some form of insight. Aristotle, as we noted, acknowledges two 
forms of insight: intelligence (nous) and good sense (gnome). He suggests: “At a 
given stage in life a person acquires intelligence and good sense: the implication 
is that <human> nature is the cause.”405 Hence, if the judgment is to be correct 
understanding must cooperate with intelligence and/or good sense.
Now, in chapter 1 we also observed that phrondsis, gnome, and synesis are 
generally found together in persons of arete - persons of virtue, or excellence of 
character.406 As Aristotle suggests, “a man cannot have practical wisdom unless 
he is good”.407 But virtue comes in two forms: natural virtue and “virtue in the full 
sense”. Natural virtue is, it seems, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
acquisition of practical wisdom.408 And virtue in the full sense cannot be attained 
without practical wisdom.409 The transition from natural to full virtue is made 
possible by the emergence of intelligence (nous) and good sense (gnomd). But 
they are not in themselves sufficient to the task. Intelligence cannot bloom into 
practical wisdom, full virtue cannot be reached, and our eyes cannot be opened, as 
McDowell suggests, to the relevant tract of the space of reasons, in absence of 
experience with particulars. Experience with particulars is the missing piece that
404 Ibid., 1143al5, p. 164.
405 Ibid., 1143bl0,pp. 166-7,
406 Ibid., 1143a25, p. 164.
407 Ibid., 1144a36, p. 170.
408 Ibid., 1144a30, p. 170.
409 Ibid., 1144bl7,p. 171.
is necessary for intelligence to acquire the characteristic of practical wisdom and 
so for full virtue to be reached.410
The intelligence that is provided by nature must, it seems, be subject to 
maturational forces and habituation - both of which require experience with 
particulars. It is, however, entirely unclear how such experience is able to work 
with intelligence to bring about the acquisition of the characteristic of practical 
wisdom. Like intelligence, practical wisdom is part of the mind that thinks, i.e., 
the intellect.411 But as we argued in our third chapter the active intellect cannot 
get what is has not already got.412 If we are only able to have experiences by 
employing some member(s) of a set of constitutive concepts then the resulting 
experience will reflect the conceptual space which was constitutively responsible 
for that experience and so also, therefore, any concepts abstracted from that 
experience. At best, therefore, such mental activity will develop our appreciation 
of the “detailed layout” of that conceptual space through “reflective scrutiny”.413 
As McDowell observes: “In Aristotle’s conception, the thought that the demands 
of ethics ... bear on us, is just irreducibly itself. It is something that comes into 
view only within the kind of thinking that conceives practical situations in terms 
of such demands.”414 Hence, it would seem that for any experience to be it must 
be constituted through a tract of the space of concepts to which intelligence, in
410 Ibid., 1143b4, p. 166.
411 Ibid., 1140b25, p. 154.
412 “Abstracting images from outward things” is not sufficient to render them intelligible unless 
the operation is itself powered by “ultimate forms/Forms,” which, in some way, must already exist 
within the abstracting process. The movement in which and through which things are rendered 
intelligible is, it seems, constituted by intelligibility itself.
413 McDowell, p. 82.
414 Ibid., p. 83.
some sense, already has access. And this is just to say that intelligence must 
always already be complete.
This line of thought reveals the utility, if not the necessity, of postulating 
some kind of a priori unified structure of awareness to govern experience. 
McDowell argues that for an experience to involve normativity, i.e., to be an 
experience, it must be powered by concepts that are linked in a space of sui 
generis rational relations that possess a requisite independence from a subject’s 
conceptual capacities. One way of providing the necessary independence would 
be to suggest that any particular is an instantiation of some aspect of a governing 
“rational space”. This space need not exist, in any sense of the word, but it must 
be “real” such that experience can be said to always, in some way, conform to it.
In DeAnima Aristotle suggests that “the forms” exist potentially in the part 
of the mind that thinks, i.e., the intellect. The accompanying model of the 
operation of the intellect has it that when a particular is encountered the 
appropriate “form-like potentialities” are activated in a movement through which 
the particular in question is enabled to be.415 An experience, therefore, becomes 
an experience by means of the employment of “form-like potentialities” to which 
intelligence has access.416 Hence, as Aristotle writes: “Intelligence is, therefore, 
both starting and end; for demonstrations start with ultimate terms and have 
ultimate facts as their objects”.417 On this account any particular is an “ultimate
415 For a detailed account of this matter, which in a general way supports these contentions cf.
T.K. Johansen, Aristotle on the sense-organs, Cambridge University Press 1998 In particular cf  
chapter 6, section 4 entitled “The sense-object as active potentiality” and section 5 “The ' 
object as an irrational potentiality” (pp. 263-271). ’ e
416 Aristotle suggests that, “it is intelligence that apprehends fundamental principles ” i l  I41a 81 
Or elsewhere: It is “the intelligence [which] grasps the limiting terms and definitions that cannot 
be attained by reasoning,... [1142a25],
417 Ostwald, 1143bl0, p. 167.
particular fact” from which a “universal” may be grasped.418 Hence, for Aristotle, 
“that” through which a particular becomes and is must, in some way, always 
already be accessible. Experience with particulars, therefore, cannot “develop” 
intelligence in any straightforward manner because it cannot “add” anything to 
it.419 The particular, as something intelligible, can only be an opportunity for 
intelligence to reveal some aspect of its nature to the subject.420 If all goes well, 
intelligence acquires the characteristic of practical wisdom by means of 
successive “insights” feeding back into the source of production so as to form a 
habit of mind, i.e., the habit deliberating well.421 In this task initiation into a 
tradition and rational reflection both have critical roles to play. But they cannot, it 
would seem, without the constitutive role of some kind of a sui generis rational 
space, account for the appearance of anything, let alone the “acquisition” of 
practical wisdom.
Returning now to McDowell’s picture of the acquisition of a second nature 
we can observe that his characterization is largely in keeping with facts that we 
have just outlined. He, for example, writes that, augmented with an appropriate 
place for rational reflection:
418 NE 1143a25-143b5.
419 Note also that if an a priori potentiality permitted the possibility of modification its status as an 
absolute permanent would be compromised as would its ability to constitute experience in a 
legislative fashion in accordance with “laws”.
420 Aristotle writes: “Hence one must have perception o f particular facts; and this perception is 
intelligence.” [1 143b5] Note also: This line of thought helps explain the attractiveness of theories 
in which the things of the world lie buried like seeds, e.g., Plato’s to his theory of recollection
(anamesis).
421 O f course, not all insights are correct. The appearance of some particular needn’t lead to the 
acquisition of practical wisdom - a kind of correctness. As Aristotle observes that “the same causes 
and the same means that produce any excellence or virtue can also destroy i t , ... It is by playing 
the harp that men become both good and bad harpists, and correspondingly with builders and all 
other craftsmen: a man who builds well will be a good builder, one who builds badly will be a bad 
o n e ....” [1103b7-13] Hence: “In a word, characteristics develop from corresponding activities.... 
Hence it is no small matter whether one habit or another is inculcated in us from early childhood; 
on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or rather, all the difference." [ 1103b23]
Aristotle’s picture can be put like this. The ethical is a domain of rational 
requirements, which are there in any case, whether or not we are responsive 
to them. We are alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate 
conceptual capacities. When a decent upbringing initiates us into the 
relevant way of thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existence of this 
tract of the space of reasons. Thereafter our appreciation of its detailed 
layout is indefinitely subject to refinement, in reflective scrutiny of our 
ethical thinking. We can so much as understand, let alone seek to justify, the 
thought that reason makes these demands only at a standpoint from which 
the demands of this kind seem to be in view.422
But McDowell doesn’t examine in detail the role of experience with particulars in 
the acquisition of those “conceptual capacities” which are responsible for bringing 
the relevant demands into view. In particular he fails to take account of the fact 
that those experiences which are necessary for the “acquisition” of any previously 
inaccessible tract of the space of concepts must themselves be powered by 
concepts that form a part of that same inaccessible tract and which, consequently, 
cannot, prior to their employment, be under the command of the experiencer. This 
fact renders “practical wisdom” more of an “emergence” than an “acquisition” 
and it makes the “enchanted” part of Aristotle’s theory a necessary component of 
his account of the emergence of the “natural” part. Applied to McDowell’s 
theoretical framework this line of thought reveals that the emergence of any 
previously inaccessible tract of the space of reasons must be arrived at by means 
of a kind of insight. To the extent, therefore, that McDowell relies on practical
422 McDowell, p. 82.
wisdom as a model for how the understanding functions he appears committed to 
the simple idea that, given the right opportunities, tracts of spontaneity at large 
“emerge”. And this, of course, is just to leave the whole matter unexplained and 
somewhat “spooky”.
5. The position which McDowell is putting forward is an attempt to 
“reconcile reason and nature” through naturalizing a central insight of Kantian 
philosophy.423 McDowell finds Kant’s existing theory of the understanding 
unsatisfactory because of its inclusion of Kant’s particular “transcendental 
framework”. He suggests that Kant’s division of experience into concepts and 
intuitions as descriptive of how the world actually appears leads Kant ultimately 
to a view in which the “real” world is always beyond our reach. Of the resulting 
transcendental philosophy, McDowell suggests: “The frame spoils the insight, 
because the radical mind-independence of the supersensible comes to seem 
exemplary of what any genuine mind-independence would be, and then when 
Kant purports to attribute mind-independence to the ordinary empirical world, as 
it figures in his thinking, that looks merely disingenuous.”424 The distorting effect
423 Cf. ibid., p. 85.
424 Ibid. p. 96. Cf. also where McDowell writes: “We are asked to suppose that the fundamental 
structure o f the empirical world is somehow a product of subjectivity, in interaction with 
supersensible reality, which, as soon as it is in the picture, strikes us as the seat of true 
objectivity.” (p. 42) And again: “The empirical world’s claim to independence comes to seem 
fraudulent by comparison. I think that it has to be admitted that the effect o f the transcendental 
framework is to make Kant’s philosophy idealistic in the sense I have been considering. This is 
quite the contrary to Kant’s intentions, but in spite of his staunch denials, the effect o f his 
philosophy is to slight the independence of the reality to which our senses give us access. What is 
responsible for this is ... the fact that he recognizes a reality outside the sphere of the conceptual.” 
(p. 44)
McDowell’s basic criticism of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, as it is presented in the 
first Critique seems sound. Kant, for instance, writes: “I call transcendental all cognition that 
deals not so much with objects as rather with our way o f cognizing objects in general insofar as 
that way of cognizing is to be possible a priori”. A system of such concepts would be called 
transcendental philosophy.” {A12/B25, p. 64; Cf. also “Transcendental philosophy is the system 
of all principles of pure reason” (A13/B27 p. 66)} But Kant, it seems, has made a fundamental 
error in attempting to do transcendental philosophy so defined. He suggests, for example, that: 
‘The foremost goal in dividing such a science is this: no concepts whatever containing anything
of the transcendental framework can be safely bypassed, McDowell argues, if his 
central insight concerning the relationship between concepts and intuitions is 
augmented with “a pregnant notion of a second nature”.425 Generalizing the 
acquisition of a second nature to account for the functioning of the understanding 
renders the acquisition of any set of conceptual capacities a “natural occurrence”.
Now, we already have provided some reason to doubt the 
comprehensiveness, if not the plausibility, of this last statement. This should make 
us suspicious of the justifiability of separating Kant’s central insights from his 
transcendental framework. In relying on the notion of a “second nature” 
McDowell is suggesting that the understanding does not function through the 
interaction of a subject with a realm of radically independent universal, or of 
pure concepts with noumena. Instead he argues that, through initiation into a 
tradition, or wider reality, previously inaccessible sui generis concepts are made 
available for application in both activity and passivity. More than this, he implies, 
we need not know. He writes: “If we restrict ourselves to the standpoint of 
experience itself, what we find in Kant is precisely the picture I have been
empirical must enter into this science; or, differently put, the goal is that the a priori cognition in it 
be completely pure.’’ (A14/B28 p. 66) Unfortunately, all thought necessarily employs intuitions 
together with concepts, and this means that all intuition, for a human understanding is empirical 
Hence, since concepts arise from thought through the understanding, any concept that can be ’ 
thought cannot, it seems, be a pure a priori concept of the understanding. Kant writes' “Whatever 
in an appearance corresponds to sensation I call its matter, but whatever in an appearance brines 
about the fact that the manifold o f the appearance can be ordered in certain relations I call the form 
of appearance. Now, that in which alone sensations can be ordered and put into a certain form 
cannot itself be sensation again. Therefore, although the matter o f  all appearance is given to us 
only a posteriori, the form o f all appearance must altogether lie ready for the sensations a priori in 
the mind; and hence that form must be capable of being examined apart from all sensation ” 
(A20/B34, p. 72) The argument is straightforwardly o f the non sequitur variety The form of all 
appearance may indeed, in some sense, lie ready but there is nothing here from which to justify 
the conclusion that the form of appearance can be examined - particularly if  all examination 
involves thought. Hence, it would seem that the faculty of reason cannot function entirely 
independently o f sensibility. 3
425 Cf. ibid., pp. 97-9.
recommending: a picture in which reality is not located outside the boundary that 
encloses the conceptual sphere.”426
When it comes to matters concerning the structure within which meaning 
comes into view McDowell, for the most part, argues for a Wittgenstenian 
quietism as the most appropriate stance to take. He suggests that we have no need 
for a constructive philosophy either of the naturalistic or transcendental variety to 
account for how spontaneity functions in the world.427 428He writes: “The naturalism 
of second nature that I have been describing is precisely a shape for our thinking 
that would leave the last dualism not seeming to call for constructive 
philosophy.” Meaning is an implicit characteristic of human life that occurs 
because we are the kind of beings that “by nature” acquire sui generis conceptual 
capacities. “Spontaneity” is both completely ungraspable and yet “it is needed for 
describing actualizations of natural powers as such”.429 McDowell implies that to 
say more than this is simply to find ourselves running again in unproductive 
philosophical grooves. To a large extent our own investigations here have 
supported such a conclusion.
But there is at least one bit of constructive philosophy that McDowell 
cannot avoid. By augmenting Kant’s insights with a notion of a second nature and 
claiming that meaning is a natural characteristic of human life McDowell has in 
effect argued that some kind of substantial subject interacts with spontaneity.430 
By restricting his philosophy to the standpoint of experience he opens a gap 
between “spontaneity” and the “subjective take” which must then be bridged in a
426 Ibid., p. 41.
427 Cf., for example, pp. 94-6.
428 Ibid., pp. 94-5.
429 Ibid., p. 88.
430 Cf. Ibid., p. 109.
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way that will make their necessary interaction appear “natural”. As he writes:
“We are looking for a conception of nature that includes a capacity to resonate to 
the structure of the space of reasons”.431 Now, as we have seen, any “resonance” 
requires the participation of two entities of similar structure. Hence, to render 
plausible the idea that a substantial continuant interacts with spontaneity 
McDowell must address the issue of the structure of the participants. But, since 
the Kantian position upon which he relies argues that both spontaneity and the 1 
think lie a priori of the appearance of any determinate structure, McDowell needs 
to augment Kant’s original insights to permit an interaction between spontaneity 
and a substantial continuant.
McDowell begins his attempt to redress Kant’s position with a comment 
on Strawson’s interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.432 McDowell 
observes:
In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant seems to offer a thesis on these lines: 
the possibility of understanding experiences, “from within”, as glimpses of 
objective reality is interdependent with the subject’s being able to ascribe 
experiences to herself; hence, with the subject’s being self-conscious.433
McDowell suggests that it would be satisfying if the self in question here were the 
ordinary self of daily life. But he thinks that it is difficult to make that cohere with 
what Kant actually says. McDowell continues: “When he introduces the self- 
consciousness that he argues to be correlative with awareness of objective reality, 
he writes of the ‘I think’ that must be able [i.e., capable] ‘to accompany all my
431 Ibid., p. 109.
432 Cf. P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, Methuen and Co. Ltd dd 72 117
433 M cDowell,?. 99.
representations’.”434 From this McDowell appears to conclude that the I  think is 
that which Kant must maintain arises interdependently with the world. With the 
problematically formal self-consciousness of the 7 think in mind McDowell then 
suggests: “The subjective temporal continuity that is a counterpart to experience’s 
bearing on objective reality shrinks to a mere point of view, not, apparently, a 
substantial continuant.”435 But Kant neither does nor, it can be argued, need he 
maintain that a subjective temporal continuity is necessary counterpart to reality.
That the /  think is not that which Kant holds to arise interdependently with 
an object can be concluded from passages which immediately follow the infamous 
quote to which McDowell refers. But before proceeding to those passages we 
should first observe that Kant writes: “The I think must be capable of 
accompanying all my presentations” not that it does accompany all my 
presentations. It is, of course, no accident that Kant emphasizes the word capable 
in this passage. The phrase “must be capable" significantly refers to the formally 
necessary role that the I  think must play in experience.436 As Strawson suggests:
Unity of self-consciousness to which a series of experiences belong implies, 
then, the possibility of self-ascription of experiences on the part of a subject 
of those experiences; it implies the possibility of consciousness, on the part 
of the subject, of the numerical identity of that to which those different 
experiences are by him ascribed.437
434 Ibid., p. 99, brackets mine. The passage to which he refers us at this point begins § 16 o f  the 
Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding. It reads: “The I think must be capable of 
accompanying all my presentations.” (B 131, Pluhar, p. 177)
435 McDowell, p. 98.
436 Cf. also B277, Pluhar, p. 291.
437 Strawson, p. 98.
The possibility of “experiences” entails the possibility of this unity because the 
possibility of a unity of consciousness provides for the distinction between how 
things are and how things seem to be. In other words, Strawson observes that the 
possibility of things “seeming” one way and “being” another implies the notion of 
an active self-consciousness to discriminate between these options. Hence, the 
original synthetic unity of apperception simultaneously gives birth to the 
possibility of both objective and subjective experiences.438
It is quite correct, of course, to assume that this possibility of a unity is not 
a substantial continuant and that no “determinate intuition” corresponds to it. But, 
as Strawson also observes: “It is not essential for Kant to maintain that his 
provisions are sufficient to explain the actual occurrence of self-ascription of 
experiences. It is enough if they are necessary to its possibility.”439 One cannot 
explain the existence and experience of self-ascribing substantial continuants 
without first establishing the possibility of “experience”. Only once the possibility 
of experience has been established can we discuss the details and appearance of a 
world relative to some determinate and temporally continuing point of view. 
Hence, when Kant, a little further on in B132, attempts to add some clarity to the 
notion of 1 think, he writes:
Or, again, I call it original apperception; for it is the-self-consciousness 
which, because it produces the presentation I think that must be capable of 
accompanying all other presentations!;,] and [because it] is one and the same 
in all consciousness, cannot be accompanied by any further presentation.440
438 Cf. ibid., p. 102.
439 Ibid., p. 103.
440 Cf. B132, Pluhar, 1996, p. 177.
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What Kant is suggesting is that the I think is the formal condition of the 
possibility of any experience whatsoever, the power of the understanding,441 and 
the vehicle through which the understanding is able to function.442 Hence, it is that 
which renders possible that empirical apperception which may more properly be 
deemed the correlate of all other presentations. But, in itself, it is the correlate of 
nothing, i.e., “it cannot be accompanied by any further presentation”. Hence, 
although it may in some sense, be a “counterpart to experience’s bearing on 
objective reality” because it is required to make this “bearing” possible, it is not 
that which arises interdependent^ with an object. It neither can be the correlate of 
the objective world, nor can it be absent from that correlate. Hence, the 7 think is 
an inherently problematic and ungraspable notion, which although formal, cannot 
be merely formal.443
This investigation of the Kantian 7 think aside we can now examine 
McDowell’s characterization of that substantial consciousness which he holds to 
be correlative of the objective world. McDowell first suggests that attempting to 
determine a substantial continuant within the flow of consciousness one is bound 
to arrive at either the Cartesian or the Kantian position. But, he continues, the 
conclusion that a substantial 7 think necessarily implies a Cartesian ego results
441 Cf. B 134, ibid., p. 178.
442 Cf. also ibid., B399, p. 382, and B406, p. 424.
443 Cf. for example, ibid., B429, p. 439. Why can not the /  think be merely formal? For one thing, 
if  the original unity of apperception were merely formal its activity(ies) would be rule-like and so 
would require interpretation. Strawson details this fact in the following manner: “The objection we 
have been considering turned, in its original form, on the point that the ascription of states to a 
subject required the subject itself to be an intuitable object for which there existed empirically 
applicable criteria of identity. The requirement that underlies the objectivity-condition, however, 
is not exactly that experience should be ascribable to such a subject, but that it should have a 
certain character of self-reflexiveness which is expressed by Kant in terms of the notion of self- 
consciousness. The expression is not altogether happy because we are immediately led by it to 
think in terms of personal self-consciousness and hence in terms of the full conditions for ordinary 
empirical self-ascription of experiences. But what is intended is something less than this, which 
yet really does constitute the essential core of personal self-consciousness.” (p. 107) For more on 
the significance o f “reflexivity" to self-consciousness see the final section o f chapter 6.
from the assumption that when we theorize about a persisting self we must 
“confine ourselves within the flow of ‘consciousness’”.444 But this assumption is 
deeply suspect. Discarding it makes room for a variety of “substantial 
persistence” which does not imply a Cartesian ego. He writes:
We can say that the continuity of “consciousness” is intelligible only as a 
subjective take on something that has more to it than “consciousness” itself 
contains: on the career of an objective continuant, with which the subject of 
the continuous “consciousness” can identify itself.445
The wider reality, it seems, is able to provide intelligibility to the idea of a 
“substantial persisting consciousness” by permitting the formation of a 
“subjective take” which is situated within that wider reality so that it “has more to 
it than ‘consciousness itself contains”. In this way the wider reality provides the 
content for “the career of the objective continuant” with which the subject of the 
continuous consciousness identifies itself.
The picture seems informative until we recall that the wider reality is only 
able to permit the appearance of any reality at all, which would then include the 
appearance of an “objective continuant”, by virtue of the integration of its 
constitutive concepts into “spontaneity at large”. McDowell suggests that the 
continuity of consciousness is made intelligible through “the subject of the 
continuous consciousness” identifying itself with the “objective continuant”, or 
“subjective take”, that has more to it than consciousness itself contains. But, since 
McDowell has argued that anything which comes into view gains its sense of 
being a real thing by virtue of its determining concepts being integrated into
444 McDowell, p. 101.
445 Ibid., p. 101.
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spontaneity at large, we can conclude that the appearance of any “real” thing 
requires the application of sui generis concepts within the stream of 
consciousness. Without such an application of concepts within the stream of 
consciousness the “subject of the continuous consciousness” would have nothing 
with which to identify itself. From this we can conclude that any “objective 
continuant” is itself made possible by the application of tracts of spontaneity at 
large in receptivity. McDowell does not deny this fact but, once again, argues for 
a Wittgenstenian quietism as an appropriate stance to take concerning such 
matters. But as appropriate as this stance may be, consistency demands that we 
acknowledge that anything with which the subject of the continuous 
consciousness can identify itself will require the immanent application of 
spontaneity to render it intelligible.446 Kant’s insight concerning the role of 
spontaneity in experience cannot, it seems, so easily be plucked from the Kantian 
frame and mated to a naturalized Platonism.447
For Kant, the idea of spontaneity is the idea of the understanding 
considered in its application to the manifold of sensibility.448 The idea of this 
active power considered as a unity, a priori to said application, is the idea of the /  
think.449 The idea of spontaneity, therefore, is the idea of the I think in application.
446 In Friedman’s commentary on Mind and World he writes: “In light of the historical- 
philosophical tangles produced by McDowell’s attempt to bring Wittgensteinian “quietism” into 
some kind o f explicit relation with the philosophical tradition nonetheless, one can only conclude, 
in the end, that Wittgensteinian quietism may itself make sense only in the context of 
Wittgensteinian philosophical method.” (Friedman, p. 467) Note also that the use o f the term 
“intelligible” here obviously has no relation to the Kantian use of the term below but rather 
indicates a meaning closer to “content” or “existent”.
447 McDowell acknowledges in Lecture II that excising Kant’s transcendental framework is not 
likely to be a straightforward matter (cf. ibid., pp. 43-4).
448 B 130, Pluhar, 1996, p. 176.
449 Kant writes: “We readily become aware that this act o f  synthesis must originally be a single act 
and must hold equally for all combination; and that resolution or analysis, which seems to be its 
opposite, yet always presupposes it.” (B130, ibid., p. 176) Cf., also B153.
And now McDowell’s attempt to separate the two notions and maintain the 
“purity” of spontaneity while spatio-temporalizing the I  think so that its 
“continuity... involves a substantial persistence”450 looks inherently problematic at 
best. To the extent that the subject is conceived as a substantial continuant it 
cannot be a participant in spontaneity because spontaneity, considered as a unity, 
can admit of no predicates. Nevertheless, McDowell suggests that something 
along the lines of argument that he is advancing “is the right frame for the Kantian 
thought that self-awareness and awareness of the world are interdependent”.451
Of course it is perfectly legitimate to provide content to the idea of a 
substantial persistence outside of the stream of consciousness. In fact, on the line 
of argument that has been advanced throughout this work, that is perhaps the only 
way to provide content to a substantial persistence. But it seems that the desire to 
have this substantial persistence interact with spontaneity is misguided from the 
first. On Kant’s account spontaneity is that which makes possible the 
interdependence of subject and world.452 The necessity of its role in the 
appearance of the actual subject and world, of course, demands that it be accorded 
some kind of “reality”, but it can be no “experienceable” reality. And now if we 
come to acknowledge that this “non-entity” is the essence of our understanding 
we seem to become deeply mysterious beings, even to ourselves, and that feeling 
flies in the face of our everyday experience of ourselves as substantial presences 
in the world. As McDowell, observes: “If something starts out conceiving itself as 
a merely formal referent for T  (which is already a peculiar notion), how could it
450 McDowell, p. 101.
451 Ibid., p. 102.
452 In Kant’s “Refutation o f Idealism” he presents us with a much clearer picture o f  how he vie«,«
the interdependence o f subject and world (Cf. B275-6, Pluhar, 1996, pp. 289-90) "
come to appropriate body, so that it might identify itself with a particular living 
thing?”453
McDowell’s answer to this problem is to argue that we should begin our 
philosophizing with a notion of an “I” which already contains something of the 
idea of a substantial continuant.454 The picture at which McDowell is aiming has 
it that a physical person, suitably initiated into a tradition, is a vehicle in which 
and through which “meaning” functions. But how “meaning” functions in this 
capacity is a mystery that he ultimately does little to clear up. McDowell’s 
attempts to account for experience through arguing that the interaction of this 
substantial “I” with spontaneity is second nature are intended to alleviate both the 
spookiness involved in the notion that spontaneity is constitutively involved in 
experience and, ultimately, the desire for an extra -conceptual given. 
Unfortunately, although much of his account seems intuitively correct, it is not 
clear that his arguments are successful in their aims.
453 Ibid., p. 103.
454 Cf., ibid., pp. 101-2. In attempting to augment Kant’s account of spontaneity with a notion of a 
second nature he is, once again, suggesting that the 1 think that can accompany all my 
(re)presentations, is also a substantial continuant in the world and is rightly conceived as such.
Chapter 6
A Dynamic Response
1. In her recent book Consciousness in Action Susan Hurley sets out to 
challenge a general conceptual framework, which she suggests has received little 
direct attention in philosophy of mind.455 She refers to it as the Input-Output 
Picture of perception and action. Theories of mind that employ the Input-Output 
Picture tend to think of the mind as something which stands apart from the world 
and intervenes in cognitive functioning to make perception and action possible.456 
What we find in such theories, she argues, is that: “The subject is the last stop on 
the input side of the person; the world impinges on the subject. The agent is the 
first stop on the output side; the agent impinges on the world.”457 Hurley 
acknowledges that under some circumstances the Input-Output Picture provides 
an appropriate framework for thinking about cognitive functioning. But as a 
general framework for theorizing about perception and action she suggests that it 
is often inadequate and a source of confusion. With the aid of thought experiments 
and examples from the empirical sciences Hurley demonstrates that whether the 
Input-Output Picture ought to be applied to a given set of circumstances is an
455 S. Hurley, Consciousness in Action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, pp. 249-50
456 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
457 Ibid., p. 249.
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empirical question.458 In so doing she challenges the Input-Output Picture’s status 
as a generally applicable framework.
At same time Hurley outlines an alternative framework for thinking about 
perception and action. At its heart is the hypothesis that complex dynamic systems 
are central to cognitive performance. Hurley’s work is part of a renewed interest 
among philosophers and cognitive scientists in the use of dynamics as a 
framework for thinking about cognitive functioning.459 This renewed interest has 
resulted in a variety of criticisms of classical approaches to accounting for 
cognitive performance as well as some programmatic sketches for alternative 
approaches. While these alternatives all provide a place for dynamics they often 
differ as to the exact role they assign to it.460 Central to Hurley’s approach is the 
hypothesis that a constitutive interdependence of perception and action emerges 
from a dynamic feedback system of natural causal relations.461 This 
interdependence, she suggests, “has consequences for philosophical issues: about 
the unity of consciousness, relations between mind and world, self-consciousness,
458 Hurley writes: “Notice that challenging the Input-Output Picture doesn’t require that the picture 
never apply. Indeed, it is about right for many cases. What needs to be challenged is the status of 
the picture as a general conceptual framework. To do this, we only need to show that whether it 
applies in particular cases is an empirical question, not that it never applies.” (p. 289)
45® With respect to this renewed interest van Gelder observes: “Dynamics forms the general 
framework for growing amounts of work in psychophysics, perception, motor control, 
developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, situated robotics and autonomous agents 
research, artificial intelligence, and social psychology". (Tim van Gelder, “The Dynamical 
Hypothesis in Cognitive Science,” Behavioural and Brain Sciences, in press, p. 2).
^ F o r  a brief introduction to some o f the central issues cf. A. Clark and J. Toribio, “Doing 
Without Representing?,” Synthese, 101: 401-431, 1994.
461 Cf., for example, p. 214 n. 21, pp. 403-4, and p. 429 where in clarifying the notion of  
constitutive interdependence with which she is concerned Hurley writes: “The constitutive 
interdependence of genotype and phenotype is not merely compatible with but emerges from 
dynamic systems o f natural causal relations among environments, organisms, and genetic material. 
So in principle there need be nothing mystical about constitutive interdependence. It holds 
between perception and action because the contents of perceptions and o f intentions depend on
relations between input and output within a complex dynamic feedback system....."(Hurley, p.
4 2 9 )
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cognition,... and so on.”462 In previous chapters we have discussed the idea of an 
emergent constitutive interdependence of perception and intention in a variety of 
guises and against the background of some of these same philosophical issues. In 
this chapter we will first examine the particular dynamics-based approach that 
Hurley advocates to see how it may be able to contribute to our concerns.463 
Second, we will consider some of the problems it would face if applied to the 
philosophical issues with which Hurley is concerned. Finally, we will explore the 
possibility that a satisfactory treatment of those issues will require a notion of 
self-consciousness to which dynamical tools may not be appropriately applied but 
which does not correspond to that notion of “mind” which Hurley criticizes.464
2. Our point of departure for this exploration will be Hurley’s critique of the 
Input-Output Picture as a general framework for thinking about perception and 
action. Hurley’s critique, as we mentioned, rests, in large part, on empirical cases 
and thought experiments. In order to understand the significance of these items to 
her critique of the Input-Output Picture, and to supporting her alternative view,
462 Ibid., p. 1.
463 Hurley outlines her main plot in a nutshell as follows: “It will be argued that the unity of 
consciousness has both normative, personal-level, and subpersonal aspects. The relations between 
these levels can be approached via the closely related but more general idea o f a perspective: the 
interdependence of perception and action that perspective involves can be explained in terms of 
their codependence on a subpersonal dynamic singularity. This subpersonal aspect of unity does 
not support sharp causal boundaries either between mind and world or between perception and 
action.” (p. 3) Whether our concerns form part of the main plot or one of the subplots is rendered 
problematic by the fact that Hurley seems to use the phrase “the unity o f consciousness” to refer 
both to the problem of “co-consciousness”, or the problem of the togetherness of contents at a 
time (cf., for example, p. 39, and p. 117) and to the problem of the possibility of content. That 
these problems are not identical is evident from the way in which the problem of co-consciousness 
(i.e., o f the togetherness of contents) must presuppose the possibility o f contents simpliciter. In 
other words, if  a “content” is a particular determinate this would, in itself, seem to presuppose its 
unification, or “combination”. The idea of “separate” contents is, on this line of thought, in fact, 
unintelligible (cf. p. 102) This is not to suggest that the idea of co-consciousness is not coherent 
nor is it to suggest that investigating it does not shed light on the problem of content. But it is to 
suggest that it is not the same problem. The “unity of consciousness” is not necessarily a 
conjoined or agglomerative unity (cf. pp. 117-118). Hence, providing an adequate response to the 
problem of co-consciousness does not in itself constitute an adequate response to the problem of 
content.
464 Cf. n. 271 above.
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we must first understand a distinction that she makes between instrumental and 
noninstrumental dependence. This distinction attempts “roughly, to capture the 
difference between action having an effect on a separate perceptual system and its 
sharing the constitution of that system”.465 In cases of instrumental dependence, 
Hurley argues, a mediating “system”, or “self’, serves to initiate action, input 
varies as a result of this initiated action and, in turn, has an effect on the mediating 
“system”. Examples of the instrumental dependence of perceptual input on output 
include walking to a better vantage point, or turning one’s head.466 In such 
instances, she suggests, “the influence of output on perceptual experience operates 
via input, so that motor output is a means to a change in sensory input”.467 Hence 
instrumental dependence is both intuitively accessible and compatible with the 
Input-Output Picture. But the experimental cases and thought experiments to 
which Hurley draws our attention are not. They point to a kind of dependence in 
which no mediating “system” is implicated. In which, for example, perceptual 
content depends directly, or noninstrumentally, on changes in motor output even 
though sensory input remains constant.468 But what is meant by the notion of 
“direct”, or “noninstrumental”, dependence? And how do such notions contribute 
to an account of an emergent constitutive interdependence of perception and 
intention?
465 Ibid., p. 363.
466 "Instrumental dependence”, Hurley observes, “is not controversial and is  not in dispute It is 
obviously true that the contents o f  perceptual experience can be affected by, for example walk’
to a better vantage point.” (Ibid., p. 248) ’ in®
467 Ibid., p. 248. Cf. also Hurley writes: “Movement can alter sensory inputs and so result in 
different perceptions.... This kind of instrumental interdependence is not at all surprising and '
compatible with the Input-Output Picture.” (pp. 341-2) ’ ls
468 Cf., for example, ibid., p. 177. Cf. also Hurley writes: “By contrast, when perceptual content 
depends noninstrumentally on output, it does not do so via input, but directly, jf  Dercent . i 
content depends noninstrumentally on output, then it is not a function of input." (p 342)
Perhaps the best way to understand the meaning of these terms is to briefly 
review a few of the cases to which she refers as examples of noninstrumental 
dependence. These cases fall into four categories. First, those that attempt to show 
how perceptual distinctions might depend noninstrumentally on output. Second, 
those that attempt to show how perceptual invariants might depend 
noninstrumentally on output. Third, those that attempt to show how distinctions in 
the contents of basic intentions might depend noninstrumentally on inputs. Fourth, 
those that attempt to show how invariants in the contents of basic intentions might 
depend noninstrumentally on inputs.469 In order to elucidate the meaning of 
noninstrumental dependence and its implications for the Input-Output Picture it is 
not necessary to review cases from all of these categories. Since examples from 
the last category turn out to involve a rather high degree of artifice we will restrict 
ourselves to a brief examination of one example from each of the first three 
categories. This should be sufficient to clarify the notion of noninstrumental 
dependence, to see how it challenges the Input-Output Picture, and to provide a 
conceptual basis from which to explore the implications of Hurley’s work for our 
concerns.
The first case we will examine involves the noninstrumental dependence 
of perception on motor output. In particular it concerns what happens when an 
individual with paralyzed eye muscles attempts to glance to the right or left. 
Hurley begins her examination of this case with the following quote from 
Galistel’s The Organization o f Action:
469 Cf., ibid., p. 369.
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When a man with paralyzed eye muscles tries to glance to the right the 
world appears to jump to the right even though the pattern of light falling on 
the paralyzed eye has not moved. Uncancelled efference copy [a copy of the 
neural motor signal that normally moves the eye, which here is not 
accompanied by the normally corresponding change in neural sensory 
signal] has created an hallucination of movement, a sensory experience for 
which there is no sensory basis. The image of the world on the retina does 
not move, but one “sees” the world move.470 *
In this case input from the world, or afference, is held constant but an aspect of 
perception varies as a result of a direct dependence on motor signals which occur 
when the subject attempts, or intends, to move their eyes. Perception then may 
vary as a result of a noninstrumental dependence between efferent signals and 
those subpersonal processes which support perception in this case.
The second example we will consider also happens to involve the 
noninstrumental dependence of perception on motor output but it has additional 
implications for the noninstrumental dependence of perceptual invariants on 
motor outputs. In this experiment, which was first described by Ivo Kohler:
Each lens of a pair of goggles is vertically divided. The left side of each lens 
is tinted blue so that when the wearer looks to the left the world looks rather 
bluish. The right side of each lens is tinted yellow so that when the wearer 
looks to the right the world looks rather yellowish. If the goggles are worn 
for several weeks, vision adapts and the color distortions tend to disappear.
470 C. R. Gallistel. The Organization of Action: A New Synthesis, Hillsdale N  J • Lawr™^
Erlbaum Associates, p. 175, in ibid., p. 344. ’ Lawrence
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Somehow the visual system learns to introduce the proper correction 
according to whether the eyes are turned to the left or right.471
In this case perceptual experience seems to depend on feedback from motor 
factors, in surprising ways. As Kohler writes:
When the subject eventually removes his two-color goggles after wearing 
them continuously for 60 days, there is no doubt that his visual world is 
tinged distinctly yellow when he looks in the direction that his goggles had 
been blue and blue in the direction that his goggles had been yellow. The 
movement of the eyes either to right or left seems to act as a signal for the 
foveal area to switch over in its color response, compensating for a yellow 
image in one case and a blue image in the other.472
In a subsequent thought experiment Hurley asks us to consider what would result 
if, seated before a uniform white field, this subject were to look right and left. 
Presumably the subject would see blue or yellow depending on which way she 
was looking. From this observation Hurley argues that, for Kohler’s subject, 
which colour is perceived depends directly, or noninstrumentally, on motor output 
involved in the action of moving the eye either side of a mid-point where the 
dividing line on the goggles would previously have been encountered. If this is 
correct then the variance in question would not result from a change in input but 
rather from a direct dependence of “perceptual contents” on motor output.473
472 IbKoMer/‘Experiments with Goggles”, Scientific American 206,1961, p. 68, in ibid., p. 287. 
^ W ith  respect to this category in general Hurley writes:
» .^ con ten t or structure, of perceptual experience may vary directly with motor intentions or 
T  even when sensory inputs are held constant. Perceptual experience is not a function only 
a?  sensory input and ‘upstream’ processing, and in particular is not independent o f  motor 
°ntentions Experimental work in various areas suggests that the nature of an intended response
Since discovering whether this is in fact the best explanation for the above 
phenomenon requires empirical research474 the question of whether the Input- 
Output Picture ought to be applied in this case is an empirical question.
So far we have established another case of the possibility of the 
noninstrumental dependence of perception on motor output. In order to see how 
this example supports the possibility of what Hurley refers to as the 
noninstrumental dependence of perceptual invariants on motor outputs we need 
first to observe that, assuming motor dependence is the correct explanation, the 
reason that colour perception is able to come to depend in some way on motor 
output is that the optic system possess the ability to regain veridicality in the face 
of the “colour noise” introduced by Kohler’s goggles. After wearing the goggles 
for some time a perceptual adaptation occurs in which eye movement to the left or 
the right of some midline covaries with compensatory adjustments which serve to 
reestablish the colour invariants disturbed by the presence of the goggles.475 The 
colour phenomenon, which results when the goggles are removed, may therefore, 
with some justification be seen to count as evidence that the relevant perceptual 
invariants have become noninstrumentally dependent on motor output. At this 
point Hurley reminds us that it remains an empirical question as to whether this is 
the best explanation of the resulting covariation. However, this fact is all that is
may alter the experience it is supposedly a response to (Tegner and Levander 1991; Bisiach et al. 
1990' and so on; see essay 9 below for further cases and references), (p. 200)
474 Hurley suggests the plausible explanation that efferent feedback from eye movements may be 
the determining factor in which color is perceived. She writes: “It is an empirical question whether 
this new ability depends on efferent signals to eye muscles or on afference concerning eye
^ H u r ley  writes: “This artificial sensory-motor correlation transforms but does not eliminate 
information about true color constancy. Kohler’s experiment suggests that color perception may 
be able to adapt to ‘find’ the new motor-mediated form of such information, despite the fact that 
there is presumably no natural or evolutionary basis for this kind o f motor-mediation of color 
information.’’ (pp. 292-3) Cf. alsopp. 385-6.
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required to bring into question the status of the Input-Output Picture as a generally 
applicable framework.
To complement her examples of the noninstrumental dependence of 
perception on motor output Hurley also considers experimental cases and thought 
experiments in which intention appears to depend noninstrumentally on sensory 
inputs.476 In such cases basic intentions vary with inputs even though outputs and 
nonbasic intentions are constant.477 In a thought experiment Hurley considers the 
possibility of acquiring a new basic intention - the intention to raise one’s alpha 
level brain wave activity given sensory biofeedback involving the observation of a 
line on a screen. Faced with this challenge subjects would initially not know what 
to do. Having no sensory access to alpha levels human beings, under normal 
conditions, do not even know how to begin to try to raise their alpha level. Hurley 
argues, however, that through noninstrumental biofeedback a subject may be 
guided to develop the requisite ability and they may also come to develop a new 
basic intention - the intention to raise one’s alpha level.478 Once the new intention 
has become established and is available, it may be possible to act on it without 
sensory feedback. Hurley argues that the establishment of the new basic intention
476 Cf., ibid., pp. 389-400.
477 Hurley writes: “Basic intentions are where the chain o f  what you intentionally (do by doing 
something else) begins” (p. 357). She provides an example in which one turns on a light in order 
to try to scare o ff a burglar. In this case she argues that intention of turning on the light is more 
basic. Given her definition this conclusion seems odd to me. Faced with a burglar my intentions 
begin with wanting to scare him off. The intention to turn on the light may never enter my head, 
so to speak - particularly if I have drilled repeatedly for such an eventuality. Of course, practicing 
scaring off a burglar may seem unusual, but practicing what to do in case o f physical attack is not 
and the implication is the same. In the case of practiced self-defense one’s basic intention is to 
defend myself. The particular defensive “action(s)” undertaken occur(s) reflexively relative to the 
attack posture. At the limit this kind of “action” is actionless - a fact that lies at the basis of 
Buddhist influenced martial arts like judo and aikido. For Hurley’s discussion of basic intentions 
cf. pp. 355-60.
478 The biofeedback in this case is noninstrumental, she argues, because it “does not here provide
new information about the effects o f something I could already do intentionally” (Cf ibid d 
390). ' ’ P'
to raise one’s alpha level “depends noninstrumentally on closing the sensory 
feedback loop” between the input from the monitor and efferent output events that 
occur concurrently with the new intention.479 The possibility of acquiring a new 
basic intention in this fashion illustrates the possibility of the noninstrumental 
dependence of intentions on input. Instead of input functioning as a means by 
which an intention is determined complex dynamic input-output relations appear 
to function noninstrumentally in the emergence of a new intention.480
These cases and others that Hurley explores have implications inconsistent 
with Input-Output Picture’s presuppositions and hence allow Hurley to proceed 
by way of counter-example to challenge the Input-Output Picture’s status as a 
general conceptual framework for thinking about perception and action.481 The 
main problem with the Input-Output Picture from Hurley’s perspective is, once 
again, that perception and action operate independently and relative to a mediator, 
or mediating system of some kind. Hurley’s examples challenge this idea by 
demonstrating ways in which action does not merely have effects on a separate 
perceptual system, and vice versa. Rather perception and action are both seen to 
depend noninstrumentally on relations between input and output such that no 
mediating system is implied. In some of the cases she considers,
479 Ibid., p. 390. . ,
480 Notice that Hurley is concerned not only with an emergent constitutive interdependence but 
also with a constitutively interdependent emergence (i.e., of content).
481 In clarifying the nature of the Input-Output Picture Hurley writes; “Our working hypothesis in 
this essay is that the Input-Output Picture is whatever it is that these cases challenge. The 
characterization of the Input-Output Picture can then be sharpened by diagnosis of why the cases 
are similarly surprising. In this way we both spell out the commitments of the Picture and show 
how it goes w rong.... actual cases and hypothetical thought experiments demonstrate that whether 
this view holds in particular cases is an empirical question. But since the Input-Output Picture 
does not present itself as an empirical claim about particular cases, but rather as a general 
conceptual framework, that is enough to defeat the status it assumes.” (p. 340)
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the intention to act seems to influence perceptual consciousness, even if the 
intention to act is itself a function of perceptual information. And the 
influence of intention on perception seems to be more than merely 
instrumental, in that it does not operate via changes in sensory inputs. 
Perception and action seem to emerge from a dynamic flow or circle of 
causes and effects. This real-life complexity is at odds with the normal 
Input-Output Picture of perception and action,... ,482
Hurley’s findings, therefore, suggest that the subpersonal causal structures 
relating perception and action do not conform to Input-Output Picture 
presuppositions and consequently cannot be accommodated by it.483
The conceptual framework through which Hurley’s investigations proceed, 
we can now observe, takes for granted the division of cognitive functions into 
personal and sub-personal levels. 484 Distinctions made at the personal level 
concern the contents of states properly attributable to subject/agents.485 Sub­
personal level distinctions concern vehicles of the personal level contents and are 
considered to possess the potential to be causally explanatory of personal level 
contents.486 But, Hurley warns, although we may ultimately be able to draw
482 ibid., p. 198.
483 Cf. ibid., p. 198, and pp. 288-9.
484 She suggests that, “once we bring the Input-Output Picture into doubt, we should distinguish 
the issue o f causal relations between input and output, at the subpersonal level, from issues about 
the relations between perceptual consciousness and intentional action, at the personal level. We 
should not simply assume that these two sets of relations are isomorphic, and therefore cast 
intentional actions exclusively in the role of effects of conscious experience." (p. 212)
485 Examples o f such contents include: perception, intention, belief, desire, etc.. Note also that 
Hurley suggests that such contents “need not be conscious contents but they are subject to 
normative constraints.” (p. 28)
486 Notice that the idea o f “vehicles” of consciousness is itself sustained by the division o f levels. 
Certainly at the subpersonal level there are no “vehicles”, there are just patterns of activity and 
inactivity across neuronal space, and neither are there “vehicles” at the personal level. It is, 
therefore, the attempt to connect the two levels which gives birth to talk o f “vehicles” of content, 
(cf. p. 30; p. 332)
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substantive conclusions with respect to how these levels are related we should be 
careful not to assume any simple isomorphism. The Input-Output Picture is 
problematic precisely because it is a view which projects personal level contents 
directly onto subpersonal states. In opposition to this kind of simple isomorphic 
projection Hurley’s work supports the idea that personal level contents are 
noninstrumentally dependent on complex systems of input-output relations at the 
level of subpersonal vehicles.487 The notion of noninstrumental dependence is, 
therefore, specified in a way that is intended to cross between the personal and 
subpersonal levels. It is this level-crossing specification that “puts the Input- 
Output Picture at issue, since it is a view that precisely projects a subpersonal- 
level distinction and a personal-level distinction onto one another.”488
The idea of noninstrumental dependence also offers support for an 
alternative way of modeling mental functions in which the notion of complex 
dynamic feedback systems plays a central role - in particular, the fact that 
perceptions and intentions depend noninstrumentally on relations between input 
and output points to the possibility that both perception and action are co­
constituted, constitutively interdependent.489 Hurley argues that if the contents of 
both perceptions and intentions at a personal level depend noninstrumentally on 
dynamic relations of inputs and outputs at a subpersonal level then “a given 
change in these relations could equally constitute a change in the contents of 
perceptions and intentions”.490 Hence, perception and intentional action may be
487 Cf. ibid., pp. 27-30.
488 Ibid., p. 380.
489 Cf., ibid., p. 214, p. 342, p. 389, and p. 400.
490 Ibid., p. 212. The possibility of the constitutive interdependence o f perception and intention is 
developed as follows: “The various ways in which perception can depend noninstrumentally on 
output and intentions on input constrain one another. Not only do distinctions and invariants 
constrain one another, but perceptual content constrains the content o f intentions and vice versa.
constitutively interdependent. This idea is central to Hurley’s Two-Level 
Interdependence View. She writes:
Consider a Two-Level Interdependence View. There might be 
interdependence between perception and action at the personal level 
because both perceptual and intentional content depend on relations 
between causal input and causal output at the subpersonal level. Contentful 
perceptual experience and contentful intentional action would be 
constitutively interdependent, in the sense that their possibility is explained 
together (not in a way such that the explanation of one presupposes the 
other).491
A programmatic sketch of the logical space that such a view would occupy 
provides insight into its philosophical implications. Hurley suggests:
On this kind of view, contentful intentions and experience both depend on 
relations between causal input and causal output, so that agency and 
experience are constitutively interdependent.492
Hence, in setting out to establish the noninstrumental dependence of perception 
on output and intention on input Hurley is, among other things, providing support 
for a type of dynamic approach to central philosophical problems surrounding 
issues of how content is possible. Perhaps through examining Hurley’s Two-Level 
Interdependence View together with some of the arguments she presents for it we 
may be able to add to the limited progress that we have, thus far, been able to 
make.
The conclusion we approach is that in general both perceptual and intentional contents depend on 
relations between input and output, and hence are essentially interdependent.” (Ibid., p. 371)
491 Ibid., p. 85.
492 Ibid., p. 85. Cf. also p. 381.
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3. A more complete understanding of the philosophical implications of a 
Two-Level Interdependence View can be developed through exploring its 
relationship to certain Kantian influenced accounts of experience. The type of 
account with which Hurley is concerned often provides a central role to ideas such 
as the activity of spontaneous synthesis, self-consciousness, receptivity, and unity. 
Although the explanatory potential of such ideas may be powerful, as we have 
observed, the attempt to actualize their potentiality gives rise to some difficult 
philosophical problems. One such problem occurs in the form of the regress 
known as Kant’s “problem of judgment”.493 Hurley also notes this regress but she 
is primarily concerned with two other closely related regresses. The first of these 
regresses, which appears to include the problem of judgment under its rubric, 
results from “the way in which the question of unity arises again for any 
subjective content of consciousness that might be appealed to in giving an account 
of unity, even self-conscious content characterized in terms of formality or 
spontaneity.”494 The second occurs as a result of the way in which synthesis, 
whether viewed empirically or transcendentally, is often, and not without 
justification, conceived as an activity involving our agency. Here Hurley observes 
that appealing to agency in a constitutive account of the possibility of content 
leads to a regress because agentic activity is content presupposing. Since actions 
involving our agency are intentional actions and intentions presuppose
493 Cf. ibid., p. 243 n.22 for Hurley’s comments on “the problem o f  judgment”
“  113 '  Il “ h.fhT dS' f°r T  °n Wl,il;h °nc Wishes one canalways ask how this that comes about.
“content”495 an account of experience that relies on agency as its ground 
presupposes that which it seeks to explain.496
This fact, together with other ancillary arguments concerning the 
explanatory limitations of related Kantian inspired thoughts, leads Hurley to 
suggest that perhaps spontaneous synthesis should not be understood in terms of 
intentional agency at all.497 Perhaps more progress would be made if we were to 
consider a combined, normative and functional, approach to the problem of 
content in which the relevant sense of self-consciousness is not necessarily bound 
to content presupposing agentic activity.498 In this case, Hurley argues, the self- 
consciousness that accompanies our intentions and perceptions need not involve 
the decompositional/recombinant capacities which we usually describe as 
conceptual. She writes:
A suggestion that has at least some intuitive force is this: it is in the contents 
of intentional motor actions of an ordinary, worldly, embodied kind - as 
opposed to acts of synthesizing, classifying or conceptualizing - that self- 
consciousness has its most natural home.499
If we require that all content be accompanied by self-consciousness and then 
insist that the relevant notion of self-consciousness involve conceptual abilities 
we will have thereby rendered any creature incapable of conceptual abilities also
495 Hurley argues: “A coherent sense of agency must presuppose the possibility of intentions and 
hence content.” (Ibid., p. 84; cf. also p. 75)
496 We might observe here that Buddhism does not presuppose such agentic activity but rather 
concurs with Hurley on the notion that intention and perception are interdependent, arising 
together and out of the same process.
497 Ibid., p. 84.
498 Cf. for example, ibid., p. 54. Cf. also Hurley writes: “The difficulty again is that we do not 
have a viable account of the nature of the agency involved in transcendental synthesis or why it 
should be taken to ground unity”, (p. 83)
499 Ibid., p. 86. Cf. also Hurley writes: “But notice that the kind o f action the perception gets 
tangled up with in these cases in not sophisticated conceptualizing or classifying activity.” (p. 389)
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incapable of content. This conclusion seems intuitively unacceptable. Fortunately, 
Hurley argues, it is not inevitable. A Two-Level Interdependence View, she 
suggests, might permit us to disassociate conceptual abilities from that sense of 
self-consciousness which is necessary for the possibility of content because it 
might permit a characterization of the relevant sense of self-consciousness in 
practical, as opposed to, conceptual or epistemologically related terms.
This practical form of nonconceptual self-consciousness Hurley refers to as 
perspective seif-consciousness. For perspectival self-consciousness, she writes, 
“the kind of agency that is essential is intentional motor agency o f an ordinary, 
empirical, worldly, embodied kind - as opposed to acts of classifying or 
conceptualizing or judging”.500 As Hurley suggests:
A creature that acts intentionally, and so on intentions, can act for reasons 
and is subject to at least some norms of practical rationality. Its actions 
depend holistically on relationships between what it perceives and intends, 
or between what it believes and desires. Relations between stimuli and 
responses are not invariant, but reflect the rational relations between 
perceptions and intentions and various possibilities of mistake or 
misrepresentation.501
Hence, the intentional agency associated with perspectival self-consciousncss may 
be capable of supporting, through practical as opposed to conceptual or
i0° Ibid., p. 140. Conceptual abilities may, in some way, piggy-back on the oerspcctival self- 
consciousness as something we do” - a practice particular to humans. Hurley writes’
‘‘Perspectival consciousness can but need not be conceptual" (d 142)  1
501 Ibid., p. 137. -w - ;
epistemologically related means, a level of normative power adequate for 
content.502
If perspectival self-consciousness, so conceived, is that form of self- 
consciousness which is most relevant to providing a satisfactory response to the 
problem of content then it seems an account of the possibility of content could be 
generated which avoids the regress which results from conceiving of spontaneity 
on a conceptual subsumption model. However, as Hurley acknowledges, the 
notion of perspectival self-consciousness is still an intentional self-consciousness. 
Consequently, she writes: “While conscious intentions with nonconceptual 
content may not presuppose conceptual unity, they will still presuppose the unity 
of consciousness, so will not avoid the regress”.503 The appeal to perspectival self- 
consciousness is not in itself, therefore, to be taken as a response to the problem 
of content. Rather Hurley suggests that it “provides a way of expressing the 
personal-level interdependence of perception and action involved in having a 
unified perspective.”504 In this way the notion of perspectival self-consciousness 
may be central to a personal-level component of a Two-Level Interdependence 
View in which personal-level perceptual and intentional contents are “in general 
... functions of the subpersonal relations between input and output, such as the 
relations that hold within a complex dynamic feedback system.”505
These are intriguing ideas, which, as Hurley suggests, leaves us with a 
project for further work. The view that Hurley advocates would abandon a
502 Cf. Hurley writes: “Practical reason, not epistemology, and the holism o f perceptions and 
intentions, rather than theoretical holism, provide the relevant normative conicxt." (p. 138)
503 Ibid., p. 87. Here she seems to have in mind the regress associated with conceiving of 
spontaneity as involving agentic activity.
31*  Ibid., p. 87.
305 Ibid., p. 339.
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conception of spontaneous activity in terms of conceptually bound agentic activity 
in favour of an account characterized in terms of practical activity. This ‘‘activity" 
and the level of normativity it supports would then be explicated functionally, in 
terms of subpersonal dynamic feedback systems such that agency and experience 
might in the end be seen to be interdependent^ constituted as a function of those 
dynamic relations.506 On such a view personal level contents would be seen to be 
determined by relations between subpersonal vehicles of content, as opposed to 
being determined by intrinsic properties of such vehicles.
Such an explanation, Hurley now suggests, would appeal to the 
codependence of perception and action on dynamic singularities.507 The notion of 
dynamic singularity, which is intimately related to dynamics as an approach to 
understanding many phenomena, is central to Hurley’s approach. It is the notion 
of dynamic singularity that promises to provide the subpersonal functional idea of 
unity, which Hurley argues is needed to supplement a normative approach to the 
unity of consciousness and to explain the perspectival interdependence of 
perception and action.508 Briefly, the general hypothesis at issue is,
506 Hurley writes: “Even though perceptual and intentional contents are different functions of the 
relations between input and output, changes in these relations should in general be expected to 
affect both perceptual and intentional content.... To say that content of a certain type is some 
function o f certain causal processes does not say which function, or that it is the same function in 
different possible worlds.... Which functions in particular may be determined in purt by still more 
inconclusive considerations, both normative and causal.” (p. 339)
507 For those interested in her arguments for the necessity of such a notion cf., for example pp 
215-17.
7  p- 336' ^ an Geldf r w"t®s: “Contemporary dynamics provides powerful resources for
descnbmg genera propert.es of the behaviour of systems. These resource can be brought t o L  
even in absence o f an actual equation-governed model. If done rigorously this can buv a 
qualitative or preliminary understanding o f the phenomenon, which may be the best available „„ . 
fon»s a solid foundalion for toher cap,ora,¡on.- (p. S) The footnote X  q„ o £  d 
poorly, on the other hand, „ te tale more than handwavlng with impotent metaphors l i e  uT„ 
S e S n g “ 7 8' “nf0rtUna,el>'- V™ '6* »»»y  opportunities for pseudo^dentifc 8
that the unity of consciousness may depend on subpersonal dynamic 
processes involving complex relations between sensory inputs and motor 
outputs and a circular or looping structure of causes, effects, and feedback 
effects on further causes, with both internal and external feedback loops.
The idea of a dynamic singularity in the field of causal flows, centered on 
but not bounded by a biological organism, may provide a subpersonal 
element in an objective account of the unity of consciousness “at a time“.
And if the contents of perceptions and intentions are interdependent because 
they are both functions of such a system of relations, as in a Two-Level 
Interdependence View, then we can see why such interdependence is part of 
what it is to have a unified perspective.509
The resulting account would suggest that dynamic singularity at the subpersonal 
level of the vehicles which carry content combined with a normative account at 
the personal (or animal) level, most likely in terms of the kind of practical 
rationality sketched above, are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the 
unity of consciousness.510 In this way a response to the problem of content might 
be generated which may ultimately be able to avoid presupposing agentic activity 
and in so doing avoid the associated regress.511
On such an account the notion of a dynamic singularity would involve the 
functional identification of the central nervous system as that system “where
509 Ibid., pp. 206-7. Immediately following the above quote Hurley writes: “A further hypothesis 
crosses the personal-subpersonal divide in a particular way: it is that this kind of subpcrsonnl 
complex dynamic feedback system can itself be an adaptive effect of intentional actions, among 
other things.” (p. 207)
510 Ibid. p. 130n. Hurley continues: “The combined view would specify a two-level functional role 
for unity, which could be realized in various ways, and the role would be defined in part by 
reference to norms governing actions.” (n. p. 130) For a discussion of the way in which dynamic 
feedback systems bridge internal-external boundaries cf. for example, pp 282-3 pp 327-37
511 Cf. ibid., p. 78, p. 214 n. 21.
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neural signals in the various modalities (such as visual, proprioceptive, and motor 
signals) converge and are compared and other signals selectively generated”.512 
More particularly, as Hurley writes:
The causal relations between nervous systems and environments are 
intricate and continuous.... At the subpersonal level, when we look at 
dynamic causal flows and patterns, distinct selves show up as distinct 
singularities, foci of systematic and complex feedback relationships,... 
which cluster around and move with the active biological organism but 
which also loop out into the environment. ...at the personal level, what it is 
to be a subject and agent is open to view, just where it seems to be, in the 
normatively constrained lives of creatures whose perception/action system 
embeds them into and deals directly with the world.513
But here we can observe that although such a view may in the end provide 
cognitive science, and maybe even philosophy, with a new and perhaps powerful 
way of modeling various aspects of cognitive performance, it seems likely to
512 Ibid., p. 271. At this point the question arises as to how the process o f “comparison” is taking 
place. The motor theory of perception, which Hurley suggests may contribute to a Two-Level 
Interdependence View, employs the notion of a “comparator", (cf. p. 443 and p. 449) But it is not 
clear how such notions can be unproblematically extended to an account of those mental functions 
responsible for content. Contrast Hurley’s comments with, for example, Kant’s comments on the 
process of comparison underlying the unity o f consciousness. He writes: “This objective basis of 
all association o f appearances I call their affinity. This basis, however, we cannot find anywhere 
except in the principle of the unity of apperception in regard to all cognitions that arc to belong to 
me.” (A 122) “Hence from what has been said thus far it is indeed evident, although strange, that 
only by means o f this transcendental function of the imagination does even the affinity of 
appearances become possible, and with it their association, and through this association finally 
their reproduction according to laws, and consequently experience itself. For without this 
transcendental function no concepts whatever of objects would meld into one experience.” (A 
123)
s13 Ibid., p. 336. Hence, Hurley’s view might be characterized as a kind o f sophisticated 
contextualism. Since Hurley is advocating an account in which content is a function of dynamic 
systems which reach out and include the “environment” she can, in contcxtualist fashion, suggest 
that “content is determined by global context” (Cf., for example, pp. 263-4) In her chapter on 
Wittgenstein she implies that it is, at least in part, through the relinquishing of mind-world dualism 
that a contextualist response to the problem o f content promises to be more effective than 
discredited Platonic and competing Kantian influenced views, (cf., pp. 237-40)
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encounter significant difficulties if applied to the problem of content. If personal 
level intentional and perceptual contents are superposed on, and explicated in 
terms of, dynamic singularities in subpersonal fields of causal flows then a 
satisfactory response to the problem of content would seem to require an 
explanation of how such content emerges from those dynamic flows. Hurley 
sometimes gives the impression that she is advocating such an approach. But there 
are at least two main reasons to doubt that a Two-Level Interdependence View 
could provide an account of the emergence of content. First, a Two-Level 
Interdependence View would presumably retain a personal level component as 
part of the explanans, and, as in the case of perspectival self-consciousness, such 
a component would seem to involve presupposing some level of content.514 
Hence, a tension exists between the need for a personal-level component and the 
idea that two-level view might provide a satisfactory response to the problem of 
content. Second, although the level crossing notion of noninstrumental 
dependence would seem to be intended to resolve this tension, as we will see 
below, it is not clear that it could accomplish this feat.
4. Whatever else Consciousness in Action is able to contribute to issues of 
consciousness and cognition it does provide plausibility and support to an idea 
with which we are by now quite familiar. This is the idea that a constitutive 
interdependence of some kind exists between experience and intention. Hurley’s 
findings in support of this idea permit her to argue convincingly that it is a 
mistake to attempt to separate intentional and perceptual accounts of the 
possibility of content. To provide an account of the possibility of content, she
514 Cf. ibid., p. 87. Utilizing a personal level component in a response to the problem o f content 
then seems likely to result m a regress.
suggests, neither agency nor experience should be taken as fundamental. The 
problem applies equally to both. Consequently, as she writes: “Explaining how 
content is possible involves explaining how unity, including the unity of 
consciousness and conceptual unity, can be determined for intentions and 
experiences together.”515 To do this in a way that is able to avoid content 
presupposing regresses does not, as we have seen, appear to be a simple matter. 
So how would a Two-Level Interdependence View provide a coherent account of 
content?
The logical and only apparent alternative to conceiving of spontaneous 
synthesis along personal/normative/intentional level lines, as involving something 
we do, is to conceive of it along subpersonal/causal level lines, as involving 
something that happens to us. Hurley’s account acknowledges and respects this 
division of levels, but since neither level in itself seems capable of providing a 
satisfactory solution to problems of consciousness and content Hurley suggests a 
combined approach which appeals to the idea of complex cross level dynamic 
relations. This approach, once again, involves supplementing a normative 
account, provided at the personal (animal) level, with a functional account, 
provided in terms of dynamics at the subpersonal/causal level. In order to avoid a 
variety of problems associated with Input-Output Picture influenced, conceptually 
bound, theories of mind, and with a view to providing a symmetric response to the 
problem of content, the personal level account is conceived in terms of a 
normativity just powerful enough to support distinctions between consistency and
515 ibid., p. 85.
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inconsistency.516 This means that, to the extent that such a view attempts to 
provide an answer to the problem of content, the constitutive power of spontaneity 
must be assigned to the subpersonal/causal level and characterized in terms of 
“happenings”.517 The most promising way of modeling these happenings, Hurley 
argues, is functionally, in dynamical terms.518 The unity of consciousness, she 
suggests, has a functional character, but it is a high-level functional character, 
which could in principle be realized in variety of ways. On a Two-Level 
Interdependence View the dynamic relations between personal and subpersonal 
levels (i.e., noninstrumental relations) would be characterized in terms of this 
high-level functional account and conceived of as carrying not only subpersonal 
information but “information” about self and world.519 In this way it is hoped that
Cf. ibid., p. 141. For a detailed discussion o f problems of normativity with respect to such an 
account o f  the unity of consciousness and Hurley’s position on the matter cf., 112-133 For further 
discussion o f the kind o f normative constraints envisioned by Hurley cf., pp 135-40 
517 Immediately before introducing the idea of Two-Level Interdependence View Hurley writes- 
“But perhaps spontaneity should not be understood in terms of intentional agency at all Then 
perhaps the contrast with receptivity can be drawn causally, in subpersonal or computational 
terms, receptivity might be a matter of causal input, spontaneity a matter of causal output Both 
causal input and causal output may be needed for contentful experience, as well as contentful 
agency, to be possible.” (p. 84)
Cf. also ibid., pp. 73-78.
5,8 She writes: “When neither subjective nor intrinsic objective properties quite do the trick trv 
functional properties.” (Ibid., p. 54) ’ y
Note also that, as Clark and Toribio observe, recent years have brought about a kind of 
theorist o f mind and advocate of dynamics which seeks to go beyond the idea that subpersonal 
systems are vehicles of content and call into question the idea o f internal representation itself. As 
opposed to this project they argue for a revisionary representationalism in which perhaps “an' 
unexpectedly large portion of what we generally take as our cognitive achievements may in fact 
turn out to be explicable without the invocation o f any kind of internal representation” Since 
Hurley does not attempt to do away with the notion of vehicles of content, or internal 
representations, her work can be taken to lend support to this project. However, insofar as the bulk 
of our cognitive activity is rather defined in terms of ‘perceiving’ and ‘acting’, by unseating "the 
dominant conception of perception as a process whereby internal representations are formed and 
action as the carrying out o f  internally formulated commands” she also lends support to the anti 
representational dynamicists camp. (Cf. A. Clark and J. Toribio, Doing Without Representing? ’ 
Synthese, 101: 401-431, 1994, in particular pp. 423-26.) i pres mg/,
S‘9 <?- ibid: \ p- 16’ P- ?30’ p- 136’ pP- 193'4- P- 207, PP- 214-18, and p. 436. Without some 
background in the explanatory possibilities of dynamic systems theory it may be difficult to
imagine what Hurley has in mind. Tim van Gelder suggests that the dynamical hypothesis in 
cognitive science is composed of two major components: the hypothesis that cognitive agents ore 
dynamical systems (the nature hypothesis) and the hypothesis that cognitive agents can be 
understood dynamically (the knowledge hypothesis). A presupposition of a dynamical approach to 
accounting for the emergence of content would then seem to be that any sense o f agency o self
a Two-Level Interdependence View might be able to respond to the problem of 
content.520
Now, at the end of her book Hurley suggests that the view she is 
advocating expresses three general ideas. She writes:
The first is the idea of context-dependence. Content can be a function of 
distributed processes, of a network of relations, rather than of intrinsic 
properties of discrete, local vehicles. Content can be both carried 
relationally and determined relationally. The second is that there is no
consciousness which turns out to be necessary to content must also be dynamically constituted. If 
this turns out to be correct then it seems reasonable to expect the emergence of content, like the 
emergence o f leopard spots, to yield to the explanatory power of dynamics. (J. Garson, Cognition 
poised at the edge of chaos: a complex alternative to a symbolic mind, Philosophical Psychology, 
Vol. 9., No. 3 ,1996, pp. 301-322.) In such an account the tools o f dynamics would be integrated 
into an explanation through which we could, in some way, understand how objective contents can 
emerge from subjectively instantiated dynamic systems of natural causal relations. Were such an 
account possible it would not, as both Hurley and van Gelder point out, be likely to be conceived 
at a “low level” in terms of neural firing rates, etc.. As van Gelder writes:
“The nature hypothesis tells us what cognitive agents are by specifying the relation they bear to 
dynamical systems. It is common to interpret the hypothesis as asserting that cognitive agents are 
literally identical with some particular low-level system made up o f a large number o f internal, 
low-level quantities such as neural firing rates. However, this needs correction in almost every 
respect.
First, the relationship at the heart o f  the nature hypothesis is not identity but instantiation. 
Cognitive agents are not themselves systems (sets o f variables) but rather objects whose 
properties, etc., can form system s.... According to the nature hypothesis, the systems responsible 
for cognitive performances are dynamical.
Second, cognitive agents “are”, in this sense, not some particular dynamical system, but as many 
systems as are needed to produce all the different kinds of cognitive performances exhibited by 
the agent. ...
Another noteworthy fact about these models is that the variables they posit are not low-level (e.g., 
neural firing rates), but rather macroscopic quantities at roughly the level o f cognitive 
performance itself. The lesson here is that the nature hypothesis is concerned in the first instance 
not with low-level systems but with how agents are causally organized at the highest level relevant 
to an explanation o f cognitive performances, whatever that may be.” (van Gelder, in press, pp. 6- 
7)
If it is correct to assume that cognitive agents are dynamical systems understanding them as such 
will require that cognitive science take a dynamical form. Confirming the knowledge hypothesis 
will require that scientists be able to furnish abstract dynamical systems to serve as models by 
specifying abstract variables and governing equations. Hurley suggests her Two-Levelled 
approach as a promising framework from which to construct models of the emergence and 
manipulation o f content.
520 Cf. for the full discussion pp. 427-9. Note also that Hurley writes: “Dynamic systems 
demystify emergence. A self-organizing dynamic system may be fully deterministic, even though 
its emergent properties cannot be predicted other than by letting it run and seeing what it does "
(p. 4 0 3 )
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neural boundary that might prevent the first point from applying to relations 
between input and output. The third is that superposition of contents make 
for interdependence. Networks of relations can carry various codependent 
or superposed contents in such a way that such contents are 
interdependently determined.521
These ideas, in general, seem to be adequately supported given one proviso. The 
word “determined” in this paragraph should be understood to mean something 
akin to “covary as a function of...”522 523In the experimental cases and thought 
experiments which Hurley considers changes in relations between input and 
output at the subpersonal level are seen to covary with changes in the contents of 
perception and intention. This covariance provides support for her contention 
that perceptual and intentional contents are, at least sometimes, superposed on the 
same complex dynamic systems of input-output relations, and hence may be 
constitutively interdependent. It also renders plausible the idea that content is 
relationally “carried” and is dependent on subpersonal dynamic flows in a way 
that may permit “noninstrumental relations” to select content for presence to 
consciousness.524 But how these facts can be harnessed to provide an account of 
content is determined in the sense with which we have been concerned in previous 
chapters is, as least for the moment, left fairly mysterious.
521 Ibid., p. 446.
522 Hurley, for example, writes: ‘T o  raise our issues cleanly, we need a generic idea like that of
noninstrumental dependence. The term “determine” will sometimes be used to indicate the ? 
complementary genenc relation. So * depends noninstrumentally on y just when y determines ,  
and interdependence implies mutual determination.” (p. 342) 7 ’
523 Cf. ibid., p. 212, p. 339, and pp. 374-376.
" lheone “ "T '6 fw t e r 1M <°emerge fromnonius,rumen,al dynamic
relations, ne„ the example of acqumng a new basic intention to raise one’s alpha levels, H „ Z  
concludes by suggest,ng that somehow, after practice with the monitor, you are able to bring 
your alpha level under intentional control. Feedback has p„,Wnri ,  „ u . . . s
the intention to raise your alpha.” (p. 444) ^  8 "eW bas,c ,ntentio" t0 emerge,
As we observed above, a tension seems to exist between the idea that a 
coherent response to the problem of content will require the inclusion of a 
personal level component, and the idea that the resulting two-level account may 
be able to respond to the problem of content in a way which is able to avoid 
content presupposing regresses. We can now observe that this tension is related to 
the fact that Hurley provides little in the way of content to the notion of 
noninstrumental dependence. Hurley’s notion of noninstrumental dependence 
seems intended to be able to cross personal and subpersonal levels in a way that 
will permit the fact that personal level contents may be superposed on subpersonal 
dynamic relations to respond to the problem of content.525 But to respond to the 
problem of content the notion of “noninstrumental relations” would seem to 
require content beyond this fact. More particularly, if content presupposing 
regresses are to be avoided in responding to the problem of content the notion of 
noninstrumental relations would need to form part of a theory which provides an 
explanation of the (co)constitution of personal level contents from dynamic 
relations (that somehow can include both the environment and “information about 
the self’). Hence, the foreshadowed high-level functional characterization of the 
emergence of content from dynamic flows would seem to be required.526 Since it 
remains to be seen how this would be accomplished in a way that is able to avoid 
presupposing content, it is, at the very least, difficult to imagine how a two-level 
view would provide a satisfactory response to the problem of content.527
525 Cf. ibid., pp. 269-70.
an ta is t a in t o  the kind o f „airative explanation which dynamics can be expected to offer 
cf. Garson, m particular, pp. 316-19. v “
* ’ Cf. Hurley, p. 244, and p. 282. At one point Hurley observes that, “to admit thal a functional 
approach has a role to play rn a complex overall account o f consciousness is not to suppose It
suffices to account for all aspects o f  consciousness”, (p. 207) 1
It seems that to respond coherently to the problem of content elements 
need to be found through which a satisfying narrative can be constructed in a 
manner that does not require presupposing content.528 In the quest for those 
elements dynamics promises to provide a powerful set of tools. However, as van 
Gelder observes, dynamics,
is a highly general framework which must be adapted, supplemented, fine- 
tuned, etc., to apply to any particular cognitive phenomena. This typically 
involves merging dynamics with other constructs (e.g., the schema ...) or 
theoretical frameworks (e.g., ecological psychology ...).” (p. 8).
Hurley’s observations together with her sketch of a Two-Level-Interdependence 
View provides some guidance to the employment of dynamics and to the 
discovery of relevant explanatory elements. But it neither is, nor does it seem 
intended to be, a blue-print for the employment of dynamics to problems of 
consciousness and cognition. Consequently, the possibility is left open that a 
satisfactory response to the problem of content will require mating dynamics to 
elements and theoretical frameworks other than those anticipated by Hurley.529
It is at this point that a question crosses our path: To what extent would the 
theories we examined in previous chapters prove suited to dynamical integration? 
Although this question cannot be pursued thoroughly in the space remaining, we 
can briefly observe certain consistencies which exist between features of some of 
those theories and some of Hurley’s central findings which point to the possibility
528 Carson’s comments suggest that what such elements might be is at present unknown r f
Garson, op. cit., in particular pp. 306-7. " ent un'cnown- Cf.
529 O f course, i f  some such theory were, in some m v  tr, u ; __  .
this would require explanation. y ’ lstent with empirical findings
of a fruitful integration with dynamics.530 These include: 1) the idea that a 
constitutive interdependence exists between intention and perception, 2) the idea 
that dynamic feedback has a central role to play in the emergence of this 
interdependence (i.e., of content),531 3) the idea that ultimately no mediating 
system, or “self’, exists between intention and perception,532 4) the idea that the 
“activity” ultimately responsible for content is not intentional,533 and 5) the 
significance of the structural determinants of flow, or motion over time, to the 
emergence of content. Of course some of the theories we examined fit these 
findings better than others. But these general consistencies provide support to the 
hypothesis that some of the theoretical frameworks which we examined above 
may be integrated with dynamics in a way that would increase our understanding 
of consciousness and cognition. Exploring this possibility in any depth, however, 
is beyond the scope of this project. In our final section we will return to exploring 
the possibility that the unity of consciousness may prove unyielding such that a 
satisfactory explanation of its possibility may ultimately prove elusive or 
impossible.
5. Many of the models of consciousness that we examined in previous 
chapters provide a role for, what can be argued to be, cognizing intermediates 
through which content is held to be rendered possible. These intermediates, which
530 1 have in mind here primarily the theoretical frameworks of Kant, Eckhart, and Buddhism (in 
particular the álayavijñána and pratTtya-samutpada).
331 In the case of Buddhism, the idea that feedback from the six cognitive groups, each displaying 
continuity by virtue of their accompanying vijñánas, interacts in complex ways to determine 
present and future content.
332 Scheler’s theory of “the person” would seem to be an exception. To the extent that Buddhism 
can be said to rely on a mediating self it is, for the most part, seen first to be the product of an 
unintentional and largely inexplicable “activity” (cf., for example, chapter 4, p. 126, n. 272 
above).
533 Recall that Kant’s reflective judgment is characterized by the “unintentional” harmonization of 
the cognitive faculties. The formation of that through which the object is grasped (i.e., the 
intention) is, hence, not presupposed.
are generally speaking interposed between mind and world, have assumed many 
forms: “categories”, “rules”, “species”, “forms”, “principles”, “seeds”, and 
dharmas. Now it is, of course, commonly supposed that in Wittgenstein’s later 
writings he targets, and reveals as futile, the employment of intermediates 
between mind and world for the purpose of accounting for the possibility of 
content. He does this in a manner that echoes the comments of Kant with which 
we began our investigations.534 He demonstrates that since intermediates (e.g., 
rules) require interpretation, and no interpretation interprets itself, they are unable 
to do the job for which they are designed.535 Hence, appealing to intermediates in 
responding to the problem of content leads only to an infinite regress of 
intermediates and, if pressed, to the absurd conclusion that content is not possible. 
In light of these facts Wittgenstein turns his attentions elsewhere emphasizing 
instead the role of practices.
But how does Wittgenstein’s appeal to practices contribute to the solution 
or dissolution of the problem of content? Hurley suggests that in order to 
understand how the appeal to practices goes beyond intermediates in responding 
to the problem of content we need to appreciate the significance of the 
symmetrical nature of our problem - i.e., that the problem of content arises 
symmetrically for intention and experience together.536 In responding to this 
symmetry Hurley has argued for a constitutive interdependence between intention
534 A 133; B 172 * (i.e......“judgment is a particular talent which can be practiced only, and cannot
be taught.”) Immediately following a footnote in which Hurley refers to this same quote. She 
writes: “These remarks seem to anticipate Wittgenstein; did Kant fully appreciate their import?" 
(p. 243 n. 22) In light of our investigations it seems that support could be found for both 
alternatives.
535 C l,  for example, L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, §§ 197-202, pp. 80-1, and § 265, pp. 93-4
536 C l  Hurley, p. 222.
and experience (or action and perception). In the context of an analysis of 
Wittgenstein’s critique of intermediates - in which cognizing intentions are 
conceived of as, or at least analogous to, “rules”, and experiences are conceived 
of as, or analogous to, “applications” - a constitutive interdependence between 
intention and experience implies a constitutive interdependence between a rule 
and its application. If a constitutive interdependence exists between a rule and 
its application then a “rule” and its “application” may simply be two ways of 
conceiving of one “practice”. Hurley clarifies and finds support for such an 
interpretation of Wittgenstein in the writings of Baker and Hacker. They write:
The apparent logical gulf between a rule and its ‘extension’ arises from the 
mistaken assumption that understanding a rule is at least partly independent 
of how it is projected on to actions. But however it is formulated or 
explained a rule is understood only if it is correctly projected.537 38
Hence, as they suggest elsewhere: “This rule would not be the rule that it is, if this 
act were not in accord with this rule. Because the relation is internal, no 
intermediary can be interposed between its two terms to effect a connection.”539 
And now if, as Hurley continues: “An internal relation is a relation of 
interdependence that runs to the very identity of the items in question” we are led 
to consider the possibility that the content of a rule (through which it may be 
understood) and the content of its application (in action) can only be 
“interdependently individuated” and “are not two independent items”.540 In other
537 Cf., for example, Wittgenstein, § 148, p. 58, § 197, p. 80, and § 205, p. 82.
538 Baker and Hacker, 1985, p. 97;... in ibid., pp. 235-6,
539 Baker and Hacker, 1985, p. 91, in ibid., p. 235.
540 Nevertheless Hurley writes: “These remarks lead us to consider the possibility that the content 
of a rule someone understands and intends to follow, and the set o f acts that constitute acting on it, 
are not two independent item s.... A parallel view about perceptual content would deny that the 
content of a perceptual experience is constitutively independent of the worldly objects o f
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words, it seems possible that the content * through which some rule y  is 
understood is constitutively dependent upon, or is identical with, the content of its 
application z. As a result we are led to consider the possibility that y, and z, 
although different conceptual isolates, are ultimately the same “entity/practice” 541
Through elucidating this contemporary Wittgensteinian line of thought in 
the context of her investigations Hurley is able to lend further support to her own 
arguments for the constitutive interdependence of intention and perception But 
we can observe that this line of thought is also consistent with some of the other 
philosophies that we have investigated. In chapter one, for example, we observed 
that in the first Critique the Kantian account of the possibility of content relies on 
the spontaneous application of a priori concepts to intuitions.542 Since these 
“concepts” are atemporal543 the “judgments” through which the manifold is united 
require their immanent synthesis and employment each time the understanding is 
confronted with an “intuition”.544 In other words, on Kant’s account, every time 
the understanding is faced with a presentation (i.e., an intuition) suitable 
schematizing “concepts” must spontaneously arise within the context of uniting 
the manifold.545 Hence, the “concepts” seem only to acquire content within the 
context of their application in “judgment”. And now if we take seriously Kant’s 
suggestion that such “concepts” are a priori “rules” (of the understanding) we are
perception. What we can call a broadly contextualist view o f Wittgenstein is suggested in work by 
McDowell, and by others.” (p, 236) This is, of course, a perfectly reasonable conventional level 
rendering o f  an ultimate level truth. An alternative approach would be simply to symmetrically 
presuppose the possibility o f content.
341 Since no act can determine its own content and no rule can provide its own guidance, Hurley, 
as we have seen, rejects the idea that the “activity” responsible for content is intentional 
suggesting instead that it be conceived of as “happenings" which reach out to include the 
environment (i.e., content) without presupposing it (cf. ibid., p. 241).
542 A  68-9/B 93-4, ibid., p. 122-3; A 79/B 105, p. 131; cf. also A 126, p. 171.
543 B 159, Pluhar, p, 196.
544 Cf. A 86/B 118, ibid., p. 143; A 126-8, p. 171-3; B 148-9, pp. 188-9.
545 It is this task, which in the third Critique, Kant assigns to reflective judgment.
led to the same possibility to which Hurley, via Baker and Hacker, have led us - 
i.e., that the content of a rule (through which it is understood and identified) and 
its application (in “judgment”) are two isolates of one “practice”, or “judgment”.
Here we can observe that if providing a satisfactory response to the 
problem of content were to require taking seriously the “substantival unity” of 
these isolates (e.g., of “rule” and “act”, “concept” and “intuition”, “intention” and 
“experience”, etc.) then an account in terms of two relata and a functioning 
intermediate is inappropriate not only because it leads to an infinite regress but 
also because it does not accurately reflect reality.546 This is a point with which 
both Wittgenstein and Hurley would undoubtedly agree. An intermediate is, of 
course, some * through which two other things y  and z are related in order to 
perform a function. Hence, the suggestion that an intermediate jc might be 
functioning between some y and z requires that each participant is, at least to some 
extent, determinate at the moment of their interaction.547 But if no content can be 
provided to these apparent determinates within the cognizing process because 
they are mere isolates of a unitary “this” then there are no determinates between 
which an intermediate can be interposed prior to a unity of conscious (i.e., the 
appearance of a “this”). Since there can be no intermediates a response to the 
problem of content in terms of intermediates simply does not accurately model the 
“phenomenon” under investigation.548
546
For an approach to mating the same point based on consideration o f  language see Williams
summary of one of Mi pham s arguments (pp. 138-142) 6 b ams
*> A s a result an appeal to intermediates in responding to the problem o f  content simply bens the 
quest,on. This wdl apply equally cases where the relevant entities are con ce iv ed T ro te  ani 
acts, or pure concepts and intuitions. “ ru es ana
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This line of thought leads us to back to some Buddhist considerations, 
which were mentioned in chapter 4. In our investigation of manas as “the one 
which has the form (-ákára) of conceiving (manyana) by way of the notion of “I” 
(ahañkára) and the feeling of identity (asmimána)”549 we observed two perhaps 
not wholly incompatible ways of viewing the role of an ákára.55° First, we 
suggested that one may view an ákára as an intermediate - a form or aspect 
through which an object is cognized or rendered possible. In this case 
consciousness functions by means of the ákára, which stands, in some sense, 
between the subject and world. This model leads ultimately to an infinite regress. 
Second, we suggested that one may see an appeal to an ákára as a way of 
referring to the reflexive nature of Consciousness itself - that is, to a kind of self- 
consciousness (svasamvedana or svasamvitti, rang rig) which is comparable to 
Kant’s notion of the original synthetic unity of apperception, insofar as one does 
not conceive of apperception as implying or involving an “act” of a separate 
consciousness.551 From this perspective we observed that it is possible to identify 
the ákára with both the subject and the object, since the subject and object can be 
argued to be two “aspects”, or ways of conceiving, the same 
“consciousness/entity”.552 In other words an ákára can be conceived of as two
549 Once again, Schmithausen translates this early “statement of identity” from the VinSg Slay. 
Treatise (7.1A.2.2c), pp. 150-1).
550 Cf. chapter 4, p. 125, n. 270 above.
551 Cf. G. B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality :DharmakTrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan 
Interpretations, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997, pp. 335-41 .
552 On Dharmakîrti’s analysis, for example, each unified consciousness contains both an objective 
aspect (grähyäkära, bzung rnam) and a subjective aspect (grähakäkära, ’dzin rnam) (Paul 
Williams, The Reflexive Nature o f Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defense Surrey Curzon 
Press, 1998, p .339).
isolates of one “entity/consciousness” - in some non-ultimate sense.553 As Dreyfus 
writes:
Akura is the aspect of the object in consciousness as well as the aspected 
consciousness itself. The implication of this analysis is that perception is 
inherently reflexive.... Awareness takes on the form of an object and 
reveals that form by assuming it. Thus, in the process of revealing external 
things, cognition [i.e., consciousness] reveals itself.”554
On such reasoning there is a very real sense in which self-consciousness is not 
different from consciousness of, for example, a table.555 But how can such a 
reflexively self-revealing self-consciousness be employed in a response to the 
problem of content?
In the first chapter of her book Hurley considers the idea that self- 
consciousness can be characterized in terms of “reflexivity”. But after a very brief 
examination of a few uses of the term she abandons it suggesting that it ‘‘is not in 
itself a helpful conception of self-consciousness. It can be interpreted in too many 
ways and lends itself to confusions.”556 There is, as we will see, some truth to this
553 Cf., Williams, p. 179. Cf. also Guy Newland writes: - ‘“To say two things are different isolates 
is to make only the most minimal distinction between them. Since conceptual consciousnesses 
often operates under the sway o f language, things are different isolates as soon as they are given 
different names - even if  those names refer to the same object.’ Thus activity, agent and action 
must be different isolates and we can operate with that difference even if they are referring to the 
same thing, viz. an undivided self-awareness.... There is only a problem in self-awareness if we 
think that the ‘x is aware of y ’ model requires a substantival difference between x and y in order 
for one to occupy the subject and the object slot, this conceptual difference can be quite minimal, 
represented simply by different name-tokens (in English we can use V  or ‘one’ in the subject slot, 
and ‘oneself in the object slot), and that minimal difference only requires different isolates. 
Different isolates means conceptual difference, not substantival difference.” (G. Newland, The 
Two Truths, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1991, p. 60, in Williams, p. 145 n.28; cf. also p. 141) Cf. 
also our discussion of Eckhart in chapter 3, §3.
554 Dreyfus, p. 339, brackets mine.
555 Cf. Williams, p. 132.
556 Hurley, p. 37. She continues: “We would do better to use the related but more specific 
conceptions o f perspective self-consciousness, access, self-evidence, and incorrigibility." (p. 37)
claim. But there is also an important sense in which the concept of reflexivity may 
be central to a satisfactory understanding of self-consciousness. Moreover, as 
Williams demonstrates in his book The Reflexive Nature o f Awareness, it is 
possible to bring a good deal of clarity to such a notion of self-consciousness. 
Through a close examination of lines of thought associated with, what Tibetan 
doxographers refer to as, §antarak$ita’s Yogagacara-Svatantrika Madhyamaka, 
Williams considers arguments concerned with the possibility that a sense of self- 
consciousness as fundamentally reflexive is essential to a satisfactory response to 
the problem of content.557 In the course of his examinations he discerns two 
senses of self-consciousness, which, he argues, are central to responding to the 
problem of content, and which exist widely but sometimes ambiguously in both 
Buddhist and Western philosophy.558 These two senses he refers to variously as 
self-awareness (i), or reflective self-consciousness, and self-awareness (ii), or 
reflexive self-consciousness.
Williams begins his analysis with the observation that reflective self- 
consciousness always provides an awareness of a subjective aspect) relative to an 
objective aspect). One might say that it is a self-consciousness, which in 
accompanying one’s awareness of all things, in some sense takes the 
consciousness of those things for its object and in so doing renders them 
experiencable. In the case of a consciousness of blue, for example, there appear to 
be three elements: a blue object, the consciousness of blue (or of a blue object), 
and a self-consciousness (the subjective aspect) which takes the “consciousness of
557 Cf. Williams, p. 189. Williams does not use the phrase “the problem o f content" but is, as we 
will see, nonetheless concerned with the problem.
558 The concept with which Williams is most concerned is svasamvedana (Sanskrit) or rang rig 
(Tibetan). The reference to Western philosophy is by way of commentary (p. 238).
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blue” (the objective aspect) as an object.559 With respect to this type of self- 
consciousness Williams writes: “What self-awareness, self-consciousness, is 
aware of here is its own (object-taking) consciousness.... it is the result of a 
subjective aspect) aware of a conceptually (and also phenomenologically?) 
different objective aspect).”560 In such cases the subjective aspect is intended to 
function as mediating consciousness. Self-awareness (i), therefore, is perhaps 
most naturally associated with an intentional model of “cognition” in which an 
agentic self-consciousness, by means of a cognizing activity (directed towards an 
“object”), permits a resultant action (i.e., some content). Unfortunately, as we 
have seen repeatedly, this tri-partite model of self-consciousness leads ultimately 
to (various forms of) an infinite regress. As Williams observes, for the Buddhist 
philosopher ¿antarak$ita, avoiding this inevitability requires a rejection of the 
model of self-consciousness that leads to it.
According to 6antarak§ita, the problem of conceiving of the functioning of 
self-consciousness on the model of agent and activity is simply that such a model 
“regards what is by nature a partless unity [as] a threefold division (into action - 
‘that which is done’ - agent, and activity - the actual doing)”.561 Self- 
consciousness, he suggests, renders things known within a self-validating and 
non-dualistic “reflexivity”. Its inherent nature is such that it “illuminates” without 
need of an act and so is self-validating in a way that does not lead to an infinite
559 Cf. ibid., pp. 20-2.
560 Ibid., p. 9.
561 Tattvasamgraha v. 2000 in Williams, pp. 29-30. In his elucidation o f reflexive self- 
consciousness Williams frequently refers to éântarakçita - an 8th century representative of the 
Mädhyamika tradition who was greatly influential on the development o f madhyamaka in Tibet. 
As the purpose of this dissertation is not the historical explication of the views of Buddhist 
philosophers and their critics we have limited our historical references to brief acknowledgments 
o f the source philosophers.
regress.562 563The most common metaphor used to explain reflexive self- 
consciousness is that of a lamp which in its “illumination” of objects is held to 
function without dependence on them. Reflexive self-consciousness is, as 
Williams writes, “self-referring in a non-objective way, just as a lamp illuminates 
itself not as one object among others to be illuminated, but through the very act of 
being a lamp, an illuminator of others.” Thus, in the case of the consciousness 
of blue, for example, Santarak§ita would argue that there is only one “act” (which 
is not an act) out of which can be identified two “items” or isolates - “seeing” and 
“blue”. Since “seeing” (the interpreting) and blue (the interpretation) are mere 
isolates of the same unity the “functioning” of reflexive self-consciousness does 
not involve the case of an interpretation interpreting itself.564 Reflexive self­
562 Cf. ibid., for example, p. 20, p. 23, pp. 27-31, and chapter 4, p. 133-4 above. áantarak$ita 
writes: “All consciousness, cognitions (citta) and feelings (caitta) irrespectively are known by 
themselves, that is to say, they are self-transparent and self-luminous. Consciousness is 
diametrically opposed to matter in this that it is of the nature of illumination like the luminary in 
the firmament, whereas matter is veiled and hidden by a constitutional darkness. The being of 
consciousness is its illumination, its self-luminosity, and so it cannot be unknown. Consciousness, 
thus, differs from dead, unfeeling and unthinking matter, which has no light in itself. The 
immateriality o f consciousness carries with it the prerogative of self-revelation and does not 
connote any subject-object relation in its constitution, which its very immateriality precludes. 
Matter alone can be divided and consciousness can be consciousness only if it refuses to be split 
up into compartments, which the subject-object relation involves. So self-luminosity of 
consciousness and self-consciousness, therefore, are interchangeable terms.” (Tattvasatrtgraha áls. 
2000-2001 in Mookerjee, pp. 319-20) Cf. also where Williams writes: "Of course, ‘illumination’ 
here refers to illumination by consciousness, for which the illumination of a lamp serves as a 
metaphorical example. We have seen that even the illumination of a lamp depends on 
consciousness in order to render it knowable, in a way the consciousness itself does not. Also 
there should be no confusion between the self-validating nature of consciousness (i.e., that one 
cannot be in doubt whether one is conscious or not, whether one is experiencing at all), and a 
claim that experiences are self-verifying (i.e., that all or certain experiences are indubitable). The 
categories may overlap, but we are not concerned here with claims of self-verification.” (p. 24 n. 
5) Hence, a pre-reflective self-validating self-consciousness [the nature o f  consciousness] should 
not be confused with a reflective self-verifying self-consciousness [a pure fiction],
563 Ibid., p. 20. Note also that in a footnote Williams observes: “Geshe Kelsang comments that 
‘clarity’ [luminosity] refers to the nature of the mind [consciousness], while ‘cognizes’ 
[awareness] refers to its function.” (Geshe Kelsang Gyatso. Understanding the Mind, London: 
Tharpa Publications, 1993, p. 16, in Williams, p. 26 n. 10) This division would appear to 
correspond well to the two parts of the pratitya-samutpdda series as they were described in 
chapter 4. Svasamvedana, considered from the perspective of its ability to respond to the problem 
of content, would seem to be an alternative to the pratítya-samutpáda series.
564 In order to understand more clearly what they have in mind consider that in the hypothetical 
case o f “pure consciousness” (i.e., consciousness that is not o f anything) since reflexive self- 
consciousness is fundamentally unitary it would, in some sense, continue to exist. In other words,
consciousness, or self-awareness (ii), is not in itself intentional, does not in itself 
involve consciousness o f anything and, therefore, does not in itself involve 
consciousness of (it)self.565 It is held to be capable of providing information about 
... (e.g., the self, states of a person or animal, objects) precisely because it does not 
rely on an intentional aboutness. Hence, for Santarak$ita, as is also the case for 
follower Mi pham,566 reflexivity is the inherent nature of consciousness and a 
necessary postulate if the problem of an infinite regress is to be avoided in 
providing an account of how experience is possible.567 568
Perhaps Mi pham puts the matter most concisely when he argues along the 
following lines: If the possibility of experience were to require a self- 
consciousness in which a subjective aspect) related to an objective aspect) an 
infinite regress would result, and experience would not be possible. Experience 
clearly is possible so self-consciousness does not essentially involve such a
¿ ¿ a
relationship. But this line of argument makes it clear that the postulation of
since reflexive self-consciousness essentially does not involve two things its existence would seem 
not to require the taking of an object. As Williams writes: “The issue of an object is not relevant 
to reflexivity qua reflexivity.” (p. 21) The same, however, cannot be said of reflective self- 
consciousness where the absence o f an object o f consciousness would mean that “there would also 
be no self-awareness (i), for there could be no case of a subjective aspect taking as an object the 
objective aspect, since there could be no objective aspect.” (p. 30)
565 Cf. ibid., pp. 31-2.
566 Mi pham was perhaps the most important Nyingmapa (one of the four principal schools of 
Tibetan Buddhism) scholar o f  the late nineteenth century.
567 Williams suggests that £antarak§ita’s model of reflexivity is precisely intended to avoid an 
infinite regress (p. 31 n. 17, and, p. 32). $antarak?ita maintains that the postulation of self- 
consciousness as reflexive “is necessary at some point (and the sooner the better) in order to 
prevent an infinite regress...” (ibid., p. 6). Note also that for §antarak$ita it is also that which 
differentiates sentience from insentience. Williams writes: “The idea of portraying self-awareness 
as the quality of consciousness understood as the reverse of insentience {bems po) may well have 
originated with £antarak$ita.” (p. 25)
568 Although Mi pham does not appear to take into consideration the “symmetrical nature o f the 
problem” his argument can be straightforwardly extended to intentional “content” (Cf. ibid., p. 
137). In light o f the suggestion that the notion o f a unitary self-revealing consciousness is both 
incoherent and inconceivable Williams writes: “... Mi pham’s criterion for applying this strategy is 
that the reflexive nature o f awareness is clearly evident and therefore well-known at least at some 
level in worldly transaction. A critical analysis which shows something clearly evident and 
accepted in worldly transaction not to be the case must be an ultimate analysis.” But Mi pham is 
not arguing for the Ultimate existence o f reflexive self-consciousness. “Mi pham’s approach is
234
self-consciousness as reflexive does not so much offer an explanation of how 
experience is possible as a description of a formal condition of its possibility.569 
To say that self-consciousness is reflexive is to say that if there is experience then 
inasmuch as any experience involves self-consciousness that self-consciousness is 
reflexive, because such is what any self-consciousness must be in order to avoid 
the relevant infinite regress(es) and hence, to render experience (or content) 
possible. In this respect the postulation of reflexive self-consciousness is akin to 
Kant’s postulation of that self-consciousness which he calls the original synthetic 
unity of apperception.570
Also like Kant’s original apperception is the fact that reflexive self- 
consciousness is not merely a formal condition of experience but is rather a reality
purely structural. He is not committed to any complex conclusions, ramifications and implications 
which his opponent might wish to insist follow from his acceptance of reflexivity conventionally.’’ 
(pp. 130-1) For those interested in the details of Mi pham’s arguments see, for example, ibid., pp. 
127-34.
569 Cf. ibid., pp. 132-3. In her chapter on Wittgenstein and the significance of practice Hurley 
observes that some nonskeptical views on the import of the regress view it as part o f a 
transcendental argument concerning the conditions under which content, or “aboutness’’, is 
possible. Such arguments point out that, as Hurley’s writes: “Aboutness is possible; but it 
wouldn’t be if  it depended only on interpretation or similar intermediaries; therefore it doesn’t.”
(p. 225) Although Hurley is sympathetic to the conclusion o f this form o f argument she is quick to 
point out that it is of little assistance in identifying what the needed item is. Mi pham’s argument 
is o f this general form but it goes beyond the criticism of intermediates to suggest that the whole 
underlying model of how content is possible is flawed. The “activity” which in the end permits me 
to, for example, to “imagine a red flower” is simply not relational. It is, more particularly, not an 
awareness of... in which: step 1) I ... step 2) imagine.... step 3) a red flower. Instead “I”,
“imagine”, and “a red flower” all appear to be isolates of a self-revealing reflexivity which in a 
fundamental sense is the red flower. This line of argument permits Mi pham to argue that the 
needed item is quite simply a non-intentional self-revealing self-consciousness - that is, a reflexive 
self-consciousness that reveals the subjective aspect) and objective aspect) simultaneously and 
without relying on any activity.
570 See the discussion of the I think in chapter 5. Strawson, once again, suggests that;
“The objection we have been considering turned, in its original form, on the point that the 
ascription of states to a subject required the subject itself to be an intuitable object for which there 
existed empirically applicable criteria o f identity. The requirement which underlies the objectivity- 
condition, however, is not exactly that experience should be ascribable to such a subject, but that it 
should have a certain character o f self-reflexiveness which is expressed by Kant in terms of the 
notion of self-consciousness. The expression is not altogether happy because we are immediately 
led by it to think in terms of personal self-consciousness and hence in terms o f the full conditions 
for ordinary empirical self-ascription of experiences. But what is intended is something less than 
this, which yet really does constitute the essential core of personal self-consciousness.” (p. 107)
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which, although it can in itself be neither experienced nor perhaps even 
understood, can be known to be witb(in) every experience. As Mi pham suggests,
even though there exists in the world quite unmistakably and without error a 
mere reflexivity, if one were to investigate the conceptually-constructed 
object according to how it is that it is aware of itself there would not be 
found anything truly-established but merely unexamined worldly renown.
The sort of critical investigation which tries to find out how a basic datum 
like reflexivity can possibly be eventually fails. It is not claimed that 
reflexivity is resistant to that sort of investigation - there is no claim that 
svasamvedana is truly established. It exists simply from the perspective of
« 571worldly convention,....
In other words, to observe that self-consciousness is reflexive is to recognize from 
one’s experience that the inherent nature of experience is such that in one “act”, 
which involves no intentional activity, there is awareness of both a subjective 
aspect) and an objective aspect) - a fact, Williams suggests, which renders the 
question of whether consciousness is reflexive or not “an empirical issue (perhaps 
an issue of science - the nature of consciousness,...)”. 5712
571 Ibid., p. 133. By suggesting that svasamvedana is not being claimed to be “truly established” 
Mi pham means there is no claim that it is established as an “inherent existent” (svabhdva) - a 
something which is not co-dependently originated (e.g., Absolute Mind). But Mi pham is also o f  
the opinion that there is, in a sense, more to svasamvedana than its conventional existence (cf. 
ibid., pp. 208-210).
572 Williams, p. 34. Since following Mi pham’s arguments in detail would require a lengthy and
unnecessary aside I leave it to the reader to refer to William’s text. For a summary and review of 
possible objections see in particular, ch. 8, pp. 183-216. Note that on Mi pham’s line of thought 
the alayavijnana and its functions might also be an appropriate subject o f  empirical inquiry. 
Williams writes: “Mi pham wants to say, that interpreted correctly the substratum [alayavijnana] 
and reflexive nature o f consciousness appear to be appropriate understandings of how (of course 
conventionally) the world is.” (p. 185) ’
But if the issue of the nature of self-consciousness is empirical this raises 
the question of to what extent its functioning can be understood and explicated. 
Could the power of dynamics be employed to provide insight into the functioning 
of a reflexive self-consciousness - a self-consciousness which “illuminates” 
without the need of any relational activity between a subjective aspect) and an 
objective aspect)? Since reflexive self-consciousness is apparently not intentional 
it would seem reasonable to suggest that its functioning could be characterized as 
a kind of “happening”. But as we have seen reflexive self-consciousness, in 
responding to the problem of content, avoids the otherwise inevitable infinite 
regress(es) because it does not depend on any relational activity between a 
subjective aspect) and an objective aspect). Consequently, the suggestion that 
reflexive self-consciousness is a “happening" cannot refer to any process that 
occurs on the personal level. Hence if dynamics were to attempt to shed light on 
reflexive self-consciousness, and so provide a satisfactory response to the problem 
of content, it would seem to be faced with the problem of how an “illumination 
without any activity” on the personal level could be instantiated by sub-personal 
systems of natural causal relations which are not isomorphic with personal level 
distinctions.573 In other words, how content (whether intentional or experiential), 
in which a subjective aspect) appears with an objective aspect), could be held to 
emerge from such systems. How this would be accomplished in a manner that 
does not presuppose content is, as we have argued, difficult to imagine.574
573 Such that what must be conceived of as personal level “inactivity” could be seen to be a 
function o f subpersonal activity.
574 In elucidating the central issues with which she is concerned Hurley contrasts metaphors for the 
way in which philosophers and scientists conceive o f the unity o f consciousness. She writes: 
“Philosophers, and some scientists, tend to think o f a unified consciousness as like a kind o f  
interface between perceptual input and behavioral output, which remain in principle separable. But 
many scientists tend to think of unity as more like the twisting together o f the strands o f  a rope,
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6. J. N. Mohanty has observed that although thought is naturally conceived 
as a mode of disclosure the fact that “action could be considered a mode of 
disclosure is less often recognized.”575 Hurley has clearly recognized this fact and 
has, moreover, contributed significantly to our understanding of how it might be 
so. But Mohanty also argues that the discovery that the subjective aspect) and 
objective aspect) always occur together and as inseparable in one “act” is 
ultimately dependent on a non-intentional “pure” self-consciousness which is not 
available for inspection in either mode of disclosure.576 The “activity” of this self- 
luminous consciousness, like that of Kant’s original unity of apperception, and 
Eckhart’s One, although somehow constituting the core of self-consciousness, 
does not appear to introduce any sense of temporality. Hence, “activity” here 
carries with it a meaning closely akin to function. “Objectivity”, Mohanty argues, 
“is ‘constituted’ within the field of pure consciousness, inasmuch as the former
where each strand displays continuity of sensory and motor aspects. As well as being composed of 
twisted strands, the rope’s length coils back upon itself through time in complicated branches, 
backward loops, and reciprocal links. The strands of consciousness often pull apart in a way 
inconsistent with the interface picture. Instead of input or output separately coming unplugged 
from the interface, the links between particular types of conscious experience and action may 
remain strong, but the various perception/action strands unravel, as in a rope that has lost its 
twist.” (p. 183) “The general hypothesis at issue”, she suggests, “corresponds to the twisted rope 
metaphor, as opposed to the metaphor o f the input-output interface:...” (p. 206). On the twisted 
rope metaphor each reflexively continuous strand sustains a high degree o f unity, or autonomous 
integrity, such that content can be understood to be a “function” of the activity o f such strands. If a 
reflexive self-consciousness could be instantiated by the activity of such “strands” dynamical tools 
would be appropriate to the task of providing a response to the problem o f content.
575 J. N. Mohanty, Phenomenology and Ontology, Martinus Nijhoff: The Haag, 1970, p. 27. He 
goes on to cite Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, and Nicolai Hartmann as having been 
fundamental contributors to this insight.
576 Mohanty writes: “The unique particular (physical object) and the unique individual (person) 
are identified not through theoretic contemplation but through practical relationships.” (p. 100) In 
which case, he suggests, both are discovered together and as inseparable. For an interesting related 
discussion see Williams long footnote on Mi pham’s views concerning a truly nonconceptual 
Ultimate as ‘a mere gnosis which is reflexive awareness’ (n. 8, pp. 199-206). In particular, see 
where, in speaking o f Mi pham’s assertion of a non-conceptual ultimate, he writes, that “it is a 
condition of the existence of a truly nonconceptual entity that one cannot say that it exists. 
Nevertheless it is a condition of praxis and therefore the philosophical system which supports 
certain sorts of praxis that one can, one must, indicate that the nonconceptual entity exists.” (p. 
202) Williams suggests that Mi pham, although not identifying reflexive self-consciousness {'rang 
rig’) with this ‘non-entity’, does not want to distinguish reflexive self-consciousness from it (cf., 
p. 209).
represents a ‘function’ of the latter.” 577 578The question that dynamically minded 
cognitive scientists may need to ask is whether what appears as an atemporal 
“function” on the personal level can be modeled causally (in high-level functional 
terms?) on the subpersonal level without presupposing that which needs to be 
explained. It is certainly conceivable that dynamic approaches to various aspects 
of cognitive functioning could be highly successful and yet still need to rely on a 
notion of reflexive self-consciousness in order to respond satisfactorily to the 
problem of content.
Of course, the scientific community is not likely to be receptive to an 
account of cognitive functioning that includes, as a necessary component, a notion 
of self-consciousness with transcendental implications. If such a component were 
to prove necessary to providing a coherent response to the problem of content 
then science, to the extent that it acknowledged the reality of the problem, would 
seem to be forced to acknowledge the necessity of a “superpersonal level" to 
which its investigatory powers cannot legitimately be applied. If such a
577 Ibid., p. 146. As Mohanty observes with respect to the functioning of Kantian categories: “The 
categories are as such functions, inasmuch as they can be understood as the modes in which the 
transcendental subject ‘acts’. To call these the modes of ‘activity’ of the transcendental subject 
does not carry the sense o f any temporal process in which the transcendental subject issues forth. 
They are called ‘modes of activity’, ‘modes of synthesis’, etc., because they do not stand for static 
faculties.” (p. 146) And with respect to Husserl he writes: “It is interesting to see that this 
functional point of view is not really foreign to the doctrine o f intentionality which forms the basis 
of Husserl’s philosophy. The doctrine of intentionality recognizes conscious ‘acts’ as being 
directed towards some ‘objective’ reference. Now, to call these ‘acts’ is not to introduce any sense 
of temporality. Here ‘act’ means nothing but ‘function’. ... (p. 146) Cf. also Williams pp. 128-9 n. 
9 on §antarak?ita and Mi pham’s denial of the normal transitive activity-agent-action model of 
self-consciousness.
578 Although the comment is perhaps slightly out of context I am reminded here of a passage from 
Spinoza’s Ethics which I include here as note of interest. It reads as follows: “All must surely 
admit that nothing can be or be conceived without God. For all are agreed that God is the sole 
cause of all things, both of their essence and their existence; that is, God is the cause of things not 
only in respect of their coming into being (secundum fieri), as they say, but also in respect of their 
being. But at the same time many assert that that without which a thing can neither be nor be 
conceived pertains to the essence of the thing, and so they believe that either the nature of God 
pertains to the essence o f created things or that created things can either be or be conceived 
without God; or else, more probably, they hold no consistent opinion. I think that the reason for 
this is their failure to observe proper order o f philosophical inquiry. For the divine nature, which
component were to prove unavoidable it would imply the kind of limitation on 
knowledge envisioned by Kant579 and would perhaps place that through which 
content is rendered possible squarely in the realm of faith.5*0
We began this work by pointing out that the philosophical debate about 
judgment has been informed almost entirely by the distinction between practical 
and theoretical domains. Mohanty suggests that this distinction may be regarded 
as a pale reflection of the distinction between empirical and transcendental on the 
level of secular philosophizing.581 Our investigations would seem to lend some 
support to this claim. But it also seems to be true that philosophizing, to the extent 
that it can do work, must remain within the realm of the secular for it must rely on 
what is “unhidden”, or can be rendered “unhidden”, to those who instantiate its 
praxis. As Wittgenstein reminds us: “Philosophy simply puts everything before 
us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. - Since everything lies open to 
view there is nothing to explain. For what it hidden, for example, is of no interest 
to us.”582 Since to step into the realm of faith is, it seems, to step into the realm of 
the “hidden” it is consequently to step out of the philosophical playing field. 
Philosophical performances conducted in the realm of faith run a high risk of 
being unintelligible indulgences. But this does not entail that philosophers cannot
they should have considered before all else - it being prior both in cognition and in Nature - they 
have taken to be last in the order of cognition, and the things that are called objects of sense they 
have taken as prior to everything. Hence it has come about that in considering natural phenomena, 
they have completely disregarded the divine nature. And when thereafter they turned to the 
contemplation of the divine nature, they could find no place in their thinking for those fictions on 
which they had built their natural science, since these fictions were of no avail in attaining 
knowledge of the divine nature. So it is little wonder that they have contradicted themselves on all 
sides.” (B. Spinoza, The Ethics and Selected Letters, trans. S. Shirley, Hackett Publishing Co., 
Proposition 10,1982, p. 69-70.)
579 Cf. B xxx, Pluhar, p. 31.
580 Mohanty suggests that this pure non-intentional self-consciousness “cannot even be a 
phenomenological notion and can at best be postulated by an act o f faith.” (p.48)
Í81Ibid.,p. 103.
582 Wittgenstein, § 126, p. 50.
know anything about the nature of the transcendental. It only suggests that they 
should not expect their discourses to be understood by any but those who already 
share their reality. In our investigations we have pointed to a reality that seems to 
lies outside of all possible experience. But this reality, which reason seems both to 
require and to forbid, Eckhart describes as an “unhidden truth”.583 It is at this 
point that I remain, puzzled.
583 Cf. Schilrmann, pp. 219-220.
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